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HUSKED AND 'NAKED' GRAIN

WHEN classical scholars use the term 'spelt' to translate such words as ζειά (ζέα) and ὅλυρα in Greek, and *far*, *ador*, *semen* (*adoreum*), *arinca*, and the like in Latin, they seldom realize that all these words denote grains which are nowadays included in the genus wheat. Within this genus a distinction is made between 'husked' and 'naked' species: naked wheat can be 'threshed out'¹ on the threshing-floor, the grain being separated from the chaff and left ready for milling; husked wheat has before milling to undergo a separate hulling operation to free the grain from the husks, or cover glumes, by which it is enclosed and which so tightly adhere to it that the rachis (i.e. stem of the ear) breaks before the grain is freed. The term 'spelt', when used in the way described, denotes the husked wheats, while 'wheat' is reserved for the translation of the names (*trypós*, *triticum*, *siligo*) of the naked species.²

Botanically the distinction between husked and naked grain, which applies to all cereals and not only to wheat, is not fundamental: it depends merely on how the characteristics of two parts of the plant, rachis and cover glumes, are related to each other. (If the rachis is sufficiently tough and the cover glumes sufficiently loose the grain is naked and vice versa.) But although it is now recognized that a husked species may be more closely related to a naked than to another husked species the distinction between husked and naked grain is of very great practical importance. The separate hulling operation is both inconvenient and costly; husked grain may be difficult to harvest;³ it has to be stored, transported, and sown in its husks,⁴ with the result that it is more expensive to handle than naked grain; and, most important of all, the hulling process, which is sometimes—and was in antiquity—inevitably combined with roasting,⁵ may not leave the grain itself unaffected, but may make it unsuitable for some uses, and especially for leavened bread. Consequently it is not surprising to find that this distinction, which until quite recently was thought important enough to divide the genus wheat into two genera,⁶ should figure prominently in ancient writings also, though on the face of it the ancient evidence is not always what we should expect. It is the purpose of the present article to examine this evidence.

In the wild state husked grain is better able to withstand the hazards of natural selection, but in view of its numerous drawbacks attempts have long been made in cultivation to develop naked species wherever possible. The success of these efforts has been limited, and outside the wheat family only

¹ Cf. *exteruntur* in No. 14 of the passages listed below: this does not imply (pace N. Jasny, *The Wheats of Classical Antiquity*, p. 156) that husked grains were not threshed at all.

² The very name *triticum* denotes 'threshable', i.e. naked, grain.

³ Because the ear may shatter before the grain is ripe; cf., for instance, Colum. 2.9.18.

⁴ Cf., for instance, passages No. 9, 14, and 16 below. There must, however, have been some exceptions since Diocletian's *Edit on Maximum Prices* of A.D. 301 (1. 4-8) gives

two prices each for most husked grains, according to whether they were marketed before or after hulling. On the whole subject cf. Jasny, 'Competition among Grains in Classical Antiquity', *Am. Hist. Rev.* xlvi (1941-2), 747 ff.

⁵ This is not usually recognized. To prove it would require an argument too long for the present article. It can be proved (as passage No. 14 suggests), and I hope to do so soon elsewhere.

⁶ *Triticum* and *zea*: Linnaeus was the first to combine them in one genus.

rye and a few varieties of barley are now naked. Among the cultivated wheats, on the other hand, most species—including *triticum vulgare*, from which almost all our bread is made—are naked, the only husked species being *t. monococcum* (einkorn), *t. dicoccum* (emmer), and *t. spelta* (spelt). (Einkorn was known in Greek and Latin as *τίφη* (*tiphe*), and is not normally included when 'spelt' is spoken of, which thus includes *t. dicoccum* and *t. spelta*. Since, however, 'spelt' is also the normal name for *t. spelta*, which was in all probability not known to the classical world until the first century A.D., the use of this word to translate *far*, etc., is undesirable.)

The cultivation of the husked species of wheat is, and has long been, on the wane, and the general direction of the development makes it unlikely that more naked grains were known in antiquity than now, or that any of the kinds which are still generally husked now—such as oats (*βρόμος, avena*) or the millets (*μελίνη, κέγχρος, ἔλυμος, milium, panic(i)um*)—were naked then. Similarly it is probable *a priori* that then as now the majority of barleys (*κριθή, hordeum*) was husked. How does this square with the ancient evidence?

The relevant passages may be listed as follows:

1. Theophr. *H.P.* 8. 4. 1 : ὁ μὲν (πυρὸς) ἐν χιτῶσι πολλοῖς, ἡ δὲ (κριθῆ) γυμνόν· μάλιστα γὰρ δὴ γυμνοσπέρματον ἡ κριθή. πολύτοπον δὲ καὶ ἡ τίφη καὶ ἡ ὄλυρα καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ μάλιστα πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν ὁ βρόμος.
2. Id. *C.P.* 4. 1. 2 : τὰ δὲ τοῦ στόου γυμνά καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ πυροῦ καὶ τῆς κριθῆς· εἰ δὲ μή, χιτῶσι γε περιέχεται λεπτοῖς.
3. Ibid. 4. 6. 3 : πολυχιτῶν δ' εἶναι καὶ τῷ βρόμῳ καὶ τῇ ζεῦῃ συμβέβηκε.
4. Ibid. 4. 13. 4 : καὶ γὰρ γυμνὴ (ἡ κριθῆ) καὶ τὸ ὄλον ἀσθενής, ὁ δὲ (πυρὸς) καὶ ἐν χιτῶσι καὶ πυκνότερον καὶ ἵσχυρότερον.
5. Ibid. 4. 14. 1 : κριθῆς δὲ μᾶλλον (ἡ ἐρυσίβη ἀπτεται) ἡ πυροῦ διά τε τὸ γυμνοτέραν εἶναι τὸν δ' ἐν χιτῶσι πλείουσι.
6. Diosc. *M.M.* 2. 89 Wellmann: ζέα δισσή ἡ μὲν γάρ ἀπλή ἡ δὲ δίκοκκος καλεῖται ἐν δυοῖν ἑλύτροις ἔχουσα συνεξεγμένον τὸ σπέρμα.
7. Gal. 6. 519 Kühn: τὸ δὲ σπέρμα τὸ τῆς τίφης ἔχει μὲν ἔξωθεν λέμα καθάπτερ καὶ ὄλυρα καὶ κριθή. πτισθὲν δὲ ἀρτοποιεῖται καὶ ὄλως εἰς χρῆσιν ἀγετα.
8. Ibid. 520: ὡς ἐν Καππαδοκίᾳ μὲν τὸ καλούμενον γυμνόκριθον (mentioned as a cereal with a composite name, intermediate between the various species enumerated).
9. Varr. *R.R.* 1. 63: far, quod in spicis condideris per messem et ad usus cibatus expedire velis, promendum hieme ut in pistrino pisetur ac torreatur.
10. Ibid. 48. 1: (spica) ea quae mutilata non est, in hordeo et tritico tria habet continentia, granum, glumam, aristam et etiam, primitus cum spica oritur, vaginam. granum dictum quod est intimum soldum; gluma qui est folliculus eius; arista quae ut acus tenuis longa eminent e gluma, proinde ut grani apex sit gluma et arista. arista et granum omnibus fere notum, gluma paucis.
11. Ov. *Med. Fac. Fem.* 53: hordea, quae Libyci ratibus misere coloni, exue de palea tegminibusque suis.
12. Colum. 2. 9. 15: nam et fragili culmo et nulla vestitum palea granum eius (*scil. hordei hexastichi sive cantherini*) celeriter decidit isdemque de causis facilius teritur quam cetera.

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- 13. Plin. *N.H.* 18. 61: tunicae frumento plures: hordeum maxime nudum et arinca set praecipue avena.
 - 14. Ibid.: in area exteruntur triticum et siligo et hordeum; sic et seruntur pura, qualiter moluntur, quia tosta non sunt. e diverso far, milium, panicum purgari nisi tosta non possunt; itaque haec cum suis folliculis serantur cruda. et far in vaginulis suis servant ad satus atque non torrent.
 - 15. Ibid. 112: tunditur granum eius (*sc. zeae*, quam semen appellavimus) in pila lignea . . . excussis inde tunicis iterum isdem armamentis nudata conciditur medulla.
 - 16. Ibid. 298: far, quia difficulter excutitur, convenit cum palea sua condī et stipula tantum et aristis liberatur.

Some of these passages, though apparently relevant, cannot for one reason or another serve as evidence. These are:

(a) No. 2: Theophrastus is here comparing cereals *as a whole* with other fruits, and the distinction between husked and naked grains is too small to be material for the comparison.

(b) No. 10: Varro again is emphasizing similarities rather than differences: cover glumes exist with naked no less than with husked grains, and it is only their behaviour during threshing that is in question.

(c) No. 13: This is too similar to No. 1 to be admissible as separate evidence, though it gives the opposite sense for *arinca* (= ὄλυρα; cf. Plin. *N.H.* 18. 92, etc.) and *avena* (= βρώμος; *Ed. Diocl.* 1. 17). The discrepancy is easily accounted for. Every word in Pliny's sentence is literally translated from Theophrastus, but Pliny condenses a little and omits what he does not consider to be of sufficient interest. (His lack of interest in *tiphe* is shown clearly a few sections later; 18. 93.) If the translation were complete it would include a plant called πολύλοπος, perhaps thus: *hordeum maxime nudum et polylopum et tiphe et arinca et eiusmodi omnia set praecipue avena*. Pliny's information as it stands contradicts all other—ancient and modern—evidence, and since πολύλοπος is a very rare word (confined, according to Liddell and Scott, to Theophrastus) the assumption that Pliny mistook it for a plant name seems justified. The same mistake has again been made in modern times.¹

(d) The admissibility of No. 6 seems questionable. Dioscorides' ζέα ἀπλῆ and ζέα δίκοκκος are almost certainly to be identified with *t. monococcum* and *t. dicoccum* respectively, and the difference between these consists in the number of grains (one or two) contained in each spikelet of the ear. The phrase ἐν δυοῖς ἐλύτροις ἔχοντα συνεζεγμένον τὸ σπέρμα is apparently intended to explain this difference, although it fails to do so accurately. In any case the passage contains nothing to contradict the assumption that both kinds of ζέα were husked grains.

The remainder of the evidence is tabulated in Table I. With the exception of *hordeum* in No. 14, all the statements from No. 7 onwards agree. *Far*, *semen adoremum*, ζεά, ὄλυρα, τίφη, *milium*, *panicum*, and 'normal' κριθή and *hordeum* are husked; *triticum*, *siligo*, and some exceptional *hordea* (κριθαί) are naked. (There is no evidence outside Theophrastus for βρώμος = *avena*, which we should

¹ By Guiraud, *La Propriété foncière en Grèce jusqu'à la conquête romaine* (Paris, 1893) p. 493; cf. Jardé, *Les Céréales dans l'antiquité grecque*, I (Paris, 1925), p. 4, n. 5.

expect to be classed as husked, nor for πυρός, which, as the Greek equivalent of *triticum*, should be one of the naked grains.) We are left, therefore, with Pliny's generic classing of *hordeum* as naked, and with the evidence of Theophrastus which contradicts all the rest.

Pliny himself elsewhere (18. 73) speaks of a *purgatio* of barley which preceded milling and which must—like the *purgatio* of *far* in No. 14—have been a hulling

TABLE I. *The Evidence for Husked and Naked Grains*

<i>Author and passage</i>	<i>With 'coats'</i>	<i>Without 'coats'</i>
THEOPHRASTUS		
(1) . . .	πυρός, τίφη, ὅλυρα, βρόμος	κριθή
(3) . . .	βρόμος, ζειά	
(4) . . .	πυρός	κριθή
(5) . . .	πυρός	κριθή
GALEN		
(7) . . .	τίφη, ὅλυρα, κριθή	
(8) . . .		γυμνόκριθον (presumably)
VARRO		
(9) . . .	<i>far</i> *	
OVID		
(11) . . .	African <i>hordeum</i> *	
COLUMELLA		
(12) . . .		<i>hordeum hexastichum</i> sive <i>cantherinum</i>
PLINY		
(14) . . .	<i>far, milium, panicum</i> *	<i>triticum, siligo,</i> <i>hordeum</i> *
(15) . . .	<i>zea = semen (adoreum)</i> *	
(16) . . .	<i>far</i> *	

In the cases marked * the presence or absence of 'coats' is inferred from the operations to which the grains are subjected.

operation. The barley affected must therefore have been husked. But in the passage in question Pliny is distinguishing Greek from Italian usage. The *purgatio* is mentioned as the practice of Greece, and Italian usage there, as in the present passage, agrees with the assumption that the barley grown in Italy was of the naked or 'deciduous' kind recommended by Columella in No. 12 and in the passage preceding it. Such forms of barley are known, but they are exceptional.¹

It seems certain that Galen's *γυμνόκριθον* was of this kind, just because Galen—unlike any of the other writers—shows by the name which he gives to it that he was aware that a naked barley was exceptional.² Unfortunately we

¹ Cf. A. Schulz, *Geschichte der kultivierten Getreide* (Halle a. d. Saale, 1913), pp. 97 ff. They are found both among the two-rowed and among the six-rowed species, both of which are normally husked: Columella's

hexastichum does not help.

² Schulz (p. 101) mentions a *γυμνοκριθή* which, according to Sprengel, was grown in the late eighteenth century on the island of Zante.

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cannot be equally sure with respect to the barleys mentioned by Pliny and Columella, and Theophrastus' evidence presents a further problem.

On many kinds of barley the cover glumes adhere so closely to the grain that 'they apparently do not exist',¹ so that the grain, which in all other cases is contained in its hull (from which it may or may not be separated during threshing) appears to grow on the plant without any 'coat'. This appearance is made even more deceptive by the fact that barley grains grow each in a separate spikelet with often three spikelets at each node of the rachis, while wheat has single spikelets at each node, each (except in the case of einkorn) containing more than one grain. It is possible, therefore, that some of the ancient writers were led astray by this.

Columella stresses the brittle nature of the straw of his *hordeum hexastichum sive cantherinum* which, he says,² makes early harvesting advisable in order to avoid the shattering of the ear. Since brittle straw is a characteristic of husked rather than naked grain, Columella may have been misled in the way described. But this is made rather less likely than it would otherwise be by the fact that the barley mentioned by Pliny in No. 14 can be 'threshed out' and must therefore be naked.³

The naked varieties of barley are so rare that it is a little difficult to believe that all or most of the barley grown in Italy in the first century A.D. was naked.⁴ Pliny's generic statement is in any case difficult to justify since he himself makes it clear that at least some husked barleys were known to him. It is tempting, therefore, to assume that this generic statement is mistaken and is made under the influence of the information in No. 13 which Pliny derived from Theophrastus (No. 1) and which, as we shall see, must itself be mistaken. If so, it becomes probable that Columella's *hordeum cantherinum* was also a husked grain. But certainty is impossible.

We are left with the evidence of Theophrastus, which is in a somewhat different category. This evidence, which, unlike Pliny's, is internally completely consistent, cannot be explained by the assumption that naked barleys predominated in Greece,⁵ since this explanation does not cover the real difficulty in Theophrastus' statements. This is that, even if all barley was naked, barley cannot have been the only naked cereal known, as Theophrastus would suggest. It is inconceivable that no naked wheat was known in Greece, and we can also be quite certain that naked wheat was called *πυρός*: yet Theophrastus opposes *πυρός* and *κριθή* to each other, but does not differentiate with regard to the possession of *χιτώνες* between *πυρός* and any other kind of cereal. But all the other cereals which Theophrastus classes together with *πυρός* as having 'coats' are known to be husked,⁶ and *κριθή*, his only 'coatless' grain, is at any

¹ Schulz, op. cit., p. 101.

² In the sentence preceding passage No. 12.

³ In 18. 73-74 the Greek barley must be husked, but the Italian might be either husked or naked.

⁴ Yet it is very probable that barley was not an important cereal in Italy at that time. (The detailed argument on this point cannot be given here.) This makes the belief that only naked varieties were grown a little easier.

⁵ Jardé (op. cit., p. 8) thought it could.

⁶ Cf. here Theophrastus' statement (*H.P.* 2. 4. 1) that *τίφη* and *ζειά* change into *πυρός* in three years *ἐὰν πιοθεῖσαι ὀπειρωνται*. This shows that with *τίφη* and *ζειά* a separate hulling operation (which could be omitted before sowing) was known. The statement itself must be mistaken, but it can be explained if the seed-bag contained a percentage of naked-wheat kernels each year. Hulling would damage some of the *τίφη* and *ζειά* kernels each time, and the genuine naked wheat would therefore preponderate in the course of a few years.

rate doubtful. We thus seem compelled to assume both that he regarded as normal a kind of barley which is in fact exceptional, and that in the case of πυρός he made a mistake which cannot easily be explained.

But Theophrastus, like the modern botanist, may not have been primarily concerned with the behaviour of the various grains on the threshing-floor. It may not have mattered to him whether husks are separated from the grain during threshing or not, but rather whether they are present or absent on the plant. If so, he ought to have classed all the grains he mentions—including both husked and naked barleys—as πολύλοποι, since cover glumes are present on them all. His mistake, however, would be confined to barley, and it could be explained by the fact which was mentioned earlier that on many husked varieties of barley the cover glumes are so firmly attached to the grain that they appear to be part of it. Instead of assuming an unaccountable mistake for πυρός, together with a mistake for κριθή which can be explained only if all Greek barleys were naked, we should thus be left with a single mistake which, if Greek barleys were normal, can be explained simply as due to faulty observation. This is surely more probable.

But if this is right it follows—paradoxically enough—that the *naked* varieties of barley were unknown to Theophrastus. On these varieties the cover glumes can be seen as clearly as on wheat, and Theophrastus could hardly have overlooked them. Since, however, naked barleys are, as we have seen, exceptional, it is easy to believe that Theophrastus was unacquainted with them.

The evidence set out earlier in this article looked most confused. It is hoped that this discussion of it has shown that, if we recognize that some (exceptional) naked barley was grown in Cappadocia, and if we allow for the possibility that it was grown also in Italy (though this is more doubtful), the statements of ancient writers contain nothing that need be regarded as inconsistent with the modern evidence on husked and naked grain.¹

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¹ This article, like an earlier one in *C.Q.* xliii (1949), 113 ff., is connected with a study on Milling and Breadmaking in Classical Antiquity which is being undertaken for the National Association of British and Irish Millers and will, it is hoped, be published before long in book form. The writer is

indebted to the Editors of the *C.Q.* for the opportunity of publishing here one part of his argument which is contained in his Oxford D.Phil. thesis on the subject, but would be out of place in the more general book that is contemplated.

'CORN'

In this country and in those with which we are best acquainted, that large part of the human diet which is derived from grain is mainly eaten in the form of bread. Bread, in order to be palatable and digestible, must be leavened; and this means that the dough must be able to retain some of the carbon dioxide gas produced in it by the agency of yeast or some similar substance. Its capacity for doing this depends upon the presence in the grain of a sufficient amount of proteins of such a kind that when mixed with water they form the elastic substance known as gluten. It is largely because wheat—and especially the species of *triticum vulgare* to which all our bread wheats belong—is superior to all other grains in this respect that wheat has become the main bread grain of a large part of the world.

Yet bread has been and is still being made from other cereals also, and in much of central, eastern, and northern Europe rye still occupies the position that is held by wheat in this country. Nor is the cereal part of the diet necessarily consumed in the form of bread: it is true that man cannot, like many animals, eat raw grain, since his equipment for digesting uncooked starch (which is the main constituent of grain) is poor; but all that is required to remedy this is the addition of water and a heating of the resulting 'porridge' to about 140 degrees Fahrenheit, when the starch swells and gelatinizes and becomes digestible. Practically all cereals—barley, oats, rice, maize, sorghum, and the millets, as well as wheat of all kinds and rye—can be cooked in this way,¹ and although bread from wheat has long been the favourite form of staple cereal food it is possible for other cereals also—and even for cereals quite unsuitable for bread—to be the main grain in the human diet, if economic conditions (especially climate, soil, etc.) make wheat difficult to obtain.² The importance of rice and millet in the East and that of sorghum and millet in Africa are obvious examples, and it is well known that in the world of ancient Greece and Rome, too, bread wheat³ did not until comparatively late become the main grain, though it is uncertain when it acquired this importance.⁴

Now it is a striking phenomenon that many languages have words which, after denoting originally either edible cereals in general or even food in general (a meaning which they usually retain later also), have acquired in addition a specialized sense which depends on the particular cereal that forms the basis of the diet in the area in which the language is spoken. The English word 'corn', the French *blé*, and the German *Korn* are familiar instances of this, the

¹ And in some other ways; e.g. in the form of *pasta*.

² On this subject, and on others arising in this article, cf. N. Jasny, 'Competition among Grains in Classical Antiquity', *Am. Hist. Rev.* xlvi (1941–2), 747 ff.; *The Wheats of Classical Antiquity* (The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1944); *Wheat Prices and Milling Costs in Classical Rome* (Wheat Studies of the Food Research Institute, Stanford University, California, vol. xx, no. 4); and, above all, A. Jardé, *Les Céréales dans l'antiquité grecque* (Paris, 1925; only vol. I, *La*

Production, has been published), which, though in some respects superseded by Jasny's work, still contains much that is of value. Grain is, of course, also grown for beverages (e.g. beer, whisky) and as fodder, but this is irrelevant here.

³ This term is here used in a rather unorthodox way to include all 'naked' wheat; cf. the preceding article.

⁴ Cf. Pauly-Wissowa, s. 'Frumentum' (Rostovtzeff), vii. 126 ff.; and—much more recently—s. *Σῖτος* (Heichelheim), Supp.-Bd. vi. 819 ff.

first two in their narrow sense denoting wheat, while the German word is commonly used for rye. The two classical languages also contain such words, and it is the purpose of this article to identify the narrow sense of these words—*σῖτος* and *frumentum*—and, if possible, to trace its emergence.

It is true that with the greater rigidity of language in modern times the specialized meaning of such words may refer to a state of affairs which was, but is no longer, true: 'corn', for instance, is taken to mean oats in Scotland and maize in the United States of America. The picture of social customs reflected by this usage may therefore sometimes be anachronistic. But there was almost certainly less danger of this in antiquity than in our day, and in any case the connexion must have existed at some time for the usage to develop. An investigation of this usage is therefore more than a mere linguistic exercise.

In Homer the word *σῖτος*¹ is contrasted either with liquid nourishment² or with meat³, and it is difficult to decide whether an original meaning of 'food generally' was becoming restricted to 'cereal food' or whether the word properly denoted cereal food and was being loosely used to cover other food also.⁴ Fortunately this point is immaterial here: once meat was distinguished from it, *σῖτος* naturally meant cereals, the main vegetable food.⁵

In the tenth century A.D. 'Suidas'⁶ makes it quite clear that in 'his' opinion this was the correct meaning of the word: *σῖτος*, in other words, is the equivalent of 'corn' in the wider of the two senses of that term. In pointing this out, however, Suidas implicitly admits that in common speech the meaning of *σῖτος* had become restricted to the narrower of the two senses of 'corn', and that in this restricted meaning it denoted *πυρός*, i.e. those wheats which in Latin were known as *triticum*.⁷

When did this narrow meaning emerge? In answering this question it must be borne in mind firstly that there is no reason to assume that the restriction was at any time so complete that the word could no longer be used correctly in the wider sense (i.e. an occurrence of *σῖτος* in the sense of 'grain generally' does not prove the non-existence of the narrow sense), and secondly that we cannot always be sure in which of the two senses the word is used in any given passage.⁸ 'Useful' passages are those where it is clear that the word must have the narrow sense (usually because it occurs in a list side by side with specific names—as in 'corn and barley'—but sometimes for other reasons also) or where there is something in the context to show what the writer meant by *σῖτος*.

The fact that there is no passage in which *σῖτος* and *πυρός* are juxtaposed in the way described justifies the negative conclusion that *σῖτος* never meant 'main grain' to the exclusion of *πυρός* and that it was never possible to speak of

¹ Its etymology is obscure; cf. Boisacq, *Dictionnaire étymologique*⁴, s.v.: Hehn's attempted connexion between it and slav. *žito* (*Kulturpflanzen und Haustiere*⁶, p. 536; cf. Schrader's comments, ibid. 538) cannot be maintained. The initial ante-vocalic *s* suggests a late introduction, but it is interesting to find that the word (and some of its compounds) has been identified in the Minoan Linear B Script.

² *ποτήρις*, *Il.* 19. 306; *Od.* 9. 87; *οἶνος*, *Il.* 19. 705; *Od.* 3. 479; *μέθυ*, *Od.* 4. 745; 7. 264.

³ *κρέα*, e.g. *Il.* 24. 625; *Od.* 9. 6; 12. 18.

⁴ As Jardé, p. 1 f. n. 2.

⁵ Especially since *όδα* were also distinguished from it; e.g. *Od.* 3. 480.

⁶ s.v.: *πᾶς ὁ σιτικὸς καρπός, οὐχ ὁ πυρός μόνον*.

⁷ In one of the two senses of this word; cf. below, p. 140. The *πυρός-triticum-wheat* equation is so well established that the evidence requires no discussion.

⁸ e.g. *Hdt.* 7. 23; *Thuc.* 4. 26. 3.

σῖτος without *πυρός* being included as at least part of its connotation.¹ If, however, we wish to use this line of argument to show positively that *σῖτος* had become the equivalent of *πυρός* we have to find examples of *σῖτος* side by side with all other important grains, especially barley (*κριθή*); and this is not easy since the first clear instances of *σῖτος καὶ κριθή* come from the tenth-century *Geoponica*.² Nothing at all can be quoted from before the late fourth century B.C. (a fact which may or may not be significant), but from then on there are some slight indications.

Theophrastus³ has a 'corn-like' (*σιταρίας*) and a 'barley-like' (*κριθανίας*) plant in close proximity—a nomenclature which would surely be impossible if *σῖτος* were not capable of denoting 'corn' to the exclusion of barley, and which thus comes close to *σῖτος καὶ κριθή*—and some Ptolemaic papyri⁴ clearly mention *σῖτος* as a specific grain, though without showing what grain. But it can hardly be a grain other than *πυρός* and *κριθή*,⁵ and since *πυρός* and *σῖτος* are never both found in the same text, while the value of an artaba of *σῖτος* and one of *πυρός* is the same in at least two of the documents,⁶ it is probable—though far from certain on these grounds alone—that *σῖτος* in these papyri is to be identified with *πυρός*. If so, it seems likely that it had in Hellenistic times acquired the restricted meaning which Suidas condemns.

This has almost imperceptibly brought us to the second of the two criteria suggested—identification by means of the context. Here clear evidence comes from the pseudo-Demosthenic speech against Phormio⁷ which must, whatever be thought about its authorship, belong to the period of Alexander the Great.⁸ In this speech the words *σῖτος* and *πυρόι* are used in the same sentence and obviously with reference to the same grain, so that the two words must have been considered synonymous by the speaker. This passage, in combination with the other evidence, provides a reasonably well-defined *terminus ante quem* for the emergence of the narrow meaning of *σῖτος* in which it is the equivalent of *πυρός*.

This *terminus ante quem* cannot on the extant evidence be moved farther back. Yet even for earlier times linguistic usage provides a guide to the relative importance of cereals. Thucydides⁹ explains *σῖτος* as *πυροί καὶ πεφρυγμέναι*¹⁰

¹ This is not contradicted even by passages like Xen. *An.* 5. 4. 27, where *σῖτος* (evidently in its generic meaning) is specified as *ζειαί αἱ πλεισταί* with reference to one particular store of grain among the Mossynoikoi. Similarly the word *σῖτος* is probably used in its generic sense in Thuc. 7. 87, although we are told by Plutarch (*Nic.* 29) that the grain in question was in fact *κριθή*. On the other hand these passages show that great care is needed in using the context for purposes of this argument.

² *2 introd.*; cf. 3. 1. 10 and Jardé, p. 3, n. 3. All passages where *σῖτος* translates the Latin *frumentum* (e.g. in *σῖτον διανομή* (cf. Cass. Dio 54. 1. 17) for *cura frumenti dandi* and in *Edict. Diocl.* (cf. below, p. 139, n. 10) 1. 1) are ignored at this point since the meaning of *frumentum* is more relevant than that of *σῖτος*: that the two words are normal translations of each other is too certain to need discussion.

³ *H.P.* 2. 3.

⁴ References are given in detail by Jardé, p. 3, n. 2. The present comments on these papyri are based on Jardé's note.

⁵ *Ολύρα* is another grain mentioned in the papyri, but it is ruled out because it is opposed to *σῖτος* in one of them.

⁶ This is significant because a similar measure of barley would normally, owing to the husks, contain less grain, and its price would therefore tend to be lower. (In Diocletian's *Edict* the ratio is 6 : 10.)

⁷ [Dem.] 34. 39: ὅτε δ' ὁ σῖτος ἐπειμήθη τὸ πρότερον καὶ ἔγένετο ἔκκαθεκα δραχμῶν, εἰσαγαγόντες πλείους η μνίους μεδίμνους πυρῶν διεμετρήσαμεν ὑπὲν τῆς καθεστηκυιάς τιμῆς, πέντε δραχμῶν τὸν μεδίμνον.

⁸ The evidence for this is contained in section 38 which presumably refers to the events of 336 B.C.

⁹ 6. 22.

¹⁰ i.e. roasted or parched: this roasting was part of the hulling operation necessary with grains such as barley.

κριθαί on the one occasion on which he explains what he means by the word, which he uses in its generic sense. He mentions two grains and does so in an order which is not accidental. In all enumerations of cereals from Homer onwards¹ *πυρός* always takes pride of place. It is usually followed by *κριθή* with other names sometimes following later, their order—and indeed the names themselves—varying. The order of words in any particular instance might well be accidental, but the great regularity with which this order occurs seems to convey some indication of the relative importance of the various grains and especially of *πυρός* and *κριθή*.

The same arrangement is followed also by Theophrastus in whose classification the term *τὰ οιτώδη* occurs in two different meanings. In the broader of these *οῖτος* καὶ *τὰ οιτώδη* is an immediate sub-group of *τὰ ποιώδη* (herbaceous plants)² and includes also pulses.³ In this sense it appears to be a group name which properly belongs to its most important subdivision only. This subdivision—*τὰ οιτώδη*⁴ in the narrower sense—begins in Theophrastus' list with *πυροί* and *κριθαί* which are followed by some 'non-*πυρός*' wheats⁵ and 'other wheat-like or barley-like plants'.⁶ The last few words again show which were *τὰ οιτώδη par excellence*, and in which order.

The conclusion to which this part of the evidence points seems to be that in fifth-century Greek literature 'corn' was *πυρός* and *κριθή*, with *πυρός* coming first, but that within the next century *κριθή* began to fade out, and the narrow meaning attacked by Suidas became fully established. In Modern Greek *οιάρι* always denotes wheat.

The Latin *frumentum* certainly never had the wide meaning of 'food generally'.⁷ Its obvious etymological connexion with the stem of *fruges* (and 'fruit')⁸ makes it clear that the word must from the outset have denoted vegetable foods, and the jurist Paulus,⁹ who himself defines *frumentum* as 'cereal' (in Theophrastus' narrow sense of *τὰ οιτώδη*), quotes a definition by Servius¹⁰ according to which it approximates closely to Theophrastus' wider class which also includes the pulses.

But although this very broad sense may at one time have been pedantically

¹ Cf. C.Q. xliii (1949), 114. Only in Plat. *Rep.* 2. 372 b does *κριθή* take first place—probably because of its greater 'simplicity'.

² H.P. 7. 1. 1; cf. 1. 3. 1; 6. 1. 1; 7. 9. 3. The other sub-group is *τὸ λαχανῆρον* or *τὸ λαχανῶδες*.

³ *τὰ χεδροπά οίον κύαμος, ἐρέβιθος, πίσος, καὶ δύλος τὰ δόπτρα προσαγορεύουσα καὶ κέγχρος, ἔλυμος, σήσαμον, καὶ ἀπλῶς τὰ ἐν τοῖς θερνοῖς ἀρότροις ἀνόνυμα κοινῇ προστηγορίᾳ*. Some of these (especially the millets, *κέγχρος* and *ἔλυμος*) would now be classified as cereals.

⁴ The use of the word 'corn-like' may itself be significant. If *οῖτος* had not already had a specific sense it could itself have served as the name of the subdivision.

⁵ *τίφαι, ζειαί*—i.e. husked wheats; cf. above, p. 129.

⁶ *τὰ ἄλλα τὰ ὁμοιόπυρα η ὁμοιόκριθα* H.P. 8. 1. 1; cf. C.P. 4. 1. 2; 4. 7. 4; H.P. 8. 6. 4.

⁷ Except possibly when used in a clearly

extended meaning to cover all provisions of, e.g., an army: there can be no question, as there is in the case of *οῖτος*, of its original meaning being 'food generally'.

⁸ Yet Cassiodorus (*in Ps.* 4. 7) and Isidorus (*Dif.* 1. 247) would derive it from *frumen*, the larynx.

⁹ *Dig.* 50. 16. 77: 'Iulianus scribit frumentum id esse quod arista in se teneat, recte Gallum definisse: lupinum vero et fabam fruges potius dici, quia non arista sed silqua continentur, quae Servius apud Alfenum in frumento continerat putat.'

¹⁰ Presumably Servius Sulpicius, the contemporary of Cicero. The commentator Servius, incidentally, includes *frumenta* among *fruges* and not vice versa; *ad Aen.* 1. 178: 'errant qui discernunt frumenta a frugibus. nam . . . etiam frumenta fruges vocari'; cf. *ad Georg.* 1. 74: 'frumenta sunt omnia quae ex se emittunt aristas.'

and legalistically correct—just as our ‘fruit’ in its botanical sense includes much more than we commonly understand by it—there is no evidence that it was ever in historical times accepted by common speech. For the ordinary Roman *frumentum* was ‘corn’ either in the sense of ‘cereal generally’¹ or in that of ‘main grain’.

The emergence of the latter sense, which was difficult to trace for *oīros*, is in Latin much more clearly marked. From the middle of the first century A.D. onwards we find *frumentum* and *hordeum* in the kind of juxtaposition which does not occur with *oīros* and *κριθή* until very late,² so that *frumentum* must by then have been capable of being used in a sense narrow enough to exclude barley. The beginnings of this usage can be seen over a century earlier when Cicero³ uses the words *frumentum* and *triticum* almost synonymously in a way that closely resembles the use of *oīros* and *τυπός* in the pseudo-Demosthenic speech quoted earlier.

Where, instead of *frumentum*, the name of a specific grain precedes *hordeum* in Latin enumerations that name is usually *triticum*,⁴ though *far* (or *semen adorem*), of which more later, is sometimes added either in first⁵ or in second⁶ place. *Frumentum* in the narrower sense must therefore denote either one or both of these grains, and the Cicero passage suggests that it denotes *triticum*. This is confirmed by the occurrence of *frumentum* and *triticum* as variant readings, especially in the Bible translations⁷ in which, moreover, *frumentum* frequently translates the *τυπός* of the Septuagint.⁸

A similar and much earlier instance of such a translation is almost certainly to be found in a passage of the Elder Pliny.⁹ If, as is suggested in the course of the preceding article, Pliny is here translating Theophrastus, he is using *frumentum* to translate Theophrastus’ *τυπός*.

By the end of the third century A.D. the specific sense of both *frumentum* and *oīros* was so well established that even an official document such as Diocletian’s *Edit on Maximum Prices* could use the words instead of the more accurate *triticum* and *τυπός*.¹⁰ In French *froment* is the specific name for wheat, the place of the Latin *frumentum*, in both senses of ‘corn’, being taken by *blé*.

Finally one other case—to which, incidentally, there is no parallel in Greek—needs discussion. The fact that in Latin grain lists *hordeum* is sometimes

¹ e.g. Caes. *B.G.* 7. 72. 4; Hirt. *B.G.* 8. 3. 2; Varr. *R.R.* 1. 16. 2; Gaius in *Dig.* 7. 5. 7; etc.

² Cf. Plin. *N.H.* 18. 58; 60; 151; Pallad. *R.R.* 6. 1. 1; Hieron. in *Ezech.* 4. 9; etc. Passages such as Plin. *N.H.* 18. 48 ('frumenta ut triticum, hordeum') show that the wider sense continued in use even after the narrower had become common.

³ *Div. in Cae.* 30: 'queritur Sicilia . . . cum frumentum sibi in cellam imperavisset, et cum esset tritici modius HS ii, pro frumento in modios singulos duodenos sesterios exegisse'; cf. in *Verr.* 3. 73, 75–76.

⁴ e.g. Plin. *N.H.* 18. 48 (above, note 2).

⁵ e.g. Plin. *N.H.* 1 *ind.* 18. 11–13 ('far, triticum, hordeum'); cf. Cat. *Agr.* 134. 1.

⁶ e.g. Plin. *N.H.* 18. 49.

⁷ e.g. Ev. *Matth.* 13. 25; 1 *Cor.* 15. 37.

Cf. Hieron. in *Ezech.* 4. 9 (here St.

Jerome comments on his other identifications and compares them with the LXX, but evidently regards comment on the *τυπός*-*frumentum* equation as superfluous). See also *Vulg. Deut.* 8. 8; 2 *Reg.* 17. 28.

⁹ *N.H.* 18. 61 *init.*: 'tunicae frumento plures: hordeum maxime nudum et arinca set praecipue avena.' Cf. Theophr. *H.P.* 8. 4. 1.

¹⁰ 1. 1 (*C.I.L.* iii. 801 ff.; more recent fragments are added in the edition by Graser in Tenney Frank, *Economic Survey*, v. 318 ff.). *Hordeum* is mentioned separately, and *far* cannot be included in *frumentum*, since it would inevitably command a lower price because of its husks. (Cf. above, p. 137, n. 6. *Far* does not appear in the *Edit*, but its place as a husked wheat is taken by *spelta* in 1. 7–8.)

preceded not by *triticum* alone, but by two names, suggests that *frumentum* too may at times include more than *triticum* but less than 'grain generally'. This is indeed so, and Latin writers, from Columella in the first century A.D. to Palladius in the fourth, can speak of *frumenta*—always in the plural—in contrast to *hordeum*.

The use of the plural shows that this usage is closer to the wide sense of 'corn' than to the narrow. It also makes it quite clear that more than *triticum* is included in the connotation of the word when it is used in this way; and Columella, who included *hordeum* among the legumes 'because *tisana* is made from it',¹ shows in the preceding chapter that *frumenta* for him were *triticum* and *semen adorenum*.²

Pliny probably reflects the varying opinions of his sources on whether *hordeum* should be classed with *frumenta* or *legumina* when in a passage in which *frumenta* are contrasted with *legumina* he also contrasts them with *hordeum*,³ though he elsewhere⁴ expressly includes *hordeum* among the *frumenta*. Here again the *frumenta* which are contrasted with *hordeum* are presumably those enumerated by Columella, and when Palladius⁵ speaks of *frumenta et hordeum* he probably has the same cereals in mind.

The connotation of the term *triticum* was itself elastic in Latin, depending on whether *siligo* was included in it or not,⁶ but unlike the modern botanical genus *triticum* it was confined, as the name itself implies, to those wheats which could be 'threshed out' on the threshing-floor. The distinction between these 'naked' species on the one hand, and the husked wheats, einkorn, emmer, and spelt, on the other, was discussed in the preceding article,⁷ and no more need be said about it here except that *far* and *semen adorenum* were husked wheats (almost certainly emmer). *Frumenta* in the 'intermediate' sense just described therefore almost coincides with the modern genus *triticum*:⁸ indeed, Linnaeus

¹ 2. 7. 1. This, of course, is hardly a botanical criterion.

² 2. 6. 1. Unfortunately the relevant sentence ('prima et utilissima sunt hominibus frumenta triticum et semen adorenum'), if read on its own, lends itself to mistranslation, and it is mistranslated by the Loeb editor. From the context it is clear that *prima et utilissima* agrees with *seminum genera* in the preceding sentence, so that the correct interpretation is, 'first and most useful for men (among the various kinds of seed) are the grains, namely *triticum* and *semen adorenum*' (not 'the grains of first importance are . . .'). The rest of the chapter is devoted to a discussion of these grains only—*semen adorenum* and *far* being interchangeable terms (cf., for instance, Col. 11. 2. 74) and *triticum* including *siligo*, as often—and in the next chapter Columella goes on to discuss *legumina*.

³ N.H. 18. 60.

⁴ e.g. ibid. 49.

⁵ R.R. 6. 1. 1.

⁶ This has long been recognized, and the source material was assembled long ago in an article by M. Voigt ('Die verschiedenen Sorten von Triticum, Weizenmehl und Brod bei den Römern', *Rhein. Mus.* xxxi

(1876), 105 ff.). Jasny (*Wheats of Class. Antiquity*, p. 57 and *passim*) distinguishes four senses of *triticum*, but only the second and third of these seem to the present writer established; cf. also next note.

⁷ Jasny (*Wheats of Class. Antiquity*, pp. 55–56) quotes a number of passages in which he takes the name *triticum* to refer to a husked wheat or to the grain of such a wheat after hulling. Among these there is only one (Plin. *N.H.* 18. 97, referring to the pounding, i.e. hulling, of a grain called *triticum*) which the present writer finds convincing, together with a post-classical passage (not mentioned by Jasny) in *Isid. Orig.* 17. 3. 6. In view of the etymology of the word, on which cf. Varr. *L.L.* 5. 22. 106, it seems impossible to believe that this usage—attested only by two writers who knew little about what they were describing—was ever correct.

⁸ Not quite, since it did not include einkorn (*τιλφη*): but einkorn was unimportant (cf. Plin. *N.H.* 18. 81 and 93); there is no evidence for its presence in Europe in classical antiquity; and it did not even have a Latin name.

might well have used the term *frumentum* when he, on sound botanical grounds, combined the earlier genera *triticum* and *zea* into one genus.

Far, according to common Roman tradition,¹ had at one time been the 'corn' of Rome, and it is clear that in the first century A.D. it was still a major cereal. The important place which it occupies in Latin literature up to the end of that century has no parallel in Greek, just as *frumentum* in Latin is never (like *oīros* in Thucydides) defined as 'naked wheat and barley'. This is one of several indications that the early 'corn', which came to be replaced more and more by naked wheat, was not the same in the Greek and in the Roman part of the ancient world, and that, when we find that the *mola salsa* made from *far* took the same place in Roman ritual which *oīlai* from barley² had in that of Greece, religious practice was a survival of something which had once been true in a much wider context.

It has recently been argued that the words *oīros* and *frumentum* are imprecise in their connotation and should therefore be avoided when specific grains are under discussion.³ While it is undoubtedly true that great care is needed in the use and interpretation of these words, it has been the purpose of this article to show that both words came to have a legitimate specific use in antiquity, and that some useful inferences can be drawn from this use. The argument here set out cannot prove when naked wheat established itself as the 'corn' of various parts of the ancient world; but it must have done so before the words *oīros* and *frumentum* acquired their narrow meaning and before it became possible to speak of naked wheat as 'corn'.⁴

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¹ e.g. Ov. *Fast.* 2. 519 ff.; 6. 180, 313; Plin. *N.H.* 18. 83 ('primus antiquis Latio cibus') and 108; Varro *apud Non.* 152. 14, Müll. ('nec pistoris nomen erat nisi eius qui ruri fat pinsebat').

² Olci in Pauly-Wissowa, vii. 1276 gives *oīlai* as an alternative Greek name for barley, but the word denotes a product rather than a plant (cf. C.Q. xlili (1949), 113 ff.). Whether it is to be connected with *ōlos*, 'whole' (cf. C.Q. xlili, 116 n. 10 and Buttmann, *Lexilogus*, Eng. tr. 448 ff.) or with *dleiv*, 'to grind', as is suggested by the parallel Latin *mola* (cf. also Liddell-Scott-Jones s.v.), it is certainly not parallel with *κριθή*: otherwise *oīlai* *κριθέων* (Hdt. 1. 160; cf. Strato Com. 1. 35) would be an odd tautology. But the association of *oīlai* with

κριθή (like that of the *mola salsa* with *far*; cf. Paul. *ex Fest.* 124 L.) is old, and we never hear of *oīlai* made from a grain other than barley; cf. Horn. *Od.* 12. 356 ff.; Plut. *Q. Gr.* 6. (There is a similar parallel between *ἄλειρα* in Theocr. 2. 18 and *mola* in Virg. *Ecl.* 8. 82.)

³ Jasmy, *Am. Hist. Rev.* xlvii. 756 n. 16 (but cf. *Wheats of Cl. Ant.* 53-54): Rostovtzeff (Pauly-Wissowa, vii. 127), whom Jasmy quotes, merely admits that *frumentum* does not always mean either 'wheat' or 'main grain'.

⁴ This article is closely connected with that on 'Husked and "Naked" Grain' which precedes it, and the acknowledgements made there (p. 134 n. 1) should be repeated here.

THE POET'S DEFENCE (1)

A STUDY OF HORACE *Serm.* 1. 4

IN *A.J.P.* lxxvi 1955 I attempted to show that, contrary to the theory of Professor Hendrickson,¹ Horace's fourth satire is what it purports to be, namely a defence against hostile criticism. The aim of the two present articles is to examine how that defence is handled.

The poet had, it seems, to contend with two main charges, one relating to spirit and the other to form. The first said in effect 'Your work reveals a malicious nature'; the second 'Your verses are meagre and prosaic'. Let us take these charges separately. In reply to the former Horace answers:

1. 'The writers of Old Comedy and Lucilius branded criminals' (1-7). As I hope to show later, Horace is not finding fault with their practice; on the contrary he is by implication claiming the same right for himself. It is interesting to compare this argument with a strikingly similar one found in Trebonius' letter to Cicero:

in quibus versiculis si tibi quibusdam verbis εὐθυρρημονέστερος videbor, turpitudo personae eius, in quam liberius invehimur, nos vindicabit; ignoscet etiam iracundiae nostrae quae iustast in eiusmodi et homines et cives. deinde qui magis hoc Lucilio licuerit adsumere libertatis quam nobis? cum, etiamsi odio par fuerit in eos quos laesit, tamen certe non magis dignos habuerit, in quos tanta libertate verborum incurriteret. (12. 16. 3.)

While Horace, like Trebonius, appeals to Lucilius as a precedent for making outspoken attacks, he carefully avoids admitting that he ever indulged in them himself. Such an admission would naturally have damaged his case. Horace makes similar appeals to the practice of Lucilius in *Serm.* 2. 1. 29 ff., and 62 ff., and also, in a narrower context, in *Serm.* 1. 10. 53. Cf. Persius 1. 114.²

2. 'Some people deserve censure' (3-5, 25-32). This argument also appears in the Trebonius passage.

3. 'The innocent have nothing to fear' (67-68. Cf. *Ep.* 1. 16. 38-40, and also Theocr. *Epig.* 19 where the same is said in relation to the invective of Hippomox).

4. 'I write seldom and have no intention of publishing'³ (18. 22-23, 70-74. Cf. these later passages written when he probably did intend to publish but was still the poet of the *élite*: *Serm.* 1. 10. 37-39, 73-77, 81-90).

5. 'Real malice is something different. It consists of back-biting one's friends and of spreading scandal' (81-103).

6. 'I got the habit of observing the faults of others from my father, and he only censured individuals in so far as they exemplified certain vices' (103-31).

7. 'I am really quite a good-humoured fellow.' By this suggestion, which occurs at various points, Horace contrives to make light of the charges against

¹ 'Horace *Serm.* 1. 4; A Protest and a Programme', *A.J.P.* xxi (1900).

² Ovid (*Tristia* 2. 515-16) and Martial (Pref. to Bk. 1 and Bk. 8) justify their coarseness by appealing to the example of the Mime.

³ This seems to be the correct inference from *habeat* in 71. The word should be given a sense which (a) would have reassured

Horace's interlocutor, (b) is consistent with *nemo . . . legat* in 22-23, (c) leads up to the vigorous contempt of 72, (d) provides a natural apodosis to *ut sis tu* in 69. These requirements are best satisfied by taking *habeat* as a Potential Subjunctive. I hope to develop these arguments in a forthcoming number of *Hermathena*.

him, e.g. 'If I have had a laugh at Rufillus and Gargoni' (*risi* 91–92). 'If I speak a little too freely' (*liberius* 103), or in too jocular a manner (*iocosius* 104), you must not ascribe that to malice.' Admitting that he has foibles of his own (130), he goes on to affirm that his observations are for his own improvement (137–8) and that his writings are simply an amusing pastime (*illudo* 139). Then he concludes the piece with a disarming smile (140 ff.).

Against the second charge Horace says:

1. 'Lucilius is harsh, careless, and diffuse' (8–11).
2. 'I refuse to aim at mere quantity' (13–21).
3. 'I do not strive for publicity' (21–25, 71–78).
4. 'I write for my own amusement' (138–9).

5. 'If you maintain that all poetry must be written in the grand style, then admittedly I am no poet; neither for that matter is Lucilius, for his verses, like my own, are more in the nature of metrical prose. In this respect Satire seems to have affinities with Comedy' (39–62).

In the first half of the poem the two themes are cleverly interwoven. Thus 1–8 concern spirit, 8–25 form, 25–38 spirit, and 39–63 form. Then, as though deciding to concentrate on the more serious charge and the more delicate to answer, Horace devotes the remainder of the piece (63–143) to the question of spirit.

The first point to emerge from this analysis is that Horace at no time denies that his poems may contain offensive material, nor does he offer any guarantee for the future. This fact so often escapes notice that it may be well to examine it in greater detail.¹ After *emunctae naris* (8) one expects a statement of Horace's own position in regard to personal attack; one gets instead a quick transition to the versification of Lucilius. So it seems that Horace has claimed the right to make personal attacks without revealing whether or not he intends to take advantage of it. In 23 ff. he admits that if he recited his work in public, people would be annoyed. This suggests that however mild his Satire was in comparison with that of Lucilius it was nevertheless capable of causing offence. After the accusations of malice in 34–38 we look for a reply; instead we are given a short dissertation on the plain style and its relation to poetry. The question is at last squarely faced in 64–65:

nunc illud tantum queram, meritone tibi sit
suspectum genus hoc scribendi.

And what is Horace's answer? 'The innocent are quite safe from the attacks of Caprius and Sulcius.' Is Horace then identifying himself with the two accusers? No. 'Although you may be like Caelius and Birrius I would not be like Caprius and Sulcius.' And where is the difference? 'My books would not be available at any shop or stall.' So although Horace may have been willing for these lines to be taken as a renunciation of the aggressive spirit, they really contain no promise to that effect, and the only point of contrast between Horace and the two accusers is the fact that Horace does not publish his work. This is, of course, an important contrast, but what happens if some of the

¹ An example of this mistake is seen in Fairclough, Loeb Translation, p. 47: 'In his reply, Horace maintains that his own Satire is not personal but rather social and general in its application. He does not indulge in the invective of Old Comedy, but rather follows the New in spirit as well as in style.'

poet's pieces find their way outside his circle of acquaintances? We are not told. In 78–79 the accusation of malice is repeated: 'You take a delight in hurting people,' says the adversary. 'None of my associates will substantiate the charge,' counters Horace. 'It is the man who backbites his friends and spreads lying scandal that is really malicious.' There follow some examples of this kind of rudeness, which, declares Horace, will never disfigure his page (101). Here again the poet has appealed to his conception of Satire as a means of diverting his friends. No effort is made to rebut the more general charge of malice—the kind of malice which might affect people *outside* his own circle. Nor is there any undertaking to abstain from forthright censure. Rather the reverse: 'If I am a little outspoken in the future, remember that I got the habit from my father.' That is an excuse, not a promise.

Why, then, is Horace so evasive? There are several possibilities. If some of the early pieces, on account of their unpleasant tone, had really given offence, then their author was in no position to write a high-minded condemnation of polemic. Again, Horace probably wished to retain the right to make personal attacks should the occasion arise, and so he was careful not to hamper himself with any rigid statement of principle. It was perhaps just as well; for when he came to write the tenth satire he made several allegations which, if not so open nor so vehement as his predecessor's, were yet designedly offensive.¹ From the purely literary standpoint we must remember that Horace, like other ancient poets, made no pretensions to complete originality. On the contrary he was anxious that his work should be seen as a continuation and refinement of the Lucilian tradition (56–57, 8–13).² Therefore although he differs from Lucilius in regard to the artistic form of his poems and their publication, he does not at this point indicate any divergence in respect of their spirit. Lastly, Horace may have been influenced by a satire in the thirtieth book of Lucilius in which the older poet had replied to adverse criticism. It is a hazardous business to attempt a reconstruction of the arguments used in that earlier poem, but we can be pretty sure that it contained no renunciation of the aggressive spirit. That would have been unthinkable for the man who 'lacerated the city and smashed his jaw on LUPUS and MUCIUS'.

This leads us on to the second point, namely that, contrary to a widely held opinion,³ the fourth satire carries no condemnation of the Lucilian spirit. In the opening lines Horace states that the types of criminal portrayed by the Old Comedy (and Lucilius) deserved to be shown up (*dignus describi*—cf. *dignus notari*, *Serm. 1. 3. 24*). The words *facetus* and *emunctae naris* imply nothing to the older satirist's discredit, and there is no suggestion of disapproval until *durus componere versus*. This is made clear by the *nam*, which explains the rapid transition from praise to blame, and also by the emphatic *hoc* 'it was here that his

¹ *Serm. 1. 10. 17–19, 36–37, 78–80, 90–93.*

² Horace emphasizes that this tradition in its turn owes much to the Greeks. As Fiske says, he wants to show that Satire 'has honorable literary antecedents, both in Greek rhetorical theory and in Greek satiric literature' (*Lucilius and Horace*, p. 277).

³ See, e.g., Nettleship, *The Original Form of Roman Satira* (Oxford, 1878), p. 12: 'Horace complains that Lucilius is entirely the child of the Old Comedy'. Rand, E. K., *Horace*

and the *Spirit of Comedy* (Rice Inst. Pamph. 24, 1937), p. 64. Horace takes Lucilius to task because 'he flung too much abuse about in the fashion of the writers of Old Greek Comedy'. Grant, M., *Roman Literature* (Cambridge, 1954), pp. 219–20: 'Horace was prejudiced in his attitude to his predecessor as is shown by his comment that Lucilius was a mere imitator of Aristophanes and the classical Attic Old Comedy of the fifth century B.C.' See also Fiske, op. cit., p. 336.

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fault lay'. Then, most conclusive of all, there is the statement in the tenth satire that Horace had praised his predecessor in this passage:

at idem quod sale multo
urbem defrictum charta laudatur eadem. (3-4)

In his very helpful article entitled 'Horace on the Nature of Satire'¹ Professor Ullman pointed out that the vices mentioned in 26-32 were all frequent subjects of Horatian Satire. He went on to maintain, however, that in listing these subjects Horace intended to indicate a distinction between his own work on the one hand and that of Lucilius and the Attic Comedians on the other. 'The Old Comedy attacked those who were *famosi* to bring them to justice. Horace attacks vices through individuals to bring about general moral reform.'² I do not think such a distinction can have been intended. In 24-38 Horace is speaking of Satire in general. Doubtless this includes his own writings, but it also includes those of Lucilius; thus *genus hoc* (24) embraces Lucilian Satire, and *poetas* (33) embraces Lucilius. The older poet was even more zealous than Horace in attacking people who were ambitious, greedy, and licentious; and so if Lucilius is as much a part of 24-38 as he is of 1-7, it is hard to see how the two passages can be contrasted. Admittedly the crimes mentioned in 1-5 are more serious than the vices listed in 26-32, yet even here it would be unwise to draw too rigid a distinction; for adultery is common to both, and the phrase *aliоqui famosus* (4-5) implies a larger range of misdemeanours than those specified. As regards the question of motive, the most obvious point and the most important one is the *similarity* between Old Comedy and Roman Satire; both have a moral purpose. I do not mean by this that the second passage merely reproduces the first, but only that one ought not to contrast them. Indeed to do so is to break the link between Roman Satire and Old Comedy which Horace has been so careful to establish. Again, it is hard to accept Ullman's view that Horace aimed 'to bring about general moral reform'. How could he have had such an aim if he neither sold his work nor recited it in public? Surely his real object at this stage was to write something which would entertain and edify his friends. Here, then, in Horace's avoidance of publicity, we do find a contrast between him and the others, but this contrast emerges from 22-23 and 71-74, not from either of the passages under discussion, and it is, moreover, quite distinct from the question of spirit.

A word must now be said about 65-74: *Sulcius acer*

ambulat et Caprius, rauci male cumque libellis
magnus uterque timor latronibus; at bene si quis
et vivat puris manibus contemnat utrumque.
ut sis tu similis Caeli Birrique latronum,
non ego sim Capri neque Sulci; cur metuas me?
nulla taberna meos habeat neque pila libellos
quis manus insuderet vulgi Hermogenisque Tigelli.
nec recito cuiquam nisi amicis idque coactus,
non ubivis coramve quibuslibet.

It is commonly supposed that through the medium of Caprius and Sulcius Horace is criticizing Lucilius.³ But this idea does not accord well with the

¹ Ullman, B. L., in *T.A.P.A.* xlvi (1917).

² Op. cit., p. 127.

³ See Fiske, op. cit., p. 291: 'Horace here

directly disavows the role which Lucilius . . .

deliberately assumed in Bk. 30.' Cf. Hen-

drickson, op. cit., p. 131.

opening lines where Lucilius is praised for his outspoken denunciation of crime. Why not take the passage as it stands, and assume that Horace is referring to a pair of contemporary figures? That seems to me the simplest and most sensible explanation. In any case, as we have just seen, Horace does not affirm any difference of tone between these accusers and himself.¹

To sum up. Horace claims that the aggressiveness of Satire is justified by its moral function; at the same time he maintains that he should not incur any resentment on account of his own satires seeing that he does not publish them. These arguments are not entirely consistent, but we must remember that Horace is on the defensive, and is anxious to use every weapon at his disposal. And how cleverly he smoothes over the awkwardness by interchanging the general (*genus hoc*) with the particular (*mea scripta, meos libellos*)!

The foregoing remarks cover all the places where Horace is usually thought to have disavowed the Lucilian spirit. There remains, however, the theory of Tenney Frank that the subject of *inquit* in 79 is Valerius Cato.² The famous grammarian will then be the person addressed in 79–100, and in particular he will be identified with *Romane* (85), a word which glances at Cato's claim to free birth. Moreover the man who seems *comis et urbanus* to Cato in 90 will be none other than Lucilius (cf. *Serm.* 1. 10. 65), and 86–90 will refer directly to a satire in which the poet had ridiculed his host. Horace, according to Frank, avoided a similar error of taste by putting *Serm.* 2. 8 into the mouth of an intermediate character, Fundanius. Now if all this is correct 86–90 will certainly be a very disparaging reference to Lucilius. The lines read as follows:

saepe tribus lectis videoas cenare quaternos
e quibus unus amet quavis aspergere cunctos
praeter eum qui praebet aquam; post hunc quoque potus,
condita cum verax aperit praecordia Liber.
hic tibi comis et urbanus liberque videtur . . .

But is Frank right? In the first place, why should the *tibi* of 90 be more definite than any of the other second person singulars? Certainly *tibi* (64), *tu* (69), and *te* (142) cannot be confined to any individual. Again, the type of person described is by Horace's own admission a common figure in Roman society (*saepe videoas*). He is the sort known as a *scurrula* or an *umbra*—a parasite who relied on his quickness of wit to provide him with dinner. In *Ep.* 1. 18. 1 ff. Horace portrays him for the benefit of his friend Lollius as an obsequious yes-man, devoid of kindly feelings, and interested only in his stomach. Now in order to divert the company and to gain the reputation of a *bel esprit*, the *scurrula* indulged in back-biting, scandal, and mockery, interspersed with malicious anecdotes; and apparently there were times when even his fellow diners did

¹ If *libellis* (66) = indictments, then a difference of tone is implied by the pun *libellos* (71) = books. But since there is only an implication and nothing like a direct statement, we should regard the pun as a smiling euphemism of the kind noted in category 7 above. It may well be, however, that Caprius and Sulcius are not accusers but satirists, and that *libellis* = books, in which case there will be no pun at all. See Ullman, op. cit., pp. 117–19, and A. Y. Campbell, *Horace. A New Interpretation*, p. 162.

² Frank, *A.J.P.* xlvi (1925), 72–74. Fairclough, Loeb, pp. 56 and 120, follows Frank in identifying *hic* (90) with Lucilius. A similar theory is advanced by Wagenvoort in *Donum Natalicium Schrijnen* (Nijmegen, 1929), pp. 747 ff. The Dutch scholar, though acknowledging Hendrickson's theory of the relation between the fourth and tenth satires, does not mention Frank's article, and so his conclusion on this point must be regarded as independent.

not escape his scathing tongue. Examples of this kind of behaviour occur in *Ep.* 1. 15. 30, where Maenius the *scurra vagus* is said to be *quaelibet in quemvis opprobria fingere saevus*, and again in *Serm.* 2. 8 where Horace describes the manners of the *umbra* Balatro, a man who 'treated everything with a sneer' (*suspendens omnia naso* 64). There were, moreover, people foolish enough to admire this kind of thing. Nasidienus, for example, cries out delightedly to Balatro *vir bonus es convivaque comis!* (76), and Maenius, when he had squandered all that his parents had left him, *urbanus coepit haberi* (*Ep.* 1. 15. 27). These illustrations show how the words *comis* and *urbanus* were used, or rather misused, quite generally in regard to the unmannerly parasite. Finally, the *Romane* of 85 can be interpreted quite satisfactorily as a parody of an oracular response, cf. *Livy* 5. 16. 9; 25. 12. 5; and *Virg. Aen.* 6. 851.

Supposing, however, one is unwilling to reject the identification of *tibi* and *Romane* with Valerius Cato, one is not obliged on that account to accept the identification of *hic* with Lucilius. For the sense could be 'You say, Cato, that in comparison with Lucilius I am neither *comis* nor *urbanus*; but I distrust your judgement on such matters. Why, you apply those very terms to a malicious buffoon (86–90), and your own practice is far from exemplary' (96 ff.). In that case the argument will be centred on the contemporary scene with its rivalries and antagonisms, and Lucilius will be very much in the background.

A few other points may also be urged against Frank's theory. He has to maintain, for instance, that in 86–90 Horace is equating Lucilius with a slanderous parasite. This is hard to accept. For Lucilius held a higher rank in society than Horace himself (see Marx, *Testimonia* 1–7), and also such an innuendo would be out of keeping with the opening lines of the satire where the older poet's distinguishing characteristic is said to be his *libertas*, a quality for which Horace admired him. The *scurra*, on the other hand, is far from *liber*, except in the eyes of Horace's adversary. More generally, if, as we have maintained, Horace had already appealed to the example of Lucilius in order to justify himself, he would scarcely refer to him in the same poem as a malicious buffoon.

According to the traditional interpretation, which we have been defending, the passage will refer to a type of person well known in Roman society, a type who in his addiction to slanderous gossip resembled the characters mentioned in *Serm.* 1. 10. 78 ff.

men moveat cimex Pantilius, aut cruciet quod
vellicet absentem Demetrius, aut quod ineptus
Fannius Hermogenis laedad conviva Tigelli?

From what has been said above it follows that the banquet satires of Lucilius will have no bearing on the present question. Even if they did have, it would be impossible (as Frank admits) to prove that Lucilius had made fun of his host directly. With respect to Book Five, nothing is established by the Pseudo-Acro's remark on *Hor. Serm.* 2. 2. 47 'Galloni quidem fuit praeco . . . quem Lucilius etiam pulsat'. Likewise the account of the dinner party in Book Twenty may well have been given by L. Licinius Crassus—such indeed is the opinion of Fiske.¹ Moreover, to follow Frank's argument to its conclusion we must imagine that Lucilius was drunk when he wrote the satire in question (88–89), or else that after indulging in some drunken raillery at the party he

¹ Fiske, op. cit., p. 409.

later recorded it all with a sober pen and embodied it in his poem. Both alternatives make heavy demands on our credulity.

I hope, then, that enough has been said to show that this satire contains no adverse comment on the tone and spirit of Lucilius. Lest, however, it may be thought that the present writer is prejudiced by his desire to prove a case, let us recall a significant remark of Professor Hendrickson's in connexion with the opening of the tenth satire: 'The somewhat subtle repudiation of the spirit of Lucilius . . . had provoked the jealous champions of the founder of Roman Satire less than the brief words of censure directed against his slovenly form.'¹ Now surely that is a very strange phenomenon in view of the fact that by far the greater part of the earlier poem was devoted to the question of spirit. Would it not be more natural to infer that the champions of Lucilius had found nothing they could take exception to in Horace's remarks on the spirit of his predecessor?

When all this has been said, we are still left wondering why Horace was not more explicit regarding his relationship to the spirit and content of Lucilian Satire. The answer is not, as Knapp believed,² to be found in the poet's youthful diffidence; for his criticisms of Lucilius' versification are forthright enough, and we meet a similar kind of evasiveness in the first satire of Book Two, a poem which cannot be earlier than 35 B.C. and may well be as late as 30. It is more likely that Horace wanted to leave himself free to develop several lines of defence. If he identified himself too warmly with the censorious candour of Lucilius and the Old Comedy, his pose as timid spirit anxious to avoid offence would be less impressive, and the formative influence of his father would become a factor of minor importance. The distinction which really did exist between himself and Lucilius in the matter of tone and temperament is clarified in vv. 11-19 of the tenth satire; here, however, it is soft-pedalled for the sake of the argument, because Horace is speaking as an advocate, not as a judge, and is therefore keen to use Lucilius (and the Old Comedy)³ in his own defence. In conclusion we may recall the points mentioned earlier, namely the force of literary tradition, the wish to reserve the right of making personal attacks, and the probability that some of his early work had shown strong traces of Lucilian influence. Nevertheless, I cannot imagine that Horace would have let any of these considerations stand in his way if his real purpose had been to criticize the *inventor* of the genre. And so one is led to the conclusion that this poem must be studied primarily in terms of contemporary feuds.⁴

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¹ Hendrickson, *Studies presented to Basil Gildersleeve* (1902), p. 151.

² Knapp, *A.J.P.* xxxiii (1912), 143: 'In *Serm. 1. 10* the situation is different. Some time has elapsed since the publication of *1. 4*; in that time Horace's position, social and literary, has become far more secure, and he is at liberty to set forth his real convictions.' In fact, Horace becomes more, not less circumspect with the passage of time. The differences between the two satires arise from a difference of aim. In the fourth Horace is using Lucilius in his own defence, in the tenth he states his own relationship to him.

³ It is worth noting that Persius (1. 123-5)

cites the example of Eupolis, Cratinus, and Aristophanes in order to vindicate his own satires. This makes it virtually certain that he interpreted *Serm. 1. 4. 1-8* in the manner recommended above.

⁴ This conclusion is therefore the opposite of Fiske's: 'In fact Horace's fourth satire may be regarded as an aesthetic and ethical analysis of the Lucilian theory of satire; a criticism, however, presented under the guise of an attack upon those contemporaries who believed in a direct revival of Lucilian invective presented in the traditional Lucilian form of improvisation' (op. cit., pp. 278-9).

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THE POET'S DEFENCE (2)

A STUDY OF HORACE *Serm. I. 4*

IN examining what Horace says about the style of Lucilius I would like to leave aside for a moment the controversial question regarding *poetae* in v. 1, and go straight to vv. 8–13. Here everything is clear and explicit: Lucilius was witty and keen-scented, but he was harsh in his versification, partly out of carelessness, partly owing to his enormous productivity. It has been suggested that these lines were simply 'a chance remark' which Horace 'happened to make in the course of his argument'.¹ It will have been apparent from the former article that this is not the view taken by the present writer. It seems much more likely that the passage was written quite deliberately as part of Horace's reply to those critics who found his work meagre in quantity and prosaic in style. This would help to explain the severity of his words; for such an adverse opinion of Lucilius' style was by no means universal. Even in Quintilian's day there were people so devoted to the *magnus Auruncae alumnus* that they ranked him not only above every satirist but above all other poets.² Certainly Lucilius' versification cannot have been too rough for them. A more sober estimate can be obtained from Quintilian himself, who disagrees equally with the uncritical adulation of the archaists and with the over-severe strictures of Horace. The reason he gives for this disagreement is not as clear as one could wish: 'nam eruditio in eo mira et libertas atque inde acerbitas et abunde salis.' What he means, if I understand him properly, is that if the verses of Lucilius had been as graceless as Horace suggests, his learning, his candour, and his wit could not have had such a telling effect. At all events Quintilian saw something to commend in Lucilius' style, and in this he was at one with some of the highest authorities of Republican times. Varro, for instance, regarded Lucilius' work as the finest example of *gracilitas*,³ and Cicero, who often quoted him to give *iucunditas*,⁴ admired the way he could tell an anecdote *elegantissime*,⁵ and *cum multa venustate et omni sale*.⁶ These words, though applied primarily to the author's wit and charm, could hardly have been used if he had consistently neglected the art of phrasing. Last of all, it looks as though Lucilius' theory of the style appropriate to Satire did not differ fundamentally from Horace's own. It was just earlier in time, more crudely conceived, and less fully formulated.⁷ Why, then, is Horace so stringent in his criticisms? Not out of any hostile feelings towards Lucilius himself, but rather from anger against his over-zealous admirers, the *Lucili fautores*. Accordingly we should not regard this satire as a chapter of literary history, nor should we seek in it a careful, dispassionate appraisal of the author's relation to his predecessor. Such a study was never intended, and indeed would scarcely have been possible in the circumstances. Moreover the controversy which

¹ Morris, E. P., *Satires and Epistles* (New York, 1909), p. 131.

² Quint. *Inst. Or.* 10. 1. 93. Cf. Tac. *Dial.* 23. ³ Varro in Gellius 6. 14. 6.

⁴ This is on the testimony of Quint. 1. 8. 11: 'summa non eruditio modo gratia sed etiam iucunditatis, cum poeticis voluptatibus

aureas a forensi asperitate respirent.'

⁵ Cic. *De Or.* 3. 171.

⁶ Id. *De Fin.* 1. 3. 8.

⁷ This has been maintained at length by G. C. Fiske in his book *Lucilius and Horace*, and in his earlier article 'The Plain Style in the Scipionic Circle', *Wisc. Stud.* iii, 1919.

formed the background to this satire did not centre so much upon the merits and demerits of Lucilius as upon contemporary issues, some of which had only an indirect connexion with literature. The function of Lucilius at this stage is rather that of a weapon which is used offensively or defensively by both sides according to their purposes. That is why Horace's remarks, if judged purely as literary criticism, seem somewhat over-harsh. When all this has been said, however, it still remains true that, viewed in the light of his own achievement, Horace's criticisms were basically just. For by observing the standards of brevity, lucidity, and euphony which he himself had set, he produced Satire of a higher artistic excellence than anything seen before, and thus went far towards creating the classical spirit of Augustan Rome.¹ All this is freely conceded by Quintilian who, while giving due credit to Lucilius, declares 'multum est tenuer ac purus magis Horatius et nisi labor eius amore praecipuus'. Cicero, too, had he lived a generation later, would surely have endorsed this judgement.

In the following section (13–22) Horace thrusts at two contemporary writers, Crispinus who prides himself on his profuse spontaneity and Fannius who takes such inordinate pains to get his work publicised. Now it is widely held that Horace is simply using Crispinus and Fannius in order to press home his attack on Lucilius.² But that, I submit, is to beg the question. As far as we can tell, the criticism which Horace is countering here said 'Your productions are meagre when compared with those of Lucilius' (see further below). It does not follow that the whole of Horace's answer should be concerned with Lucilius. On the contrary we should expect a great deal of it to be directed against his own detractors. Although we know very little about Crispinus, we do know that he was a preacher renowned for his productivity (*Serm. 1. 1. 120*)—a faculty despised by the fastidious Horace. He may also have been something of an eccentric quack, because the term *ineptum* (*Serm. 1. 3. 138*) suggests rather more than just literary deficiencies.³ Unfortunately we cannot be certain whether Crispinus was actually acquainted with Horace, but if he was he may well have thrown out the scornful challenge recorded in these lines. There can be no similar doubts regarding the Fannius incident (*delatis capsis et imagine*), and his personal hostility to Horace is pretty well established by *Serm. 1. 10. 80*:⁴

men moveat cimex Pantilius, aut cruciet quod
vellicet absentem Demetrius, aut quod ineptus
Fannius Hermogenis laedat conviva Tigelli?

There are, moreover, one or two points which add an extra sting to these personal references. The sarcastic *beatus* is obvious enough (21), but it took Postgate to see the innuendo in *hircinis* (19). This word suggests not only that Crispinus blows hot air like a bellows, but also that his exertions produce an unpleasant odour.⁵ All this shows that Crispinus and Fannius were not just shadowy nonentities, but men of flesh and blood, significant enough to take

¹ See e.g. U. Knoche, *Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft* (1936), pp. 500 ff.

² Fiske, *L. and H.*, pp. 278–9; Hendrickson, *A.J.P.* xxi (1900), 126, and *Studies presented to B. Gildersleeve*, p. 158.

³ So Schütz. Oltramare, however, thinks that Horace found fault with Crispinus on

aesthetic grounds only (*Les Origines de la Diatribe Romaine*, p. 130).

⁴ In view of the close connexion between the two satires it seems that Klingner is being rather over-cautious when in his *index nominum* he hesitates to identify the two Fannii. ⁵ Postgate, *C.R.* xv (1901), 302 ff.

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Horace's insults on their own shoulders. Lastly, though Horace is at times outspoken in his criticisms of Lucilius' style, he never assails him anywhere else with the kind of mockery that we find here. It is true that the remarks on the diffuseness of Lucilius lead naturally into the section on Crispinus and Fannius, but there is an important bridge passage, namely *scribendi recte: nam ut multum nil moror*. With that line Lucilius begins to recede into the background, and our interest becomes focused on the quarrel between Horace and his opponents: 'I do not pour out rubbish like Crispinus, nor do I hawk my poems about like Fannius.'

The next section on style is introduced by a quibble on the meaning of *poetas* (39 referring back to 33). 'People with guilty consciences,' says Horace, 'hate and fear poets. But they should not hate me, because I am not really a poet; neither for that matter is Lucilius.'¹ The satiric poets were not, of course, hated on account of their name, but for their denunciation of vice; they would have been equally disliked had they been called simply *saturarum scriptores*. The passage, however, is not meant as a serious defence against the charge of malice, nor is it designed as a red herring to side-track those who made such a charge.² No, it is just a clever way of reverting to the subject of style, and to the question whether his own work was prosaic and insipid. How does the argument run? 'I ought not to be considered a poet', says Horace, 'merely because I write in metre; for metre is not among the distinguishing characteristics of poetry. The essential qualities for a poet are an inborn gift, an inspired soul, and a sonorous diction. That is why some people have questioned whether Comedy is poetry, since in spite of its metrical form it lacks the fire and power of inspiration both in language and in material. Admittedly characters in Comedy are occasionally roused to anger, but even then their speech remains that of everyday life, and therefore does not constitute poetry. The same is true of Lucilius and myself. Ennius' work, on the other hand, would remain poetry even if his metre were destroyed.' The relevance of these remarks on Comedy was called in question by Marx, who said (Lucilius 1029):

iam intellegitur quo auctore Horatius disputationem illam de comoedia
inseruerit illo loco parum aptam, apud Lucilium propter eius ad quem
scripsit personam aptissimam.

The *parum aptam* was rightly rejected by Fairclough, who pointed out that by comparing Satire with Comedy Horace was suggesting literary standards for the newer genre.³ Since the satirist, like the comic writer, is dealing with everyday material, he ought not to strive after the grand manner, but should rather adhere to the language of conversation. Though such language may appear pedestrian when compared with the lofty diction of Epic and Tragedy,⁴ it is nevertheless appropriate to the writer's purpose.

The question now arises why Horace should be so careful to associate himself with Lucilius in his vindication of the plain style (*uti nos 41, ego nunc . . . olim Lucilius 56–57*). The answer will depend on one's conception of what the critics had actually said. If they simply alleged 'Your work is prosaic and

¹ Gow's interpretation is surely mistaken: 'You should not hate poets because you hate me, for I am no poet.' Such an argument would have no bearing on Horace's defence.

² A. Y. Campbell, for instance, calls this

passage 'dust-raising diversion' (*Horace. A New Interpretation*, p. 162).

³ Fairclough, *A.J.P.* xxxiv (1913).

⁴ Cf. *Epb.* 1. 3. 14; 2. 1. 165; 2. 1. 250 ff.; *A.P.* 89 ff.

'insipid', then Horace's reply must mean in effect 'I am writing in a genre which calls for the plain style, and I can appeal to Lucilius as a precedent'. The criticism, however, may have been 'Your work is prosaic and insipid *in comparison with that of Lucilius*', in which case Horace must mean 'Your notions about the correct style for Satire are mistaken; so is your opinion of Lucilius, for he, like myself, favoured the plain style'. The second alternative conforms (if we omit the critics' remarks) with Hendrickson's theory that 39–62 are addressed to the champions of Lucilius, who regarded his Satire as fine poetry.¹ The first represents the view of Ullman who does not think that Lucilius' supporters made any such claims, and who holds that the present passage is aimed not at them, but at those who called Comedy poetry.² Without implying that this satire is addressed exclusively to any one group of people, I feel that Hendrickson's is the more probable suggestion. The tenth satire reveals that Valerius Cato and his followers were annoyed by Horace's criticisms of Lucilius' versification. They admired the older satirist not only for his wit (*comis et urbanus*, *Serm.* 1. 10. 65) but also for stylistic reasons, notably his practice of importing Greek words. And about this time Cato was engaged on an edition of Lucilius' works. Moreover, if, as Ullman thinks, Horace was keen to enter into controversy with those who asserted that Comedy was poetry, would he not have used more vigorous phrasing than the uncontentious *quidam quasivere* (45–46)? We may believe, then, that in 41–62 Horace was glancing at those who admired Lucilius for the wrong reasons. The passage, however, contains no adverse comment on Lucilius himself, because Horace is using him as a witness in his own defence. Admittedly 41–42 and 56–62 leave room for a distinction between the two satirists, later to be developed in *Serm.* 1. 10; but here they are treated as a pair in contrast to the writers of Epic and Tragedy, and to insist on dividing them is to read the tenth satire back into the fourth.

Scholars differ in their interpretation of *comoedia* (25). Morris, Heinze, and Fairclough hold that the term applies solely to the New Comedy, while Lejay and Ullman contend that it includes the Old as well. How does Horace describe the type of literature in question? The language, he says, lacks the fire and force of inspiration; indeed apart from the metre it is indistinguishable from prose. Now this description certainly applies to the New Comedy more closely than to the Old; for the latter, especially in its choral passages, frequently adopts a more ornate and high-flown style than that of ordinary conversation. Platonius bears witness to this fact when he applies the epithet *ὑψηλός* to Eupolis and says of Cratinus *πολὺς δὲ καὶ ταῦς τρωπαῖς τυγχάνει*.³ Another commentator expresses a similar view: *τῆς δὲ νέας διαφέρει η̄ παλαιὰ κωμῳδία . . . διαλέκτω . . . μέτρω . . . διαλέκτω δὲ καθὸ η̄ μὲν νέα τὸ σαφέστερον ἔχει . . . η̄ δὲ παλαιὰ τὸ δεινὸν καὶ ὑψηλὸν τοῦ λόγου, ἐνίστε δὲ ἐπιτηδεύει λέξεις τινάς . . . μέτρω δὲ καθὸ η̄ μὲν νέα κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον στρέφεται περὶ τὸ ἴαμβικόν, σπανίως δὲ μέτρον ἔτερον. ἐν δὲ τῇ παλαιᾷ πολυμετρίᾳ τὸ σπουδαζόμενον.*⁴ Yet when viewed in relation to Epic, all Comedy including the Old approximates to everyday speech. This is partly because its subject-matter is of a humble kind, and partly because the iambic rhythm is akin to conversation. This last point was made by Aristotle in the *Poetics*,⁵ and it was certainly known to Horace, as may be seen from *A.P.* 73 ff. and especially 79–83.

¹ Hendrickson, *A.J.P.* 21, 1900, p. 129.

² *Comoedias*, Tom. 4, p. 22. ⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

² Ullman, *T.A.P.A.* 48, 1917, p. 115.

⁵ Aristotle, *Poetics* 1448^a26 (subject-

³ Dindorf, *Scholia Graeca in Aristophanis*

matter), 1449^a26, and 1459^a12 (diction).

In the second place the *comoedia* of 45 is said to draw its material from everyday life (52–53, 55–56). Again this is pre-eminently true of the New Comedy, which in ancient times was commonly designated as 'a mirror of life'—see the passages cited by Marx on Luc. 1029 and by Housman on Manilius 5. 476. Yet we cannot be sure that Horace was contrasting the New Comedy with the Old in this respect either. For, as the passage from Aristotle says, one of the ways in which the comic genre as a whole differed from Epic was in its close adherence to the pattern of ordinary life. The point is confirmed by another of the ancient writers on Comedy: ή βιωτικῶς (λέγεται) κατὰ μίμησιν τοῦ βίου . . . διαφέρει δὲ κωμῳδία τραγῳδίας, ὅτι η τραγῳδία ἴστορίαν ἔχει καὶ ἐπαγγελίαν πράξεων γενομένων, η δὲ κωμῳδία πλάσματα περιέχει βιωτικῶν πραγμάτων. Then, as though to show that this statement covers the whole of Comedy, the writer continues: κωμῳδία λέγεται τὰ τῶν κωμικῶν ποιήματα, ὡς τὰ Μενάνδρου καὶ Αριστοφάνους καὶ Κρατίνου καὶ τῶν ὄμοίων.¹

On turning to Cicero for further evidence we find that whenever the orator speaks of Old Comedy by itself he adds a distinguishing epithet like *vetus* or *antiqua*.² When on the other hand he refers to New Comedy, whether the original product or the Roman adaptation, he simply uses the generic term *comoedia*. Any ambiguity is usually precluded by the context, as in *De Opt. Gen.* 2. 6, *Or.* 109, 183–4, *Tusc. Disp.* 4. 32. 69, *Ad Fam.* 9. 22, and *Pro Rosc. Am.* 47. There are cases, however, where the ambiguity remains, and where we cannot be sure whether Cicero means the New Comedy or Comedy in general, e.g.

quis umquam Graecus comoediam scripsit in qua servus primarum partium non Lydus esset? (*Pro Flacco* 65.)

Consider also *De Rep.* 4. 10. 11:

numquam comoediae, nisi consuetudo vitae pateretur, probare sua
theatris flagitia potuissent.

Those are the words of Scipio as reported by St. Augustine *Civ. Dei* 2. 9. Is the Old Comedy included in *comoediae*? St. Augustine clearly thought it was, for he continues:

et Graeci quidem antiquiores vitiosae suae opinionis quandam convenientiam servaverunt, apud quos fuit etiam lege concessum ut quod vellet comoedia de quo vellet nominatim diceret.

Augustine then quotes some further remarks of Scipio on the same subject:

itaque, sicut in eisdem libris loquitur Africanus 'quem illa non adgit vel potius quem non vexavit? cui pepercit? esto, populares homines improbos in re publica seditiones, Cleonem, Cleopontem, Hyperbolum laesit. patiamur etsi eius modi cives a censore melius est quam a poeta notari. sed Periclen . . . violari versibus et agi in scaena non plus decuit quam si Plautus noster voluisse aut Naevius Publio et Gnaeo Scipioni aut Caecilius Marco Catoni maledicere.'

Here again one wonders whether the *illa* refers to the *vetus comoedia* or to *comoedia* in general. The castigation of public figures is appropriate only to the

¹ Dindorf, op. cit., p. 30.

² e.g. *De Leg.* 2. 15. 37; *De Off.* 1. 104; *Brut.* 224.

Old Comedy, but the comparison with Roman Comedy suggests that Cicero may have been thinking of the genre as a whole.

We come at last to *Or. 67*:

itaque video visum non nullis Platonis et Democriti locutionem etsi ab sit a versu, tamen quod incitatus feratur et clarissimis verborum luminibus utatur, potius poema putandum quam comicorum poetarum; apud quos nisi quod versiculi sunt nihil est aliud cotidiani dissimile sermonis.

Who are the *comici poetae*? In view of their conversational style and the suggestion that they are insipid when compared with Plato and Democritus it is probably wiser to limit the reference to the poets of the New Comedy, but one cannot disprove Ullman's contention that it embraces the comic poets of all periods.¹

Horace's other writings do not offer any definite solution of the present question. In *Ep. 2. 1. 50 ff.* he is talking only of the literary genres which the Romans have taken over from the Greeks, and thus the Comedy mentioned in 57–59 naturally cannot include the Old. The same is true of 168–76. More relevant to our purpose is *A.P. 73 ff.* The reference in 80 certainly includes Old Comedy, and one feels that Horace might easily have used the generic term *comoedia*; instead, however, he chose to employ the metaphor of the sock. Shortly afterwards the word *comoedia* does occur (93), but by now Horace has passed on to consider Roman literature, and so once again the Old Comedy is automatically ruled out.

The evidence regarding the use of *comoedia*, then, is not so conclusive as one could wish. What we have noticed is that when Cicero and Horace use the word, they normally have the New Comedy uppermost in their minds.² They do not, however, use it in order to point a contrast with the Old. Returning then to *Serm. 1. 4. 45* it would seem that to assert that Old Comedy is included or excluded is to argue about the wrong question. What we ought to ask first of all is 'What has Horace uppermost in his mind?' The answer is obviously 'The New Comedy', as is proved by the example which follows (48–56). We should then ask 'Is Horace contrasting the New Comedy with the Old?' If we may judge from the evidence cited above, the answer is 'No', nor is there any indication to the contrary in the passage itself. Accordingly, when Horace associates Lucilius with the Old Comedy in the opening lines, and with the New in vv. 41–42 and 57, he is simply emphasizing different aspects of the older satirist's work.

We are now back at the problem of v. 1. Those who believe that Horace is deliberately contrasting the two kinds of Comedy stress the final *poetae*—‘Eupolis, Cratinus, and Aristophanes, true poets’.³ If, however, there is really no contrast, but only a shift of attention, then this interpretation must be wrong. It is also wrong for another, perhaps more impressive reason, namely that it destroys the consistency of Horace's argument. Lucilius, says Horace, like the

¹ Ullman, loc. cit.

² I have accepted much of what Ullman says, but in regard to *comoedia* (*Serm. 1. 4. 45*) he uses one argument which is not valid. After pointing out that in 1. 4. 2 and 1. 10. 16 Horace designates the Old Comedy by the epithet *prisca*, he continues 'Why, then, in the passage under discussion should he say

merely *comoedia* if he meant only the New Comedy and not Comedy in general? An opponent of Ullman's could justifiably answer that Horace is following the normal practice of using *comoedia* by itself to denote the New Comedy.

³ e.g. Heinze, Fairclough, Wickham, and Hendrickson.

writers of New Comedy is not a 'true poet'. Lucilius followed the Old Comedy in everything but metre. A difference of metre cannot possibly decide whether a writer is a poet or not (in fact the whole question of metre may be irrelevant). Therefore Old Comedy cannot here be regarded as 'true poetry', and *poetae* must be used in a non-specialized sense.

Nor are we compelled to stress *poetae* just because of its final position. Let us consider for a moment the first epistle of Book 2. The word is not stressed in v. 41; it may be stressed in both 64 and 247, but, as is apparent from Fairclough's own translation, it does not have to be; and in 219, though *poetae* may be intended as a pun on *facimus*, it is certainly not used in the sense of 'true poets'. Lastly the word carries no special emphasis in *Ep. 1. 19. 4*. The fact that *poetae* occurs so frequently at the end of a line is due not so much to the stress placed upon it as to the exigencies of metre. If, then, Horace did not stress *poetae* when reciting the opening line, none of his listeners could have anticipated the distinction which he was going to draw later on. And anyhow this distinction is something which Horace himself does not seem to take very seriously. In v. 63 *hactenus haec: alias iustum sit necne poema*, etc., he swerves away from discussing its fuller implications, and at the conclusion of the satire he has no hesitation about including himself among the 'band of poets'. Elsewhere, too, he is quite content to grant the title of poet to the writers of New Comedy, e.g. *Ep. 2. 1. 182* and *A.P. 285-8*.

Before leaving this question we must take up another point from Hendrickson's theory. The American scholar believes that the opening lines down to *naris* (8) represent a view current among literary critics before Horace's day and still prevailing in the circle of Valerius Cato. Horace is therefore granting the dependence of Lucilius on Old Comedy and is commending the older satirist's keenness and wit 'for the sake of recording more emphatically his dissent from the praise of Lucilius' style and versification'.¹ This may be supplemented by a quotation from an earlier article: 'It is probable that Roman criticism of Lucilius, in emphasising his relation to Old Comedy had attributed to him poetical qualities which only belonged to the Attic masters with whom he was associated, and in other ways had exaggerated the poetical character of his work.'² According to Hendrickson, then, Horace wishes to say 'Old Comedy is fine poetry but Lucilian Satire is not'.

Now this suggestion seems persuasive enough until one comes to inquire how Lucilius is supposed to be distinguished from the writers of Old Comedy. Then it becomes apparent that Hendrickson's theory is based on a very narrow interpretation of vv. 6-8:

hinc omnis pendet Lucilius, hosce secutus
mutatis tantum pedibus numerisque: facetus
emunctae naris, durus componere versus.

'The Old Comedy', says Hendrickson, 'is characterised not in all its aspects but only those which made it the dreaded scourge of evil-doers in its day.' Accordingly *hinc omnis pendet* means that 'Lucilius is the faithful disciple of Old Comedy in this one respect, namely his aggressive censorious wit'.³ First of all, is Hendrickson not trying to have it both ways? If *poetae* is to be stressed, then

¹ Hendrickson, *Cl. Ph. xi* (1916), 253.

² Id. *A.J.P. xxi* (1900), 129. See also *L. and H.*, pp. 282 and 345.
p. 130.

³ *Ibid. 125.* This is accepted by Fiske,

surely Old Comedy is being characterized not just in its moral aspect, but in its poetic aspect as well; in that case we have to interpret *hinc* as including the aesthetic element as well as the ethical one, and that would mean Lucilius was 'a true poet', which (as Hendrickson admits) is contrary to Horace's intention. Secondly, Hendrickson does not seem to have decided how much of this opening section should be attributed to the pro-Lucilian critics and how much to Horace himself. If everything down to *naris* represents the opinion of the critics, then *hinc* cannot be confined to the Old Comedy's aggressive censorious wit; for these critics were the very people who insisted that Lucilius exhibited the poetic virtues of Old Comedy as well as its *libertas*.

Hendrickson further suggests that Lucilius is marked off from the 'true poetry' of Old Comedy by the formal defects mentioned in vv. 8-13. But these defects are not strictly relevant to the conception of 'true poetry', as may be seen from 43-44 where the 'true poet' is defined purely in terms of grandeur and sonority. In other words, if Lucilius had been in all other respects a 'true poet', he would not have had to forfeit that title on account of his rough versification—after all, the versification of Ennius left much to be desired.

Last of all, surely the most natural translation of *hinc omnis pendet* is 'derives entirely from' (or words to that effect). This is supported by *mutatis tantum pedibus numerisque*, which qualifies v. 6 in regard to metre only, and also by 7-8 which illustrate *omnis pendet*. Lucilius resembles Old Comedy in his wit (*facetus* recalls *comoedia*),¹ in the keenness with which he detects and censures vice (*emunctae naris* recalls 3-5), and in the fact that he writes in verse. I have stated this third relationship in as neutral a way as possible, for it is not absolutely certain whether Horace means that the verses of Lucilius are noticeably rougher than those of the Old Comedy, or whether he is indicating a further similarity between the two types of composition.² What he is not doing, however, is drawing a generic distinction between the 'true poetry' of Old Comedy and the unpoetic Satire of Lucilius.

I would contend, therefore, that we ought not to place any special stress on *poetae*, and that we should give *hinc omnis pendet* its natural meaning. Interpreted in this way, Horace's statement may seem exaggerated to the point of inaccuracy, but this will only give trouble to those who try to find in the passage a balanced and comprehensive literary judgement, instead of reading it as part of the poet's defence.

In writing these articles on the fourth satire I have naturally made some use of the tenth; but I have tried to see the piece on its own as it must have appeared to the literary circles of Rome. This seemed best not only because the fourth preceded the tenth, but also because the later work was by no means a straightforward repetition of the earlier one. In response to protests whose precise content can never be known, Horace qualified some of his former statements, clarified others, and set forth in greater detail his relation to Lucilius. The connexion between the two satires is something which I hope to discuss at another time.

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¹ I would agree with Ullman who takes *facetus* in the general sense 'witty' as against Kiessling-Heinze who equate it with *comis et urbanus* (*Serm. I. 10. 65*) and Hendrickson

who interprets it as harsh wit.

² I hope to discuss this point at another time. See Rackham, *C.R. xxx* (1916), 224.

THE CLASSIFICATION OF GREEK LYRIC POETRY

MANY years ago Wilamowitz desiderated a systematic collection of the texts which relate to the different types of poetry composed by the great lyric poets of Greece. He hoped that if we could only crystallize our admittedly scanty information about the characteristics of, say, the Paean or the Dirge, we might be able to reach a slightly better understanding than we have now of the formal structure and artistic design of the poems and fragments which have come down to us under these titles. Indeed, this kind of knowledge is very important. If we do not know the purpose for which a given poem was written, or the conventions which governed its form, we are deprived of what the Greeks regarded as one of the main criteria for assessing its quality. If we do not appreciate the nature of the task which confronted the poet when he wrote it, we are not qualified to say how far he was successful. There is an important sense in which we are debarred from saying whether or not the poem is *good*.

In 1936 a collection of this kind was compiled in Germany.¹ Starting from the scheme used by Proclus in his *Chrestomathia* it brings together all the ancient material bearing upon the classification of lyric poetry in general and upon the known types of poem in particular, and reveals some of the principles on which this branch of literature was divided by the Alexandrians into convenient categories. But if it is asked whether any conclusions emerge to justify the hopes entertained by Wilamowitz, the answer is disappointing. It is not that there is still too little information; under some heads it is as full as we could wish. But it is information of the wrong sort. It tells us, not of the differences between certain types of poetry which were important when the poetry was written, but only of those differences which were regarded as distinctive when it came to be edited. It reflects, not the original principles of artistic composition, but the posterior principles of Alexandrian classification. Nearly all the passages in Färber's collection, being quotations from post-Alexandrian authors, are more valuable for elucidating the heads under which the Alexandrians, for their own convenience, grouped certain poems, than for indicating what different types existed at the time when the poems were written. In point of fact, the divergence between the original and the Alexandrian poetic terminology is both wide and important, and must not be neglected in any study of the lyric poets.² The main purpose of what follows is to draw attention to, and illustrate, this divergence; the secondary purpose is to suggest just how much and how little it is still possible to get behind the schematism of the Alexandrians and to gain a glimpse of the real conditions governing the composition of certain types of poetry.

I. THE ALEXANDRIAN EDITIONS

It has been generally assumed, even before Wilamowitz's brilliant exposition of the question,³ that a single standard edition was compiled in Alexandria of

¹ H. Färber, *Die Lyrik in der Kunstrtheorie der Antike*, Munich, 1936.

Weir Smyth's *Greek Melic Poets*.

² It is neglected, for example, in the otherwise full and excellent introduction to

³ *Textgeschichte der griechischen Lyrik*, 1900 (T.G.).

each of the nine lyric poets. This assumption is clearly justified, in so far as we know that nine poets were edited (*πραττόμενοι*) in Alexandria (with only a later addition of a tenth, Corinna), and that there are no traces of any rival editions in existence after those of Aristophanes and his collaborators.¹ But it is dangerous to lean too much on the words 'standard edition', which suggest a homogeneous series edited on a common principle; it must be continually borne in mind that the evidence for a tidy standardization only applies to some of the poets, while the rest are quoted in a way so haphazard that, if we did not possess independent evidence, we should certainly not postulate any orderly editorial activity. Thus, it is evident that our manuscript text of Pindar is derived entirely from the edition of Aristophanes, and that this was divided into seventeen books arranged according to *εἰδη* (that is, hymns, dithyrambs, and so forth); and the edition of Bacchylides was similar. The books of Alcman, Alcaeus, Sappho, Ibucus, and Anacreon are known, not by names, but by their numbers,² which the quotations (particularly in the metricalians) show to have been fully standardized. But with Stesichorus and Simonides the situation is less perspicuous. The statement in Suidas that Stesichorus wrote 26 books is generally discounted: it would have been a prodigious *œuvre* for a poet whose fragments barely amount to fifty lines. Instead, it is assumed that Suidas means, not 26 books, but 26 poems, and indeed all references to Stesichorus which are sufficiently explicit to be of any help are not to the titles of books, but to the titles of individual poems (one of which seems to have been in two parts³). How the Alexandrian edition arranged these, and what sort of edition it was, is a question completely unilluminated by any ancient testimony; and since no commentary is known to have been written on Stesichorus after the book by Chamaeleon, since he is sometimes confused with at least one other poet of the same name,⁴ and since his poems were not always distinguished from those of Ibucus, only the single fact of his undisputed place in the canon of the nine *πραττόμενοι* justifies us in assuming that the editors paid him any attention at all. About Simonides the information is more plentiful, but still unsatisfactory. His *epinikia* were named, unlike Pindar's, according to the type of event commemorated (*τέρπιστοι*, *πένταθλοι*, etc.); and there is evidence, slender but positive, for the existence of a book of *θρῆνοι*.⁵ Otherwise, his poems are quoted only by titles (*ἡ Εὐρώπη* and *ἡ ἐπ' Ἀρεμοσίῳ ναυμαχίᾳ*), apart from a single dithyramb and a poem described by a scholiast as *ἐν κατευχαῖς*. Why the evidence should present these idiosyncrasies when referring to Stesichorus and Simonides, when references to the others are so tidy, is a mystery. We cannot even say whether these idiosyncrasies reflect variations in editorial practice or the habits of mind of the authors quoting from particular poets. The confusion is not sufficient to make us doubt the existence of an edition of all nine *lyrici*; but it does prevent us from generalizing about the character of that edition.

¹ The view that the Suidas notice s.v. *Πίνδαρος* represents such an edition seems to me implausible. Cf. Wilamowitz, *Einleitung in die gr. Tr.*, 143 f., and below p. 161.

² Unless Stephanus' words (ad Alcman fr. 13 D) *ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ δευτέρου τῶν παρθενίων στομάτων* are taken to imply the existence of a book of *παρθένων* by Alcman—a very doubtful implication. Corinna's books bore titles:

but she was certainly not edited at this time by the Alexandrians.

³ Schol. H 76 (Pap. Ox. 1087, ii. 48) *Στησοῖχος* ἐν 'Ορεστείας β'; Gramm. Bekk. An. 2. 783. 14 Σ. ἐν δευτέρῳ 'Ορεστείας.

⁴ Cf. Wilamowitz, *S.u.S.* 233 ff., H. J. Rose in *C.Q.* xxvi (1932), 92.

⁵ Stobaeus; Schol. Theocr. 16. 36; Suidas s.v., who lists *θρῆνοι*.

Yet however little uniformity may have prevailed, the compilation of the edition must have involved adopting some principle or principles of classification in order to deal with the multifarious poems of any of the lyric authors. To some extent these principles may have been ready to hand; for there is no reason to think that the Alexandrian editions were the first which had existed. The word ἔδαφια, for example, in Schol. Pind. *Ol.* 5 *inscr.* must refer to a Pindar edition of some kind previous to that of Aristophanes, and Bergk (P.L.G. iii⁴, p. 384) plausibly suggested that the curious title ἐπίνικοι δρομέου (Callimachus fr. 441 Pf.) for a book of Simonides was taken over by Callimachus from an older collection. Yet at some stage the poems had been collected from very various sources (temples, public monuments, private archives, etc.), and the search may have continued right up to the final recension: so that the editors were probably confronted with a mass of heterogeneous material which had to be divided up and arranged in books of a convenient length to be accommodated on a roll of papyrus.¹ This cannot have been an easy task, nor was it always tackled in the same way. The poems of Sappho were arranged, to a considerable extent, according to their metre; but those of Pindar, Bacchylides, and (so far as we can tell) Simonides, being unamenable to this method, were grouped under the titles of *hymn*, *epinikion*, *paeon*, and so forth: that is to say, according to their *εἰδη*. Another possible method is suggested by an unknown grammarian,² who says, *τῶν δὲ ϕῶν αἱ μέν εἰσιν μονόστροφοι, αἱ δὲ τριαδικαὶ*, but there is no evidence that this was ever adopted as a principle of classification;³ and it is impossible to tell what was done for the remaining five poets. Apart, therefore, from the metrical arrangement in Sappho, the arrangement by *εἰδη*—by the content, purpose, or occasion of the poem—in Simonides, Pindar, and Bacchylides is the only one which we can now discern in the remains of the lyric poets,⁴ and it is with this type of classification that I shall be exclusively concerned.

It involved, first, a broad distinction between religious and secular poetry. Proclus (*Bibl. Phot.* p. 319 b 33 ff.) divides the *εἰδη* into *τὰ εἰς θεούς* and *τὰ εἰς ἀνθρώπους*, with a *γένος μικτόν* to accommodate the doubtful cases of *παρθένια*, *δαφνηφορικά*, *ώσχοφορικά*, and *εὐκτικά*. It may perhaps be inferred from the order of the books in the Ambrosian Life of Pindar⁵ that this distinction goes back to the Alexandrian editors; but whether or not this is so, this division alone would have been far too broad to help them a great deal, for the poems still required a further subdivision into books of the standard length. Accordingly, attention was paid to the occasion, religious or secular, for which the

¹ Apparently between one and two thousand lines, v. Irigouin, *Histoire du texte de Pindare*, p. 41.

² 'Anonymous de Lyricis Poetis' = Schol. Epimetr. Pind. iii p. 310. 27 Dr.

³ The modern division into 'choral' and 'monodic', which appears in Diehl, derives from a passage in Plato, *Laws* 764 d-e, and is of no particular value. It was unknown to antiquity or the Renaissance.

⁴ Another idea is attributed to Apollonius the Eidographer (*Et. Mag.* 295. 52) who, εὑρήσης ὃν ἐν τῇ βιβλιοθήκῃ τὰ εἰδή τοῖς εἰδεσιν ἐπένειμεν· τὰς γάρ δοκιμάσας τῶν ϕῶν Δώριον μέλος ἔχειν, ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸν συνῆγε, καὶ Φρυγίας

καὶ Λυδίας, μιξολυδιστί καὶ ιαστί. This eccentric activity, even if historical, can hardly have any relevance to the classification of poems into books; and in fact we find him taking a perfectly rational part in the debate on the correct position of Pythian 2 (Schol. Pyth. 2 *inscr.* p. 31 Dr.). Wilamowitz and others who adduce this passage seem to have overlooked the second part of it.

⁵ Schol. Pind. i p. 3 Dr. (below, p. 161 n. 1). If *παρθένα* are regarded as *εἰς θεούς* the list falls neatly into two groups. Bergk's view that *ὑπορχήματα* belong to the *γένος μικτόν* (P.L.G. ii⁴. 370, n. 2) goes against all the explicit ancient testimony.

poems were composed, and certain specific εἰδη lay ready to hand under which they could be grouped. Thus, the religious poems of Pindar were arranged in books of ὕμνοι, παιάνες, διθύραμβοι, προσόδια, παρθένια, and ὑπορχήματα, and these names, as we know, stood for types of religious poetry which were in use all over the Greek world and had developed particular characteristics. But in considering what these characteristics were, we are confronted by a serious obstacle. This list of titles is highly selective: we know of many more names of religious songs than are contained in it (or indeed in the slightly fuller list of Proclus¹). Pindar, for example, certainly wrote a δαφνηφορικόν; he refers himself (fr. 139) to the *linus* and the *ialemus*; and we may infer from Suidas that he wrote poems which were known at some stage as ἐθνομοῖ and βακχικά. But these names, naturally, do not appear as the titles of *books* in the editions. One poem does not (usually) make a book, and poems written for different occasions had to be grouped together under a single heading. An example of this is Pindar's δαφνηφορικόν, which was placed in a book known (rather mysteriously) as κεκωρισμένα τῶν παρθενίων,² and there were doubtless many instances of poems, composed for a particular local ceremony and bearing the name of that particular cult, being placed with the προσόδια or the ὑπορχήματα or under whichever heading suited them best. Consequently, these headings represent a piece of schematization: a poem handed down under the title 'prosodion' may not be a prosodion at all. And this circumstance greatly complicates such questions as what a 'prosodion' really was. Can we be sure, for example, that all the 'dithyrambs' of Bacchylides were grouped together under the title διθύραμβοι for any better reason than that they embody a continuous narrative,³ or that Pindar's poem on the eclipse was called a 'paean' for any better reason than that it contains a prayer to Apollo?

The same sort of difficulty attends the classification of secular poetry. We possess four books of *epinikia* by Pindar, and it is perfectly clear from these that the editors were not always scrupulous in observing the qualifications of certain poems to belong to certain categories. *Pythians* 3 and 4, for example, are certainly not *epinikia*, if by 'epinikion' is meant a composition to be sung soon after an athletic victory in honour of the victor: they are both a kind of poetic epistle. Similarly, the ancients themselves were aware that the last three 'Nemeans' were only placed in that position for convenience,⁴ and there is no reason to think that in the books which we no longer possess the arrangement was more rigorous. Yet all these anomalous poems became known as 'epinikia' (or whatever the name was of the book in which they occurred), and this again greatly complicates the question of what, for example, an *epinikion* really was, or under what circumstances it was regularly sung.⁵

However, the Alexandrians did not merely extend the denotation of certain terms; in some cases they actually altered the connotation. This disturbing development can be seen clearly in the use of the word ἔγκώμιον as a title for one of the books of Pindar. Three lists of the works of Pindar have come down

¹ Proclus (p. 319 b 35) adds νύμοι, ἀδωνίδια, λέβακοι.

² Proclus, p. 321 a 34: οἱς (sc. παρθενίοις) καὶ τὰ δαφνηφορικὰ ὡς εἰς γένος πίπτει.

³ A good enough reason already for Heracleides Ponticus, [Plut.] *de Mus.* 1134 e. The point is made by Wilamowitz, T.G., p. 43.

⁴ Schol. Pind. *Nem.* 9 *inscr.* Cf. Schol. *Pyth.* 2 *inscr.*

⁵ The answer to the debate whether Pindar's *epinikia* were in principle processional or convivial may be that there existed both kinds, but that the Alexandrians placed them all together regardless.

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to us: one in the Vita Ambrosiana,¹ one in Suidas, s.v. *Πίνδαρος*,² and one in a verse résumé of his life.³ Of these, there are various reasons for regarding the first as the most authoritative. After stating that Pindar wrote seventeen books, it gives a list of titles which exactly add up to that number; Suidas' version, on the other hand, though it also (twice) gives the figure seventeen, does not add up right, contains considerable vagueness in its last words (. . . καὶ ἀλλα πλεῖστα), and is in various ways defective (it only mentions two of the four books of ἐπίνικοι; two of the titles, ἐνθρονισμοὶ and βακχικά, do not occur elsewhere in Greek; and the words δράματα τραγικά τέ̄ add nothing but confusion); while the metrical version is nothing more than a summary, and only a drastic emendation of Bergk's (*ἐν δὲ θρονισμούς* for *τὸν δεδεγμένους*) will bring it into relation with either of the others. It is possible that the Suidas version preserves an older list than that in the Vita Ambrosiana, or again it may be simply a garbled version of the same thing.⁴ But the prima facie claim of the Vita Ambrosiana, in virtue of its comparative clarity and precision, to provide a faithful account of the standard Alexandrian edition, is greatly strengthened by the fact that (except in one item) it agrees entirely with the ancient testimonia. All the poems of Pindar which are quoted or referred to by ancient authors are named—if they are named at all—by one of the titles in the Vita Ambrosiana list; and, conversely, every one of the titles in the list occurs in some quotation of, or reference to, Pindar. To this there is one notable exception: fragments 122, 125, and 128 (Snell) are all quoted as *σκόλια* (indeed fr. 122 actually describes itself as a *σκόλιον*) whereas the Vita Ambrosiana does not mention this title: it only provides, as secular titles, ἐπίνικοι, θρῆνοι, and ἔγκώμια. But it is highly significant that these three citations occur in pre-Alexandrian authors (Chamaeleon, Aristoxenus, and Theophrastus respectively); apart from that in the Suidas life, there are no references to any *σκόλια* of Pindar later than the fourth century B.C.⁵ How is this to be explained? The obvious answer is that the Alexandrians must have placed the poems until then known as *σκόλια* in some other book: obviously not in the religious books; certainly not in the ἐπίνικια (which we possess nearly complete); not, without absurdity, in the θρῆνοι; therefore (as all editors since Boeckh have assumed) in the ἔγκώμια.⁶

¹ Schol. Pind. i p. 3 Dr.: γέγραφε δὲ βιβλία ἐπικαΐδεα: ὑμνούς, παιᾶνας, διβυράμβων β', προσόδιαν β': παρθείνων β', φέρετα δὲ καὶ γ' ὁ ἐπιγράφεται κεχωρισμένων παρθείνων ὑπορχημάτων β', ἔγκώμια, θρῆνος,

Mus. xlv (1889), 558 ff.). For another explanation see Wilamowitz, *Einleitung*, 185 and n. 126.

² Suidas s.v. Πίνδαρος has *Πίνδαρος* ἐν σχῷ, where the cod. Ber. of Photius reads *σκόλιος*, em. *σκόλιος* Reitz. Hiller (op. cit., p. 368, n. 2) believes the words to be an interpolation and reads *Πίνδαρος*. [*ἐν σχῷ*?]. Even if Reitzenstein's reading is accepted, the reference can hardly be to Pindar fr. 124 (cf. Reitzenstein ad loc.); Bergk (P.L.G. i. 372-3), followed by Körte (*Hermes*, liii (1918), 198, n. 2), explains it as an allusion to an edition of Pindar prior to that of Aristophanes. Thus, one can either reject the reading or explain it away.

³ Cf. Körte, *Hermes*, liii (1918), 138 f. Fr. 118 is quoted as an ἔγκώμιον by Schol. Ol. 2. 39 a, proving that the scholiast knew of a book of ἔγκώμια.

⁴ Dr. i p. 9, 26 ff: ἐμελψε δὲ κύδος ἀγύνων τῶν ποιῶν, μακάρων παιήνων τὸν δεδεγμένους καὶ μέλος ὀρχηθμοῖο, θεῶν τ' ἐρικύδεας ὑμνούς ἡδὲ μελιφόρρυγαν μελεδήματα παρθενίαν.

⁵ So Hiller (*Hermes*, xxi (1886), 357 ff.) and (for different reasons) Immisch (*Rh.*

Why did this happen? The explanation is that by the third century the term *σκόλιον* had come to have a narrower application than it had in the early fifth century, and a new term had to be found for many of the poems which used to be called *σκόλια*. A summary of the history of these two words will make this clear.¹

(a) *σκόλιον*. Amid the confused testimony of the grammarians and lexicographers on this subject can be uncovered a statement of Dicaearchus² (*Schol. Plat. Gorg.* 451 e) that the word *σκόλιον* denoted three different kinds of singing: first (after dinner) came a paean, sung by all the guests together; then followed simple stanzas sung by each of the guests in turn, holding the *μυρρίνη* (and consequently not accompanying themselves); and finally songs sung to the lyre, not by all the guests, but only those who were able, *οἱ συνετάτατοι*. That this was in fact the custom in the fifth century has been well illustrated by Reitzenstein (*Epigramm und Skolian*, i, § 3) from contemporary authors. The *paean* was a hymn to the gods which accompanied the libations (*τριτόσπονδον παιάνω*, Aesch. *Ag.* 245; *φάντας τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὰλλα τὰ νομίζουσα*, Plato, *Symp.* 176 a); the singing with the *μυρρίνη* was clearly the performance by each of the guests in turn of the simple stanzas such as we find in Athenaeus' collection of Attic *σκόλια* (*μέλος . . . ἀπλούστατον μάλιστα*, Proclus) and was probably accompanied by the flute (Ar. *Vespae* 1219; the *αὐλητρίς* was sent away at this point in Plato's *Symposium*); and the third class of songs, sung to the lyre by the *συνετάτατοι*, were poems by the great lyric poets (cf. Ar. *Nubes* 1354 ff., Schol. Ar. *Vesp.* 1222, Eupolis ap. Athenaeum 638 e, etc.). Stesichorus, Simonides, Pindar, Alcaeus, and Anacreon are all mentioned in this connexion, and any of their poems which were suitable for performance after dinner, whether intended for this purpose, like Pindar's *ὅχημ' ἀοιδᾶν μεταδόρπιον* (fr. 124), or not, could be sung as *σκόλια* of this third class. So, in a fragment of Aristophanes (223 K), we read *ἔσον δὴ μοι σκόλιον τι λαβὼν Ἀλκαῖον κάνακρέοντος*. But fashions changed. For lyrics by Simonides were substituted choruses from the plays of Aeschylus or Euripides; for choruses from tragedy were substituted recitations (Reitzenstein, op. cit., pp. 34–35); and by the time of Aristotle (who is the last author we hear of as composing a *σκόλιον*) both the custom of singing extended lyric compositions to the lyre, and the skill required to do so, were dying out. The only drinking-songs which remained in use were those which had belonged to the second stage of the fifth-century convivialities—the short stanzas in fixed metres, sung by each of the guests in turn, holding in their hands the myrtle-branch instead of the more exacting lyre. These stanzas (which were also occasionally the work of, or at least attributed to, a famous lyric poet, e.g. no. 8 in Diehl = Alcaeus L1 Lobel-Page) were now collected into song-books, such as that used by Athenaeus in Bk. 15 and by Aristotle in his *Constitution of Athens*, and were the only type of song which continued to be known as *σκόλια*. Even in the generation of Aristotle's pupils, this narrowing of the sense of the word *σκόλιον* is observable. Reitzenstein (op. cit., p. 11) and Severyns³ agree in the view that Dicaearchus used the word to include

¹ Most of the material is collected by Färber ss.vv., Reitzenstein, *Epigramm und Skolian*, c. i, and Fraustadt, *Encomiorum in litteris Graecis . . . historia*, Diss. Leipzig, 1909.

² Apparently followed by Artemon ὁ Κασσαρέως in Athen. 694 a and by Plut. *Qu. Symp.* 615 b.

³ *Proclus et la Chanson de Table*, § 1 in *Mélanges Bidez*, 1934. The question is summarized by Wehrli in his commentary to Dicaearchus fr. 88 (*Schule des Aristoteles*, i, 1944). I do not think that it can be inferred from Schol. Ar. *Nubes* 1364 that D. did not use the word *σκόλιον* of the second class.

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the third class—the songs sung to the lyre by the *συνετάτατοι*—while Aristoxenus used it only of the second, the *ἀπλούστατον μέλος* sung with the *μυρρίνη*. However this may be, it is certain that the word *σκόλιον* soon became restricted to denoting *only* the second class. Now that it was no longer the custom to sing the poems of Pindar informally after dinner, it was no longer appropriate to call any of them *σκόλια*; consequently the Alexandrians had to find another name for those which had up till then been known as *σκόλια*.¹ As has been shown, the name they chose was *ἐγκώμιον*.

(b) *ἐγκώμιον*. In the time of Plato there were at least two uses of this word, one literary and one rhetorical. (i) In the literary use it denoted a specific kind of composition: this is proved by Plato, *Io* 534 c: οἱδέ τε ἐκαστος ποιεῖν καλῶς ἐφ' ὁ ή Μούσα αὐτῶν ὥρμησεν, ὁ μὲν διθνάρμβος, ὁ δὲ ἐγκώμια, ὁ δὲ ὑπορχήματα, ὁ δὲ ἔπη, ὁ δὲ ίαμβος. There is also good evidence to show what this *εἶδος* was: it was an *epinikion*, the song sung after an athletic victory in honour of the successful athlete (Plato, *Laws* 822 b: ἐγκώμια τε ποιοῦντες ἥδομεν τὸν ἡπτάμενον νευκικότα, οὕτε ὄρθως ἂν οὐτ' οἷμα προσφιλῶς τοῖς δρομεῦσιν ἡμᾶς ἂν τὰ ἐγκώμια προσάπτειν κτλ. Cf. *Lysis* 205 c-e). This meaning was certainly current in Aristophanes (*Tagenistae* i. 518 K) and may even be present in Pindar.² (ii) In the same period the word was used as a term of rhetoric to denote an extended eulogy, whether in prose or verse,³ e.g. Plato, *Laws* 7. 801 e, *Symposium* 177 a, Aristotle, *Eth. Eud.* 1219^b15, *Poet.* 1448^b27, etc. A limitation to this use was imposed by Aristotle:⁴ an *ἐγκώμιον* should properly be inspired by certain deeds, while a mere eulogy of a person's character is called an *ἔπαινος*. Apart from this limitation, it was perfectly legitimate to use the word of a poem,⁵ and this inevitably led to some confusion; for there was nothing to prevent a poem which contained a eulogy from being called an *ἐγκώμιον* from the rhetorical point of view, even when from the literary point of view it was positively misleading to do so, that is, when no victory was in question (e.g. Plato, *Laws*, l.c.: ὕμνοι θεῶν καὶ ἐγκώμια κεκουνωμένα εὐχαῖς).⁶ The word, however, continued to bear both these senses throughout the fourth century: Chamaeleon (ap. Athen. 573 f) refers to an *epinikion* of Pindar (*Ol.* 13) as an *ἐγκώμιον*, clearly in the literary, not the rhetorical, sense, whereas the rhetorical sense is the only one discernible in Aristotle. But the Alexandrians, in adopting the word as a term of classification for lyric poetry, discarded the literary sense—the term *ἔπινίκιον*

¹ Cf. Wilamowitz, *T.G.*, p. 44: 'Ganz allgemein haben sie den Namen Skolien perhorrescirt.'

² The word occurs *O.* 2. 47, *O.* 10. 77, *O.* 13. 29, *P.* 10. 53, *N.* 1. 7, cf. *N.* 4. 11, *N.* 8. 50. None of these passages precludes the more general interpretation 'revel-song', out of which the technical term doubtless grew, but at the same time none is incompatible with, and some seem positively to invite, the interpretation 'victory-song'.

³ Later writers distinguish it from a brief commendation (*ἔπαινος*), e.g. Suidas s.v.

⁴ Ar. *Eth. Eud.* l.c., *Rhet.* 1. 1367^b26 ff.: ἔστι δὲ ἔπαινος λόγος ἐμφανίζων μέρεθος ἀρετῆς . . . τὸ δὲ ἐγκώμιον τῶν ἔργων ἔστιν.

⁵ Ar. *Rhet.* 2. 1388^b21: καὶ ὁν ἔπαινοι καὶ ἐγκώμια λέγονται η ὑπὸ ποιητῶν η λογογράφων.

⁶ An example of this kind of confusion is Simonides' poem on the dead at Thermopylae, which is referred to by Diodorus Siculus as an *ἐγκώμιον τῆς ἀρετῆς αὐτῶν*. This phrase is surely rhetorical, not literary. Diodorus does not say *Σιμωνίδης ἐν τοῖς ἐγκώμιοις*, and we have no other evidence that one of the books of his poems bore this title. Editors should therefore be cautious (as Bergk observes, *P.L.G.* iii⁴. 383) in placing this poem under the heading *ΕΓΚΩΜΙΑ—ΘΟΡΗΝΟΙ* would surely be more appropriate. (Cf. Bowra, *Class. Phil.* xxviii, 1933, 277, whose objection to *θορῆνος* is unfounded, cf. below, p. 169.) Still less can we say with Smyth (p. lxxvii) 'The encomion was the creation of Simonides'. All that Simonides could have understood by the word, as a technical literary term, is *epinikion*.

suiting them better—and borrowed from the rhetorical sense, which they defined in such a way as to exclude religious poetry (*τὸν μὲν ὑμνον εἶναι θεῶν, τὸ δ' ἐγκάμιον θυητῶν*, Aphth. *Progym.* 8: a distinction which only appears at a late period) but to include almost any poem addressed to a man that was not already covered by the terms *θρῆνος* and *ἐπινίκιον*.¹ The *ἐγκάμιον* became, in fact, a 'poetic eulogy', a convenient heading under which to place those poems which were formerly known as *σκόλια* but which it would now, for reasons given above, have been positively misleading to call by this name.²

The effect of all this is to make us exceedingly sceptical of the value of all information about the different types of lyric poetry which may be based on the artificial distinctions of the Alexandrians rather than on real differences of technique in the compositions themselves. The interest of the Alexandrians was the practical one of classification; our interest is the more searching one of detecting formal conditions governing the composition of the poems. Our problem is to get behind the schematic classification of the scholars, so that we may see something of the methods of the poets. To this problem I now wish to turn.

II. THE ORIGINAL POETIC ART-FORMS

The admission that the classification adopted by the Alexandrians cannot be assumed to correspond with any formal differences obtaining when the poetry was written may awaken a doubt whether any such differences ever in fact existed, and this sense of uncertainty is if anything increased when we turn to the surviving poetry itself. Even when we can detect a difference in the purpose or occasion for which certain poems were written (e.g. *Pythians* 4 and 5), we find that differences of style or technique are remarkably elusive. We may think we notice a certain slackening of intensity in Pindar's 'paean' as compared with his 'epinikia', but we find it very difficult to base this subjective impression upon any reliable criterion. Again, we may think we have very good grounds for believing that the 'dithyrambs' of Bacchylides should not be so called at all: they do not bear any of the exciting characteristics which we associate with this genre. Yet we have very little idea what we ought to call them instead. Even in antiquity questions of this kind caused anxiety. Was there any real difference between a *paean* and a *hyporcheme* ([Plut.] *de Mus.* c. 9)? Was Aristotle's poem to Hermias a *paean* or a *skolion* (Athen. 696)? If questions such as these bothered the ancient critics we may well begin to doubt whether there existed any intrinsic difference between one kind of poetry and another, and we might despair of ever finding more reliable criteria than those provided by the Alexandrians. However, to adopt this extreme scepticism is to ignore an important piece of evidence: that some formal differences did exist is

¹ Why was the *ἐγκάμιολογικόν* so named? Hephaestion (p. 50 *Cons.*) adduces examples of it from Alcaeus and Anacreon, which he would hardly have done if it had been called after the original *ἐγκάμιον* = *ἐπινίκιον*. It is more likely that the Alexandrians gave this name to a metre found in the numerous *σκόλια* of Alcaeus and Anacreon, which they had by now renamed *ἐγκάμια*. Cf. below, p. 175. *ἐγκάμιον*, meaning *ἐπινίκιον*, still turns up occasionally in the Scholia on Pin-

dar, e.g. Schol. *Nem.* 7. 113.

² This change seems to be the point of a difficult passage in Philodemus, *de Musica* (p. 67f. Kemke): *περὶ τῶν ἐγκάμιων αὐτὰ ταῦτα εἰπώμεν· οὐτὶ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιημάτων ἐγίνετο, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπὸ τῶν κατὰ μουσικὴν τὴν νῦν ἔξεταζομένην, καὶ ὧν' ἐκείνων εὑτελῶς καὶ διονήτως τοῖς ἐπαινούμενοις· καὶ τοῦτο καὶ τῶν ρητορικῶν ἔστι καὶ καθόλου τῶν συγγραφέων κοινόν.*

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stated unequivocally by Plato, *Laws* 700 a-b, a passage which it will be well to quote in full.

διηρημένη γάρ δὴ τότε ἦν ἡμῖν ἡ μουσικὴ κατὰ εἶδη τε ἑαυτῆς ἄπτα καὶ σχῆματα, καὶ τι ἦν εἶδος ὥδῆς εὐχαὶ πρὸς θεούς, ὄνομα δὲ ὕμνοι ἐπεκαλοῦντο· καὶ τούτῳ δὴ τὸ ἑαυτίον ἦν ὥδῆς ἔτερον εἶδος—θρήνος δὲ τις ἀν αὐτοὺς μάλιστα ἐκάλεσεν—καὶ παιῶνες ἔτερον, καὶ ἄλλο, Διονύσου γένεσις οἴμαι, διθύραμβος λεγόμενος. νόμος τε αὐτὸ τούτῳ τοῦνομα ἐκάλουν, ὥδὴν ὡς τινα ἔτεραν ἐπέλεγον δὲ κιθαρῳδικούς. τούτων δὴ διατεταγμένων καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν, οὐκ ἔξῆν ἄλλο εἰς ἄλλο καταχρῆσθαι μέλους εἶδος.

In this passage Plato is comparing the state of affairs which preceded the Persian War with the decadence which he alleges to have followed it, and he makes it perfectly clear that in the former period (i.e. what we call the 'archaic' period) the hymn, the dirge, the paean, the dithyramb, and the nome each had its specific *eîdos* καὶ σχῆμα and that these were rigorously adhered to until the later period, when poets began 'mixing dirges with hymns and paens with dithyrambs'.¹ These final words preclude, in my opinion, the possibility that Plato is here talking only about the *music* which accompanied poetical compositions and not about the compositions themselves. Indeed he makes separate mention of purely musical deterioration (*καὶ αὐλωδίας δὴ ταῖς κιθαρῳδίαις μυαιόμενοι*) and although his strictures certainly apply also to musical innovations, they are not by any means restricted to music alone; and it is impossible to make sense of the passage as a whole unless it is allowed that Plato is referring to well-known formal differences which existed between these various types of poetry. Nor is there any reason *a priori* to doubt the truth of Plato's statement: it would be more surprising to hear that there were no such differences, and in point of fact certain features emerge from the fragments themselves which bear Plato out. The distinctive structure of the *nome* is already familiar from Wilamowitz's exposition of it in his edition of the *Persae* of Timotheus, and to this I have nothing to add. There are, however, a few characteristics of the other genres which go some way towards distinguishing them one from another and which deserve a detailed discussion.

(a) *ὕμνος*. So multifarious are the uses of this word throughout Greek literature (it is used of almost any kind of song) that it is at first sight surprising to find it as the name of a specific *eîdos*. On the other hand, there is evidence that Plato (*Rep.* 607 a, *Symp.* 177 a) used it in a fairly limited sense, that of a religious, as opposed to a secular song, and this enabled later writers² to make the distinction *τὸν μὲν ὕμνον εἶναι θεῶν, τὸ δὲ ἐγκάύμον θηρῶν*. This technical limitation of the word was not universally accepted, even at a later date;³ but I think we may take it that Plato here intends *ὕμνος* in the sense, discernible elsewhere in his works, of a song addressed to gods and not to men, and this at any rate gives us the opposition required by the following words, *καὶ τούτῳ δὴ* (sc. *τῷ ὕμνῳ*) *ἑαυτίον ἦν ὥδῆς ἔτερον εἶδος—θρήνος . . .* —for there is no doubt that the *θρήνος* was addressed only to men. But it takes us no farther towards seeing why the *ὕμνος* was different from the other *eîdē* in the list; indeed a

¹ *κεραυνόντες δὲ θρήνος τε ὕμνοις καὶ παιῶνας διθυράμβοις* (700 d).

² e.g. Ammonius *περὶ διαφόρ. λέξ.* p. 52 Valck.

³ For example, we find in Schol. Lond. Dion. Thrax 451, 6 Hilg. the definition, *ὕμνος ἐστὶ ποίημα περιέχον θεῶν ἐγκάύμα καὶ ἥρων μετ' εὐχαριστίας*.

number of the passages collected by Färber which go back to Didymus *περὶ λυρικῶν ποιητῶν* illustrate *ὕμνος* as a generic term which could be further specified by phrases such as *ὕμνος προσοδίου*, *ὕμνος ἐγκωμίου*, *ὕμνος παιάνου καὶ ῥά ὅμοια*. Menander *Rhetor* corroborates this by saying that when a hymn is written for Apollo we call it a *paean*, when for Dionysus a *dithyramb* or *iobacchus* and so on. But this generic use of *ὕμνος* (*ώς γένος πρὸς εἰδή*)—which is doubtless at least as old as Plato—will not fit the passage in the *Laws* at all: for there the *ὕμνος* is something specific, and there is opposition and contrast (*ἐναντίον . . . ἔτερον εἴδος κτλ.*) between the hymn and the other forms mentioned. How is this to be explained?

Clearly Plato was using *ὕμνος* in a still more restricted sense than that of 'any song addressed to a god'. That such a sense at some time existed appears from Didymus himself, who makes a distinction between *hymns* sung to the lyre and *prosodia* sung to the flute.¹ At one moment, therefore, Didymus is talking of the *ὕμνος προσοδίου* while at the next he is contrasting the *ὕμνος* with the *προσόδων*! At least we can gather from this that Didymus was aware of two senses of the word *ὕμνος*, one of which (*ὅ κυρίως ὕμνος*) was entirely technical, and denoted a specific kind of religious song, sung to the lyre. The same distinction is made by Proclus (p. 320 a 18) who adds a further difference: *ὅ δὲ κυρίως ὕμνος πρὸς κιθάραν ἥδετο ἑστάτων*. This detail (*ἑστάτων*) is interesting; and since there is independent evidence² that hymns existed which were not accompanied by dancing, we may perhaps accept it as true and affirm that the *κυρίως ὕμνος* was a religious song sung to the lyre without movement in the choir;³ and this second characteristic has an interesting corollary. The current explanation of the triadic structure of most choral lyric poetry was that each strophe, antistrophos, and epode corresponded with an evolution of the choir. Claudius Ptolemaeus⁴ propounded the theory that the direction of these movements had an astrological significance. This theory is of course valueless: but its notable popularity shows that the connexion between the triadic system and the movements of the choir was generally admitted. Now it would have been difficult to believe in this connexion if one type of choral composition (namely the *hymn*) was always sung standing still—unless this type was not triadic.

We are not explicitly told, but it is perhaps not too rash to guess, that this type of hymn—*ὅ κυρίως ὕμνος*—was always monostrophic. The fragments we possess are unfortunately too meagre for us to be able to say that this was so (although we can recognize far more hymns in the remains of the monostrophic poets than anywhere else); but we may observe that no 'hymn' has survived

¹ Orion p. 156, 3 ff. Sturz. *κεχώρισται δὲ* (sc. *ὕμνος*) *τῶν προσοδίων καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἔστι τὰ μὲν προσόδαια, καθὰ καὶ κέκληται, προσιότες ναοῖς η̄ βωμοῖς πρὸς αὐλὸν ἥδον· τὸν δὲ ὕμνον πρὸς κιθάραν.*

² Athenaeus 631 d (probably from Aristoxenus): *τὸν γὰρ ὕμνον (τῶν γὰρ ὕμνων edd.) οἱ μὲν ὠρχοῦντο οἱ δὲ οὐκ ὠρχοῦντο.* The sense of the context seems to me to rule out the proposed emendation, and as it stands the passage supports no conclusion weightier than that which I have drawn.

³ Et. Mag. 690, 41 has an article dividing

μέλη καὶ ὕμνοι into *προσόδαια, ὑπορχήματα, and στάσιμα*. If this is relevant, the *στάσιμα* are the *κυρίως ὕμνοι* of Proclus, and it is possible that the stance of the choir (*ἑστάτων*) should be interpreted as a comparatively restricted movement, as in the *στάσιμον* of a tragedy. Cf. Smyth, p. xxix, n. 1. This concession in no way affects the point that a particular kind of hymn existed which was performed in a particular way.

⁴ Schol. Epimetr. Pind. iii, p. 311 Dr. Cf. Färber, i. 20-22.

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which conflicts with this hypothesis,¹ which, if it is accepted, furnishes a formal characteristic sufficient to distinguish the *ὕμνος* from any of the other *εἰδη* of religious poetry in Plato's list.

This, however, is mere conjecture. We are on safer ground if we consider the specific content of the hymn rather than its form. Plato, in the passage under discussion, gives us a lead in this direction by introducing the hymn as *εὐχαὶ πρὸς θεούς, ὄνομα δὲ ὕμνοι ἐπεκαλοῦντο*, and we find just the sort of description of this that we want in the late rhetorician Menander (pp. 333 ff. Sp.). We need have no scruples about consulting a manual of rhetoric on this subject. Menander, quite justifiably, regarded the business of addressing the gods (whether in prose or in verse) as an exercise in rhetoric, and went on to discuss, from a rhetorical point of view, the various forms which such addresses might take. As a title for all these forms, whether in prose or in verse, he was evidently using *ὕμνος* in a wide and purely rhetorical sense (cf. the same treatment of *ἐγκώμιον* discussed above). But there are two of these forms—*ὕμνοι κλητικοί* and *ἀποπεμπτικοί*—which he found particularly exemplified in lyric poetry and which, since they consist principally of prayers and addresses to the god invoked, appear to correspond exactly with what Plato describes as *εὐχαὶ πρὸς θεούς*. He explains that 'kletic hymns' would dwell on all the temples, countries, rivers, and so forth which the god might be residing in at the time, and always ended with a prayer.² If the *εὐχαὶ* were the most important part, the *ἐπίκλησις* would be curtailed; otherwise the *ἐπίκλησις* might occupy the greater part of the poem (as in Pindar, *Ol.* 14, which is manifestly written in the style of a hymn). 'Apopemptic hymns' were in a less urgent, more propitiatory style and tended to dwell on the charms of the spot which the god was leaving. Moreover—*ἀνάγκη δὲ γένεσθαι καὶ τὴν εὐχὴν ἐπὶ ἐπανόδῳ καὶ ἐπιδημίᾳ δευτέρᾳ*.

Menander shows, by his frequent references to the lyric poets, that he found these recurrent details in the poems themselves, and it is a fair guess that they were characteristic of those poems which were generally known, after the Alexandrian age, as *ὕμνοι*. This guess is confirmed by the fragments which we still possess of these poems. Typically 'kletic' formulae occur again and again (*Κύπρον ἵμερτὰν λιποῖσα*, Alcman 35 D; *δεῦρο δηδὺτε Μοῖσαι χρύσιον λιποῖσα* . . ., Sappho 154 D; *Ἄνασσ' Ἀθανά πολεμάδοκος ἀπο Κορωνίας* . . ., Alcaeus 3 D, etc., etc.) and we have no difficulty in recognizing specially hymnodic constructions such as *εἴ ποτε . . . ἔθε καὶ νῦν* (*O* 372, Sappho 1 D, Soph. *O.T.* 159 ff., etc.).³ Indeed, as H. Fränkel (*G.G.N.*, 1924, p. 73) has observed, the hymn to Aphrodite of Sappho (1 D) is so strictly bound by the hymnodic form that the whole of Sappho's personal experiences are contained in a single period introduced by the conventional *εἴ ποτε . . .* I need not elaborate on this topic here: it has been excellently treated by Norden, *Agnostos Theos*, pp. 143–76. The important point gained is that Menander found, and we

¹ Even if Snell's reconstruction, from various fragments, of Pindar's first hymn is accepted, there is still no evidence of triadic construction: indeed metrical correspondence between the strophes is the main argument for grouping the fragments together. Cf. Snell, *Antike und Abendland*, ii (1947), 187, and Turyn, *Pindari Carmina*, p. 341.

² *ἀπαντες γὰρ ἀνυποῖντες τοὺς θεοὺς εἰς εὐχὰς ἐγκλείουσι τοὺς λόγους* (p. 342).

³ Plato refers explicitly to one such formula in *Cratylus* 400 e: *ῶστετέντας εὐχαῖς νόμος ἐστίν ήμιν εὔχεσθαι, οἵτινες τε καὶ σπόθεν χαίρουσαν ὄνομαζόμενοι, ταῦτα καὶ ήμᾶς αὐτούς καλεῖν*. Plato himself frequently parodies these formulae, e.g. *Philebus* 63 b, *Prot.* 358 a. Even in Homer one may detect this kind of flippancy, *I* 96–97. For a comprehensive analysis of these formulae, cf. Zuntz, *Rh. Mus.* xciv (1951), 337 ff.

can still detect, in the poems edited under the title *Ὕμνοι*, a structural form sufficiently clear and regular for treatment in a book on rhetoric;¹ and this alone fully justifies Plato's description of the archaic hymn as a specific *εἶδος*.

(b) *θρῆνος*. The fact that the *θρῆνος* was sung in honour of a man and not of a god is sufficient in itself to distinguish it from the other *εἶδη* mentioned by Plato (for this is the only non-religious *εἶδος* in his list): and that this is the distinction which he had in mind is suggested by the fact that part of his charge against later poets is that they 'mixed *θρῆνος* with *Ὕμνοι*'. But this banal distinction is not quite all we can say about the *θρῆνος*, even though only two of the nine lyric poets, Simonides and Pindar, are known to have written any, and the fragments which survive are wretchedly few.² Exiguous as these fragments are, they present a notably consistent appearance: their content is entirely gnomic and consolatory. Here is no wild tearing of the hair or flood-gate of unrestrained emotion; the mood is one of resignation and of philosophic admonition, resembling the calm detachment of the figures on fourth-century tombstones.³ The passion of, for instance, Cassandra's great lament in the *Agamemnon* is absent: the fragments of Simonides' dirges breathe only the vanity of human life, those of Pindar glow with the glory of the life after death. This quality of restraint, which is present in all the fragments, may seem somewhat surprising: we are inclined to assume that the Greek dirge was a highly demonstrative affair. The question at once arises, whether the fragments are by some chance exceptional in mood,⁴ and the *θρῆνος* normally a much more impassioned composition, or whether, on the contrary, they are typical of the form, and a fair sample of the mood which the *θρῆνος* generally expressed.

It must be confessed at once that the evidence is exceedingly meagre; but so far as it goes it gives some support to the view that these fragments are typical of the archaic *θρῆνος* style; and since the opposite view, that the *θρῆνος* was a highly impassioned affair, is also a pure assumption, based on modern expectation rather than on ancient evidence, the following argument, though by no means decisive, may perhaps be allowed to hold the field until (as may yet happen) another *θρῆνος* turns up in Egypt. It is necessary, in the first place, to make a distinction. There are two occasions in Homer on which a *θρῆνος* is performed: one (*Ω* 720 ff.) at the reception into Troy of the body of Hector,

¹ One 'hymn' has survived which does not conform at all. Pindar fr. 29 begins "*Ιαγκρὸν ἡ χρυσαλάκαρον Μελίαν ḥ . . . ḥ . . . ḥ . . . ḥ . . . ḥ . . . ὑμήσουμεν*"—a rhetorical flourish which, though it has a story attached to it (Plut. *de gloria Ath.* 347f.), is wildly inappropriate to what we think of as a hymnodic invocation. Yet the scholiast on Pa-Lucian (who quotes it) calls it the *ἀρχαὶ τῶν Πωνέρων ὕμνον*. If this is accepted, we must either suppose that this is not really a hymn at all, and was only placed in its position by the Alexandrians for some adventitious reason (such as that the first verb is *ὑμήσουμεν*); or else that Pindar already shows symptoms of the decadence diagnosed by Plato, in that he does not adhere to the strict form of the hymn. Schol. *Nem.* 1 a lends support to the first alternative.

² There is not the slightest evidence for

Diehl's assumption that the Danae-fragment of Simonides was a *θρῆνος*: it is quoted by Dion. Hal. as *ἡ διά πελάγους φερούμενη Δανάη τὰς έαυτῆς ἀποδυνομένη τύχας*. A narrative of this kind is just as likely to have occurred in a dithyramb or an epinikion. Exactly the same goes for Sim. (?) 13 b D = Bacchyl. (?) 60 Sn.

³ It was this restraint which struck R. M. Rilke: 'Erstaunte euch nicht auf attischen Stelen die Vorsicht menschlicher Geste?' (*Duino Elegies*, ii.)

⁴ It might be maintained that *of course* all the fragments of Simonides' *θρῆνοι* are gnomic, since they all come from Stobaeus (who was collecting just this sort of thing). But it will still have to be explained why this was the only book of Simonides in which Stobaeus found the sort of sentiment he was looking for.

the other (ω 60 f.) at the funeral of Achilles. In each case there is an explicit contrast between two kinds of lamentation. In the first, it is said of the professional singers, the *δοιδοί*, that 'they performed the *θρῆνος* (*οἱ μὲν ἄρ' ἔθρηνεον*) while the women lamented at the same time (*ἐνī δὲ στενάχοντο γυναικεῖς*); and to them (*τρῆναι*, the women) Andromache was the leader of the *γύος*'. It is evident that Homer is describing two different, though possibly simultaneous, performances, the *θρῆνος* of the professionals, and the *γύος* of the women. In exactly the same way, at the funeral of Achilles (ω 58 ff.), the daughters of the Old Man of the Sea stood around 'piteously lamenting' (*οἴκτρ' ὀλόφυρόμεναι*), while all the nine Muses, 'responding to each other with beautiful voice, *θρῆνον*'. (Pindar describes the same scene in *Isthm.* 8. 58 and also mentions the *πολύφαμος θρῆνος* of the Muses.) There is therefore a distinction to be made between the formal, artistic *θρῆνος* performed by professionals (or by the instructors *par excellence* of the professionals, the Muses themselves), and the *γύος* of the bereaved.¹ The content of the *γύος* can be inferred from Homer. Andromache, Hecuba, and Helen each take a part in 'leading the *γύος*' over Hector, and their speeches are expressions of personal grief and affliction. What, meanwhile, the *δοιδοί* were singing, Homer unfortunately does not say; but it is reasonable to guess that this *θρῆνος* was a lament in more general terms, which the bards could quickly adapt to the particular occasion, even if (as in this instance) they were given no time in order to prepare themselves. It is not to be expected that they were providing just another, more organized, version of the chief mourners' personal *γύος*.

This professional performance of dirges continued, as one might expect, into later times. When it was restricted to the ritual performance at a funeral it bore the name ἐπικήδειον, and became indeed so rigidly conventional by the end of the fifth century that it was customary to hire Carians to perform these ἐπικήδειοι φόδαι at funerals (Plato, *Law* 800 e and Schol.). But at the same time the word θρῆνος is preserved by the grammarians as a slightly less restricted technical term—slightly less restricted because, according to Proclus,² it could also denote a dirge sung subsequently in memory of the deceased. There seems no reason to doubt that this was the type of composition by Simonides and Pindar which the Alexandrians placed under the title θρῆνοι. Indeed, it is probable that Pindar must have written at least some of his θρῆνοι well after the death of the man commemorated (cf. fr. 137 b Schr.), by which time a γόος would have been inappropriate, an ἐπικήδειον belated (and not apparently a form practised by the lyric poets), and a θρῆνος the only acceptable artistic composition.

To return, then, to the character of these *θρῆνοι*: it is now possible to say that they did not express the personal grief of the bereaved (which belongs to the *γόος*), and it has been suggested that they were couched in somewhat more general terms. Various hints can be gathered about their content. The grammarians insist that the *θρῆνοι* must contain an ἐγκάώμοιο: Aristocles (ap. Ammon. περὶ διαφόρ. λέξ. p. 54 Valck.) says that it ὁδηρίζει σὺν ἐγκάωμι τὸν τελευτήσαντος, and a fragment of Didymus³ has the same implication. Furthermore, there is slight evidence for a narrative content in the *θρῆνοι* of Simonides

¹ The point is made by E. Reiner, *Die rituelle Totenklage der Griechen* = Tüb. Beitr. z. Altertumsw. Heft 30, 1938, pp. 8 f.

² See the passages collected by Färber, ii. 53 f.

³ Didymus (ap. Orion 58. 7, followed by

Journal (pp. 311-312), November 1,

Proclus, p. 321 a 30) offers the derivation ἐλέγος ὁ θρήνος, διὰ τὸ δὲ αὐτὸν τοῦ θρήνου εἰ λέγειν τοὺς κατοιχμένους. This does not make sense unless by θρῆνος is understood that particular kind of consolation which consists in dwelling upon the virtues of the deceased.

and Pindar (Favorinus ad Sim. fr. 6 D; Schol. Pind. *Ol.* 1. 127 a = Pind. fr. 135). But it is not the content of these poems that is important here (for this is lost beyond recall) so much as the mood which pervaded them; for we want to know whether the surviving fragments are in this respect typical or not. By excluding from its province the immediate and personal lamentation of the bereaved we have already made it seem more plausible that the formal lyric *θρῆνος* was a more restrained type of composition. A further indication that this was so is in the use of the word *θρῆνος* in two instances in Tragedy. It is true, of course, that by the fifth century the word could be used with complete generality of any form of lament. For instance, in the *Agamemnon* (1075) Cassandra utters an inarticulate cry (*ἀτονοτοτοῖ πόσοι δᾶ*), upon which the chorus comment that Apollo is not *τοιοῦτος ὥστε θρηνητοῦ τυχεῖν*; and the word can be found in almost any funereal context. But since the word also survived as a technical term, it would be surprising if one did not occasionally find it used more precisely, and in fact one such use gives the point to a famous passage in the same play (1322 ff.). There, after her long and desperate scene, Cassandra decides to add a final word. She says, *ἄπαξ ἐτ' εἰπεῖν ρῆσον η̄ θρῆνος θέλω ἔμον τὸν αὐτῆς*, and, after a brief prayer to the sun for retribution, she proceeds to pronounce her own *θρῆνος*. It is a simple passage of four iambic lines, a pathetic comment on human affairs, which may be turned by a shadow or erased altogether by the touch of a damp sponge. Hermann, disconcerted, read *εἰπεῖν ρῆσον, οὐθρῆνον, θέλω*: Fraenkel¹ rightly rejects this miserable emendation, discerning that it is in these words that Cassandra finally touches the nerve of the matter in the spirit of the formal Greek *θρῆνος*. Compare with this Eur. *Hec.* 960, where Polymestor, again after a general reflection on the precariousness of human prosperity, breaks off with the words *ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν τί δεῖ θρηνεῖν*; In these two instances the *θρῆνος* takes the form of a general reflection on the human condition: there is surely now no reason to regard these instances as exceptional, any more than the fragments of Pindar and Simonides.²

The point is important in connexion with the old controversy about the origin of the elegy. It is well known that the 'elegy' was believed by the ancients to have been originally a lament. The earliest occurrence of the word *ἔλεγος* is in the dedicatory inscription of Echembrotus at Delphi, where the context in Pausanias, who quotes it (10. 7. 4), shows that it must have been some kind of lament; and from the time of Aristophanes and Euripides ancient opinion was unanimous in connecting it with mourning.³ The great objection to the ancient theory has always been that the remains of archaic elegiac poetry simply do not bear it out: none of the surviving elegies are dirges.⁴ But if the

¹ In his commentary ad loc. Cf. also his remarks iii. 623-4. I only differ from him in making a sharper distinction between *γόος* and *θρῆνος*.

² One may possibly detect the same distinction in Lucian, *de Luctu* 13-17. There the bereaved father is made to pronounce *γοερόν τι* over his son: this is a typical Homeric *γόος*. Then the son comes momentarily to life and, with the words *διδάσκουαι σε θρηνεῖν δληθεστεραν*, proceeds to dwell on the consolations of being dead.

³ The material is collected by D. L. Page in *Greek Poetry and Life*, pp. 206-30.

⁴ There is the further objection that since elegy is a solo performance and the dirge a choral one, they cannot ever have been the same thing. But were *ἔλεγεια* never sung by a choir? Those introduced by Sacadas into Sparta at the second *κατάστασις* may well have been choral ([Plut.] *de Mus.* c. 9): the *κατάστασις* was predominantly a matter of choral music, Sacadas is known to have had a choir, and was a *ποιητής μελῶν καὶ ἔλεγειων μεμελοποιημένων* ([Plut.] c. 8). The relevant chapters in Plutarch suggest at least the possibility that this 'Dorian elegy' was choral.

θρῆνος was, or could be, a philosophic reflection on the conditions of human life, or a message of consolation to the bereaved; if, that is, its mood was not one of passionate lamentation but of sober contemplation, this objection becomes less cogent. It becomes possible, for example, to take the words of Plutarch (*de aud. poet.* 23 a), *τὸν ἄνδρα . . . ἡφανισμένον ἐν θαλάττῃ . . . θρηνῶν*, at their face value as introducing a *θρῆνος*, since the elegiac fragment of Archilochus which is quoted¹ is a perfectly respectable example of the gnomic style of *θρῆνος* and moreover genuine threnodic elegies may probably be discerned (as Friedländer, *Epigrammata*, pp. 66 ff., shrewdly observes) in Archilochus (?) 16 D, Anacreon 100 D, Simonides 84 D. It becomes possible to understand how the non-threnodic elegy may have grown out of the threnodic: the mood of both is similar, that of advice, exhortation, and reflection.² The whole family of elegiac poetry becomes an intelligible entity. One can see how the elegiac grave-epigram may have grown out of the elegiac dirge; for why did Plutarch so often call the grave-epigram an *ἐπικῆδειον*, if not because it resembled the elegiac *ἐπικῆδεια* performed (according to Diomedes ad Dion. Thrax p. 20, 22 Hilg.) at funerals?³ One can see the affinities of Euripides' elegiacs in the *Andromache* with the rest of the elegiac tradition;⁴ and if one postulates, with Professor Page, a forgotten school of Dorian elegists, who used the form for a kind of lament (cf. the *σκυθρωπότατα μέλη* of Echembrotus, the *ἐπικῆδεια* of Olympus) something becomes available to fill the curious gap between Homer and Simonides; for otherwise, what happened to the *θρῆνος* during all that time? It is no longer necessary to assume that the word *ἔλεγειον* stands only for the metrical form, which was used, quite by coincidence, for two different types of composition:⁵ *θρῆνος* and elegy are sufficiently alike to bear, without undue harshness, the same name. It is at last possible to accept the testimony of Horace (who was only voicing the accepted ancient view) that the one grew out of the other (*A.P.* 77 ff.):⁶

Versibus impariter iunctis querimonia primum,
post etiam inclusa est voti sententia compos.

If this argument from the meagre fragments of the lyric dirge to the general character of the Greek *θρῆνος* still seems too frail to be acceptable, it must be remembered that any other assumption about the *θρῆνος* must equally be supported with evidence. It is not a question of whether the Greeks were prone to demonstrative manifestations of grief: they obviously were; nor whether they

¹ 10 D. The same goes for the longer passage quoted by Stobaeus (7 D) which probably comes from the same poem. Cf. exactly the same sentiment in Sappho 109 D, which is quoted from a lament for her own daughter.

² Jacoby (*Rh. Mus.* ix, 1905, 43) well describes the difference between the epic and the elegiac form: 'die neue Form war bestimmt, nicht Stoff sondern Gedanken aufzunehmen, nicht zu erzählen, sondern zu ermahnen und zu belehren.'

³ These were doubtless also the models for the compositions of Parthenius and others which the Alexandrians called *ἐπικῆδεια* (v. Crusius in *R.E.*, s.v.), a form which Olympus is said by Aristoxenus to have invented, [Plut.] *de Mus.* c. 15. Cf. Severyns, *Mélanges*

Navarre, pp. 383-94.

⁴ The first lines contain typical elegiac sentiment (*Andr.* 103-4): 'Ιδέω αἰτευνά Πάρις οὐ γάμον ἀλλά τῷ ἀταν ἡγάγει' εἴναιας εἰς θαλάμους 'Ελέναν.

⁵ So Zacher. *Philol.* lvii (1898), 9-22. Schol. Eur. *Andr.* 103 ἔλεγειος οὐ μόνον ἐπὶ θρῆνων ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλων ἔχρων is a bare statement of fact, and does not support one theory rather than another.

⁶ This origin may account for the special tone of delivery reserved for elegiacs: τὰ δὲ ἔλεγεια λιγυρᾶς ἀναγνάμεν Dion. Thrax π. γρ. § 2. Like the *θρῆνος*, the archaic elegy was accompanied by the flute. Cf. Schmid-Stählin I i, p. 354 n. 5.

would have called this kind of manifestation *θρηνεῖν*: this again they certainly did. The only point in dispute is whether the artistic composition described in Homer as a *θρῆνος* and reappearing in the *θρῆνοι* of Pindar and Simonides was of a highly emotional character or not. That it was not seems to me the more probable view, and to be supported by such evidence as is available. I see no evidence, and no particular probability, for the opposite view. Nor is there any question about the *efficacy* of the form. The judgement in Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Quintilian (*magna in commovenda miseratione virtus*), that Simonides' dirges were highly evocative of emotion, has no bearing on the matter, for how can we say whether passion or pathos is a more effective drawer of tears?²¹ Many would agree that Cassandra's quiet comment on the transience of human fortunes is more deeply moving than the long scene of emotional turmoil which precedes it.

(c) *παιάν* and *διθύραμψος*. These words do not merely stand for specific types of musical and poetic composition, and it is important to separate the literary from the ritual sense. The word *παιάν* is not the name of a song but of an invocation of the god Apollo. Merely to utter the ritual words *ἰη παιάν*—or some metrical variation of them—was to 'sing a paean to Apollo' (e.g. Callimachus fr. 260, 10 Pf.: *πάντες ιη παιῆσον ἀνέκλαγον*, H. Hom. Ap. 5.17: *ἴη παιῆσον ἀεύθον*), and on many of the occasions when *παιανίζειν* was customary—before or after a battle, for example—there may have been nothing more than a rhythmical chanting of the ritual formula (cf. Aesch. *Sept.* 268, Xen. *Cyrop.* 3. 3. 58, *Anab.* 5. 2. 14). Nor can we be certain that the battle-paeon or the banquet-paeon (see above p. 162) ever developed into an extended artistic form (although Archilochus (76 D) and Alcman (71 D) prove the antiquity of the banquet-paeon); the only paeans of any pretensions about which anything is known are those written to be sung at a religious ceremony, and any discussion of the paean as an art-form must be disengaged of references to martial paeans, sympotic paeans, and so forth. Much the same goes for the dithyramb. This, like the paeon, could be sung at a feast; but no 'sympotic dithyrambs' survive, and we cannot say whether they ever developed an artistic form for themselves. Again, like the paeon, it was sung ceremonially on religious occasions, and to this class probably belong the dithyrambs of Pindar. But the institution of dithyrambic competitions in the sixth century also led to the development of a complex literary form, and this third type of dithyramb, performed by rival poets at the Dionysia or the Thargelia, must in its turn be kept distinct from the Dionysus-song sung on religious occasions.²²

The ceremonial paeans which survive vary greatly. In some³ the structure is concise, the refrain occurs every few lines, and the subject-matter is confined

¹ Catullus 38. 8: 'Maestius lacrimis Simonideis' probably refers to the *θρῆνος*, but is equally inconclusive.

² This must be the solution to the *ἀνορία* about the inventor of the dithyramb. Herodotus (1. 23) and Aristotle (ap. Proclus, p. 320 a 31) say that it was invented by Arion; yet the dithyramb is mentioned by Archilochus (77 D) who lived long before Arion. Arion may well have been the first to make the dithyramb into a literary form: but

this is not to say that before he did so no one could have sung a 'dithyramb' to Dionysus after a banquet. The same explanation goes for the various traditions in Pindar (Schol. *Ol.* 13. 26). The distinction is recognized by Severyns, *Recherches sur la Chrestomathie de Proclus* (1938), ii. 134.

³ e.g. Pindar, *Paean* 5, the paean of Aristonous (which is inscribed as a *ὑμνός* but is clearly a *ὑμνός παιᾶνος*) and the *παιὰν εἰς Διόνυσον* of Philodamus Scarpheus.

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to Apollo and his cult; in others¹ the composition shows more freedom, the ἐπίρρημα occurs irregularly or not at all, and the connexion with Apollo (though still present even in Pindar's paeans) is more flexible. Even the paionic and cretic rhythms, although intimately connected with the form,² are often absent altogether. There seem, in fact, to have been practically no rules at all; and this impression is confirmed by the confusion that was felt even in antiquity. In [Plut.] *de Mus.* c. 9 the doubt is expressed whether there is any difference between a paean and a hyporcheme;³ in c. 10 it is debated whether Xenocritus' 'paceans' were really dithyrambs; and Athenaeus 15. 696 b ff. records the argument whether Aristotle's poem to Hermias was a paean or a skolion. If even in those days people could not always tell a paean when they saw one, we cannot expect to discover a reliable criterion ourselves.

The dithyramb had more distinctive characteristics. These are discussed exhaustively by Crusius (*R.E.* s.v.) and Pickard-Cambridge, *Dithyramb, Tragedy and Comedy*, c. i; for convenience they may be summarized as follows:

- (i) It had a special kind of rhythm. [Plut.] *de Mus.* 1141 b-c.
- (ii) It was accompanied by the flute (until the fourth century, when the lyre was sometimes added) and the music was in the Phrygian mode (Pollux 4. 81, Aristotle, *Pol.* 8. 1342^b).
- (iii) It used a highly wrought vocabulary. Plato, *Cratylus* 409 c: διθυραμβῶδες γε τοῦτο τοῦνομα (sc. Σελανάι); Horace C. 4. 2. 10: *seu per audaces nova dithyrambos verba devolvit*. Less so, however, than the νόμος, Proclus, p. 320 b 12 ff.
- (iv) It had a considerable narrative content. Plato, *Rep.* 394 c: η δὲ διθυραγγελίας . . . εύροις δ' ἄν αὐτὴν μάλιστά που ἐν διθυράμψοις. Cf. [Plut.] *de Mus.* 1134 e (Heracleides Ponticus), Schol. Lond. Dion. Thrax, p. 451. 21 Hilg.
- (v) It was originally antistrophic, but abandoned responson when sung by professional musicians, and when there were long narrative solos. This can hardly have happened before the middle of the fifth century, pace Horace C. 4. 2. 11 ([Aristotle] *Probl.* 19).⁴

But this information must be used with extreme reserve; for it is not always possible to tell whether it applies to the ceremonial dithyramb, such as that sung at Delphi for three months of the year in place of the paean (Plut. *de E.* 389 c), or to the literary dithyramb such as those sung competitively at the Dionysia. The two forms, indeed, may have been very different. It is probable, as Wilamowitz suggested, that poets who specialized in composing dithyrambs for the dithyrambic festivals were regarded as a distinct class, separate from

junction with cretins. Cf. Christ, *Metrik* 384-5.

³ The two are closely connected: both originally came from Crete, and often used the same metre. The evidence is assembled by L. Deubner in *Neue Jahrbücher*, 1919, pp. 396-7.

⁴ Cf. also Ar. *Rhet.* 1409^b 26 ff. and Maas in *R.E.* s.v. Melanippides. The same development occurred with the *nomē*. [Ar.] *Probl.* 9 shows that the νόμος was not antistrophic; but according to Proclus p. 320 a 32 ff. the *nomē* developed out of choral—and therefore antistrophic—lyric.

¹ Those of Isyllus of Epidaurus and Linneus Atheniensis, and the majority of Pindar's. We cannot be sure that all those of Pindar are really *paeans*, but they are all closely connected with Apollo, and it is hard to know what else they might be. Still further doubt is caused by the fact that *paeans* could be addressed to other gods than Apollo. Cf. Smyth, p. xxxviii, n. 1.

² The quotations given by Aristotle (*Rhet.* 3. 1409^a) for the παιανικὸν metre (δαλογενές, εἴτε Λυκίαν and Χρυσοκόμα Ἐκατε, παῖ διός) suggest that it was indeed named after its use in *paeans*; and it is often used in con-

the lyric poets and approaching the status of dramatic poets. This may be the reason why Simonides, who says himself (fr. 79 D) that he won fifty-six dithyrambic victories, has yet left no trace of a *book* of dithyrambs. One dithyramb only of his is known of (Strabo xv, 728) and is referred to under the curious appellation *ἐν Μέμνονι διθύράμβῳ τῶν Δηλιακῶν*. Possibly the Alexandrians, not recognizing dithyrambs of this kind as lyric poetry, did not include them in their edition of a lyric poet. The winning dithyrambs were presumably preserved in local collections and records, such as (if that is its meaning) *τὰ Δηλιακά*. What sort of poems Bacchylides' 'dithyrambs' originally were is a mystery: there is no trace of any tradition that he won dithyrambic competitions. All we can say for certain is that the book of his poems which the Alexandrians called 'dithyrambs' is entirely different from the book of the same name by Pindar.

(d) *σκόλιον*. Now that it has been shown that the title *ἐγκώμιον* was originally only used of *epinikia* it is necessary to say something about the poems which we are accustomed (following the Alexandrians) to call 'encomia'. What, for example, about the poem in praise of Polycrates attributed to Ibucus (3 D)? This fitted very comfortably into the category of *ἐγκώμια*: should it now be called a *σκόλιον*?

The first objection to doing this is that the poem is triadic, whereas we are accustomed to think of *σκόλια* as monostrophic. But it is far from certain that *σκόλια*—by which is meant almost any song sung after a feast (we cannot even say whether they were always sung solo)—were never triadic. For if so, what can be done with Pindar's triadic love-poem to Theoxenus (fr. 123)? It does not help to call this an *ἔρωτικόν*, for no book of this title existed in the edition of Pindar, and anyhow the term was probably introduced by the Alexandrians. Despite our ignorance of its manner of performance, it is probably better to call it a *σκόλιον* and include it (as editors do) in the book which the Alexandrians called *ἐγκώμια*.¹ Moreover, Didymus (Schol. Pind. *Nem.* 11 *inscr.*) deliberated whether *Nemean* 11 (a triadic dactylo-epitrite poem) should be placed with the *παροίνια*. Now there was no such book,² but *παροίνια* is a perfectly intelligible expression for *σκόλια*, and these, as we know, were placed among the *ἐγκώμια*. Didymus, therefore, had no scruples about triadic *σκόλια*, and perhaps we may follow his example.

More significant is the question of metre. The great majority of the poems known to have been *σκόλια*—viz. all those of Pindar, all except one of the supposed *ἐγκώμια* of Bacchylides, and the *σκόλιον* of Aristotle—are in a straightforward dactylo-epitrite metre. Now there is no point in suggesting that a lyric *σκόλιον* had to be in dactylo-epitrite: the suggestion would be completely unverifiable and in any case fails to embrace the Hybias-poem. But the frequent occurrence of the metre in the context of a *σκόλιον* makes one suspect some connexion, and it is just with this metre, that, as Miss A. M. Dale has recently put it (*C.Q.* xliv, 1950, p. 147), 'the distinction between the style of choral lyric and Lesbian monody is at vanishing point'. For a line which Hephaestion calls an 'encomiologicon' and quotes from Alcaeus is metrically identical with vv. 2 and 3 of Bacchylides' dactylo-epitrite poem to Alexander, which is doubtless a *σκόλιον*. Now Alcaeus and Anacreon were well known for

¹ In the same way the books of Bacchylides entitled *ἔρωτικά* and (possibly) *ἐγκώμια* (cf. Körte in *Hermes*, lxi, 1918, 137–40) probably contained poems which an earlier

generation would have called, simply, *σκόλια*.

² Bergk therefore reads *παρθένια*: but his reasons (*P.L.G.* i. 316) are not convincing.

their *σκόλια*: and here is evidence¹ that they might compose them in a metre very similar to that used by Bacchylides in one of his, and indeed to that of the majority of *σκόλια* we possess.² The form, in fact, seems to be one in which choral and Lesbian poet are equally at home. But the Ibucus poem is not merely not in dactylo-epitrite: it is in a different kind of metre altogether, a complex of lyric dactyls which we associate strongly (though perhaps without good reason) with choral lyric; hence we feel uncomfortable in calling it a *σκόλιον*. In fact, there is no reason why we should expect to be able to answer the question at all. The circumstances of the performance of this poem may have been quite peculiar, and the Alexandrians, who would doubtless have called it an *έγκαμπον*, would probably have had very little idea what *εἶδος* it originally belonged to. Moreover, if the poem is by Ibucus, we must remember that Ibucus' poems did not submit to any classification by *εἴδη* in the Alexandrian edition: as far as we can tell, the individual books were known only by their numbers. Our knowledge is just sufficient for us to be able to see the inadequacy of the Alexandrian classification of secular poetry, but it leaves us in lamentable ignorance of the occasions and manner of performance of the poems themselves.

The result of this discussion is, I am aware, depressingly negative; and I forbear to prolong it with additional paragraphs on the minor lyric genres, for the reason that the few scraps of information which can be gained about them are, for the present purpose, simply not worth having. The remains of Pindar may, of course, provide sufficient material for a constructive study of the form of the *epinikion* or the *paean*; but the attempts made so far are not very encouraging.³ If, however, what I have said is even only destructive of a few misconceptions bred by the tidy minds of Hellenistic scholars it will have served its purpose in defining some of the limits beyond which, in this subject, we unfortunately cannot hope to go.⁴

A. E. HARVEY

¹ Cf. above, p. 164, n. 1.

² The 'iambelegus' (the exact converse of the 'encomiologicon') is quoted by Hephaestion from an extant poem of Pindar which is in dactylo-epitrite; and the term *έγκαμπολογικόν* occurs frequently in the metrical scholia to dactylo-epitrite poems of Pindar.

³ Cf. Croiset, *La poésie de Pindare*, pp. 359 ff. and, for a recent attempt, R. Nierhaus, *Strophe und Inhalt im pindarischen*

Epinikion, 1936. W. Schadewalt, in *Der Aufbau des pindarischen Epinikion* (1928), achieves a penetrating formal analysis of certain of Pindar's epinikia; but the attractive generalizations offered in his first chapter are seriously debilitated by the qualifications he is forced to introduce in his last.

⁴ I am indebted to Professors R. Pfeiffer and D. L. Page, who kindly read through earlier drafts of this article and made many valuable suggestions.

A NOTE ON THE BERLIN PAPYRUS OF CORINNA

AT the conclusion of his recently published paper on Corinna¹ Professor Page leaves open the question whether the poetess was a contemporary of Pindar or of Moschus—whether she belongs to the middle of the fifth century or the end of the third. He gives excellent reasons for believing that these two dates exhaust the possibilities: they are far more probable than a date either outside or between them; but there seems to be no sure criterion by which we can decide between the two, and Professor Page has to end his researches with a suspension of judgement. He says (p. 84): 'It seems to me clear that our general conclusion must be that there is not sufficient evidence available from internal and external sources to establish the date of Corinna with certainty... confession of doubt may be disappointing, but I believe it to be in this instance the correct judgment on the evidence presented, unless her use of the choriambic dimeter is thought to be irreconcilable with a date in or near the lifetime of Pindar.'²

These are the last words of the paper itself: there follow two short appendixes, one on the 'political, social and economic conditions in Boeotia c. 200 B.C.', the other on an 'enigmatic feature' in the first column of the Berlin Papyrus. Since each of these points is relegated to an appendix, one assumes that they are not especially significant. Yet at the end of the second appendix one is startled to read that 'it is now perhaps time to admit that the champion of the earlier date is at this point, as at one or two others, driven to a degree of special pleading from which the champion of the later date is exempt'. The intention of these words is unmistakable: Professor Page has abdicated from the position of reluctant but firm agnosticism which he professed at the end of his main text, and is now a partisan of the later date. Far from being insignificant, the point raised in the appendix seems to have been decisive; and since its humble position on the last page may lead to its failing to receive the attention it deserves, I propose to give it an airing and see whether it really has any bearing on the date of Corinna.

¹ *Corinna* by D. L. Page, *J.H.S.* Supplementary Paper No. 6, 1953.

² I do not understand the implication which appears to run through Page's paper that if Corinna was a contemporary or near-contemporary of Pindar (as is suggested by the admittedly wretched ancient evidence) she must have lived right at the beginning of the fifth century (cf. p. 20 n. 5: '... Euripides could not get out of his head on this occasion the lines of a parochial versifier who had already been forgotten by everybody else for the greater part of a century', p. 69: '... the hypothesis that her poetry passed out of

fashion in or soon after her own lifetime (in, for example, the early fifth century)'). A contemporary of Pindar may well have been writing (like Pindar) c. 450, in which case her choriambic dimeters do not greatly antedate those of the *Antigone* (produced 443 or 441). And so far as the argument from the orthography goes, she may well have been a contemporary of Sophocles (v. Page, p. 75).

Incidentally the syncopated ionic clausula of *Hcol. i* (○—○—○—○—) has now turned up in a poem of Anacreon (*Ox. Pap. xxii. 2321, fr. 1*).

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I reproduce below the first sixteen lines of col. i.

] <u>υστεφανον</u>] <u>γῶγ' επιδῆ</u>] <u>επ' ἀκρῦ</u>] <u>χορδάσ</u>] <u>ρῶντ' ορίων</u> θηρῶ] <u>νφῶνλονόρνι</u>]]] <u>η!</u>] <u>ενεθλᾶ</u>] <u>δά</u> <u>χερα</u>
	5	<u>]εν . [. . .]κώ . η</u>] <u>ψ α ν δάδι . [. . .]σσ</u>
	10	<u>]σαντροι· λαθράτ· . [. . .]νάρυ</u>] <u>. [. . .]υλομειτακρόνωτ· . [. . .]ιανανι</u>
	15	<u>. [. . .]ανικάνινκλεψεμαστηραρέα</u>

From an examination of the photograph (kindly lent to me by Mr. Lobel) I was able to satisfy myself that the layout given above (which is reproduced from Page, p. 10) faithfully represents that of the papyrus. The anomalies it contains may be presented in Professor Page's own words:

'Lobel was the first to comment on the extraordinary fact that in the first nine lines of the column "1, 2, 5, 6 project to the right appreciably beyond, and vv. 3 and 4 as far or almost as far as, the longest of the lines in the rest of the column, i.e. the ten-syllable lines which close each stanza of the Ionic poem". We must therefore "necessarily infer either that they are in a different and longer metre, or that they project to the right because indented on the left, and consequently belong to a different poem".'

It follows from this that a change from one poem, or one metre, to another must take place between vv. 10 and 11. The poem which occupies the rest of the column is composed in 6-line stanzas in an ionic 'metre, each stanza closing with an easily recognizable clausula. The first of these clausulae of which we can be certain is that in 16, and what remains of the immediately previous lines leaves no room for doubt that they are in the same metre as the rest of the poem. There is therefore every reason to suppose that 11 was the first line of a normal 6-line stanza. On the other hand it is impossible, according to Lobel and Page, to regard the previous line (Ιενεθλᾶ) as the end of a similar stanza (even though it is metrically qualified to stand at the end of a clausula) since the first lines of this stanza would reach back into 5 and 6, which are unduly long for lines in this metre and which in any case do not scan correctly (5]. ρῶντ' ορίων, 6]. νφῶνλονόρνι).

Page wisely rejects the second alternative proposed by Lobel: the context absolutely precludes the possibility that v. 11 is the beginning of the poem. He is also surely justified in regarding as a remedy of despair the suggestion that the copyist, either by error or of necessity, omitted the first part of the poem and only took it up half way through at v. 11. He therefore adopts the other alternative, that at v. 11 (I do not know why he says '9 or 10') the poem changed into ionics from some other metre, perhaps (as Lobel suggests) polyschematist dimeters. He adds: 'This conclusion is likely to be unacceptable

to those who believe in the earlier date for Corinna.¹ Hence his own belated option for the later date.

This argument seems cogent. Yet I would point out how very little this hypothesis of a change of metre explains. One does not see why 8-syllable polyschematist dimeters should take up so much more room than 8-syllable ionics *a minore*, and anyway the hypothesis only accounts for 1-6. 7-9 are no longer than the normal ionic lines lower down, and are shorter by some three syllables than the lines which precede them. Is there a second change of metre here, and if so, how many changes of metre are we prepared to postulate in order to explain these phenomena? The hypothesis moreover throws no light on the irregularities at the end of the column (see below), and is surely an uncomfortable one whatever period Corinna belongs to: the middle of the prize song seems an astonishing place for any poet, however late, to change to the metre which he subsequently uses for narrating the result of the competition. All that has been gained by adopting this theory is an explanation of the projection of 1-6: 7-10 remain as mysterious as ever.

In view of these difficulties it is worth examining a little more closely 'a conceivable third possibility' suggested (according to a footnote) by Mr. Barrett—that the colometry of 1-10 is seriously at fault. This suggestion does not postulate anything entirely chaotic: it merely allows for the possibility that the copyist failed to appreciate the metrical structure of the poem until he got half a dozen lines or so down col. i. One of the main arguments of those who believe in a change of metre is that the syllables which survive in 1-6 could not stand as the ends of iionic lines. Yet it must be observed that all of them could stand in some part of an iionic line (except 6, J. *νφοῦλδηρνι* which is difficult to scan on any theory, and is in any case a doubtful reading) and that what we have at the top of the column may be, not a stanza or stanzas in a different metre, but one in the same metre with the lines misdivided and allowed to run on over the correct metrical division. That the copyist was weak in his colometry is suggested by the other minor slips in the papyrus (i. 15, 33) and by the fact that he apparently did not have the confidence to put in any paragraphi;² and it is surely not an entirely improbable supposition that he failed to make sense of the metre when he started on his transcription. At any rate, this theory has the attraction that it explains a great deal more than the other:

1. The projection of the first few lines will be due to the failure of the copyist to divide the lines correctly. All the endings of 1-5 are compatible with the hypothesis that he divided the text up into lines a few syllables longer than iionic dimeters, and if J. *πωτ̄* *οπ̄ιων* is to be scanned – – – – we may detect

¹ The statement of Hephaestion (p. 74, 17f. Cons.) that Alcman, in writing a poem of fourteen stanzas, made the first seven alike of one metre, the other seven alike of another, does not make the break in this poem any easier to understand.

² That the change of metre is to be placed after 6 and not after 10, and that 7-9 are therefore iionic dimeters, is an equally unacceptable hypothesis. A string of 6-line stanzas preceded by a 4-line stanza of the same character is unthinkable.

³ There is certainly no *paragraphus* in col. ii around v. 5 (where the colometry again

seems to be at fault) and Croenert was unable to detect one after i. 22. In the other places the state of the papyrus makes it impossible to judge. In the next poem (col. ii. 12 ff.) the paragraphi are bold and regular until the latter part of col. iv.

⁴ *όπιων* in this text can stand either for *όπιων* (= Attic *όπειων*), cf. i. 28 *γεγαθέι*; or for *όπιων* (= Hom. *όπέων*), cf. i. 23 *πλέονας*. The marginal note *θηραν* is presumably the word *θήραν* (not *θηρᾶν*) and does not help one to decide. In any case there is no reason to assume that the top of the column coincides with the beginning of a stanza, and

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here a clausula. There remains the problem of *J. νφοῦλονορν*, which is apparently incompatible with the metre; but since the reading is far from certain and, as it stands, equally impossible to fit into any metrical scheme so far proposed, I do not think it should be given sufficient weight to overthrow the theory here advanced.¹

2. *γ]ενεθλᾶ* may be taken for what it looks like—the end of a clausula ($\sim\sim-\sim\sim-$ $\sim\sim-$), in which case 11 will be, as one would expect, the first line of the next stanza.

3. The projection of 12 remains unexplained (as indeed it does on any hypothesis). But we cannot rule out the possibility of an erasure earlier in the line similar to that in 15.

4. Between the last clausula at i. 46 and the paragraphus after ii. 11 there are only traces of seventeen lines—one too few for the three 6-line stanzas which were to be expected.² Moreover ii. 6 begins with the letters *ρωνκρ* which will not stand at the beginning of an ionic line.³ It is of course possible that the first poem ended at the bottom of col. i, but it is then harder than ever to account for the first eleven lines of col. ii. Again the most economical interpretation seems to be that at some point the copyist again misdivided the lines, with the result that he compressed (say) twelve lines into eleven and went temporarily astray in the colometry.⁴

This, to my mind, is the most concise and satisfactory explanation of the irregularities in the first two columns of the papyrus. If it is accepted the champions of the earlier date for Corinna are rescued from at any rate one of their predicaments, and the question can remain open as before. It depends, however, on one assumption: the writer of this papyrus (2nd century A.D.) must have been copying a manuscript in which the lines were written out like prose. Professor Page has shown that the spelling is characteristic of a period around 200 B.C. At just about this period Aristophanes of Byzantium introduced the practice of arranging lines of poetry on the page in metrical *cola*.⁵

one place is not much more probable for the clausula than another. The same reason makes it impossible to reconstruct the arrangement of the first 10 lines; all one can say is that the line-endings which survive (1 $\sim\sim\sim$, 2 $\sim\sim\sim$, 3 $\sim\sim$, 4 \sim , 5 $\sim\sim$, 6 $\uparrow\sim\sim\uparrow$) are all, except the last, capable of standing in some part of an ionic line.

¹ Page's reading, which gives $\sim\sim\sim$, will not go into either ionics or polyschematist dimeters; Croenert thought the *p* had been deleted and read *J. νφοῦλονον* ($\sim\sim\sim$) which could occur in an ionic line; this reading has not been generally accepted. Since only the last upright of the first letter is visible, Wilamowitz read *J. νφοῦλονον* ($\sim\sim\sim$) which could either be a clausula (unwelcome at this point) or an instance of anacasis, a licence which does not occur elsewhere on the papyrus but is not absolutely to be ruled out. Metrically Croenert's reading is the easiest, and Page in fact prints an otherwise unexplained dot over the *p*.

² On this v. Page, p. 87 n. Croenert's

detection of an extra line at the foot of col. i has not been endorsed by other editors.

³ The same goes for ii. 4 *ψδ. .pa[*; but the previous line ends with an open vowel, and since a hiatus of this kind does not occur elsewhere in the manuscript it is perhaps better to reject the reading *ψδ.* (only the extreme left-hand portion of the *w* is visible). Even if it is retained, the same explanation will apply.

⁴ The lack of a paragraphus at ii. 5–6 is then no longer a 'mystery', as Page would have it. Clearly the bewildered scribe was in no mind to put one in. In any case the absence of one here is no more remarkable than in col. i.

⁵ Cf. Dion. Hal. *De Comp. Verb.* 156, 221. On the question of colometry at this date, see Wilamowitz, *Iyllas von Epidavros*, p. 12. Stichometry, as opposed to colometry, was of course practised much earlier; but I know of no new papyrus finds which substantially affect Wilamowitz's arguments.

It need surely be no cause for surprise that the innovation had not yet affected the manuscript of a Boeotian poetess who was in any case ignored by the Alexandrian editors (cf. Page, p. 68), particularly since we have an exact parallel in the Paean of Isyllus of Epidaurus (c. 200 B.C.) which is a poem also composed for a local public, is also in ionics *a minore*, and is written out on stone with no regard to the metrical structure whatever. It is of course likely that some edition of Corinna was published between 200 B.C. and the writing of the Berlin papyrus (2nd century A.D.). Antipater of Thessalonica, Propertius, and possibly Alexander Polyhistor and Trypho,¹ all show familiarity with her poems towards the end of the first century B.C. But whether this was a scholarly edition similar to that of the nine lyric poets² is a much darker question, and we certainly cannot assume that it set out the poems in their correct metrical form.³

One further point. Professor Page very plausibly argues (p. 72) that the tradition preserved in Plutarch, Aelian, and the Suidas notice, that Corinna was a rival (and consequently a contemporary) of Pindar, 'is no more than a very bad inference from that poem of Corinna in which she says, "I censure Myrtis for competing, though a mere woman, with Pindar"'. But it is surely not quite so easy to deal with the Pausanias passage (9. 22) in this way. Pausanias has not merely another 'version of the tale'. He saw a picture of the competition in Tanagra. Did the painter also draw a 'very bad inference' from Corinna's poem, and if so, why was he allowed to perpetuate his error on the walls of a public building? Were the memories of the natives of Tanagra so short that they could not remember to the nearest two or three centuries the date of their only famous poet? Maybe this passage, like the others, can be explained away; but it would need a different, and more ingenious, explanation.⁴

A. E. HARVEY

¹ Alexander, *F. G. H.* 273 F. 97 with Komm. Trypho may be the source of Athenaeus 4, c. 75 = Corinna fr. 34 Page, cf. Bapp in *Lips. Stud.* viii (1885), 86–160.

² We have no means of knowing at what period Corinna was added to the Alexandrian canon. Cf. H. Färber, *Die Lyrik in der Kunsttheorie der Antike* (Munich, 1936), i. 26.

³ There is no attempt at metrical division in the late anapaestic poem Pap. Berol. P. 9775 (i.A.D.).

⁴ Something more should also be said

about the mention of Corinna in [Plut.] *de Mus.* 14. 1136 b (= fr. 17 Page). The author expressly disowns responsibility for the views set out in that chapter ($\delta\tauι \delta' \omega\tauος οὐκ \epsilon\mu\delta\delta \delta\lambda\gammaοs \dots$) and it is surely a very natural inference that the reference to Corinna is also drawn from one of the two books cited in the chapter, the *Απόλλωνος Ἐπιφάνεια* of Istrros and the *Δηλακά(?)* of Antiklides. Both these works belong to the third century B.C. Cf. Wilamowitz, *Textgeschichte*, p. 21 n. 3, *F.G.H.* 140 F. 14, 334 F. 52 with Komm.

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THE RELATION OF STOIC INTERMEDIATES TO THE *SUMMUM BONUM*, WITH REFERENCE TO CHANGE IN THE STOA¹

I

THE Stoics maintained that virtue was the only good; everything else, therefore, was not-good. On the other hand, regarded by itself, this huge class was not equally valueless. Vice, of course, was bad; but everything else was thought to be 'indifferent': wealth, health, for example; indifferent, that is, with regard to the *summum bonum*. Of these Intermediates, men, from human nature, had a leaning to some; these were *kata phusin*, had value, were called *προηγμένα*, that is, preferred, and virtue itself lay in choice exercised among them. Yet they were not good—their actual acquisition did not count against the exercise of virtue, the only good. So that although Zeno defined happiness, to live in harmony with nature, the Intermediates, although some were *kata phusin*, were indifferent. This is the bare core of Stoic ethics, and naturally met with the main attack of criticism.

That this is the crux can be seen from the ancient criticism of the Stoa in the ethical sphere from Carneades on,² and can be briefly illustrated for my purpose by Plutarch, who, while criticizing the Indifferents generally throughout the two essays, *de stoicorum repugnantiis* and *de communibus notitiis*,³ advances the following three points:

1. *comm. not.* ch. 23, 1069 e. In beginning from *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν*, Zeno and the Stoics were merely following the Peripatetics and the Old Academy; in fact they cling to *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν* in their actions as goods, while it is in the language they use that they play them down.⁴
2. *Ibid.* ch. 4. 1060 c. Nature inclines us towards what is not regarded by the Stoa as good.⁵
3. *Ibid.* ch. 26. 1071. One can offer Stoic ethics a dilemma which it implies:
(a) There are two ends. (b) There is one end, yet every action is to be referred to something else, i.e. *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν*.⁶

I bring forward these points to show that the difficulty is focused on *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν* and their relationship to the *summum bonum*. The opponents of the Stoa maintained that *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν* should have been included in the End as goods, otherwise there was a contradiction, or that the Stoics were hedging and that their thought implied this.

Modern scholars are well aware of this difficulty to the Stoa, and the tendency has been to show that the later members of the School changed their

¹ This paper owes much to the criticism and encouragement of Prof. C. O. Brink, who read it in an early draft. I am grateful also to Prof. H. J. Rose and Prof. W. L. Lorimer for reading the typescript; they pointed out many errors and supplied valuable suggestions.

² v. Cic. *de fin.* 5. 16–20.

³ Plutarch, *Moralia* 1033 ff. and 1058 ff.;

contained in the Teubner edition of Plutarch's *Moralia*, vi. 2, edited by M. Pohlenz.

⁴ This line of criticism is more developed in Cicero, *de fin.* 4 and 5, where the Stoics are accused of not departing from the Peripatetics in fact, but only in terminology.

⁵ Cf. Cic. *de fin.* 4. 78.

⁶ Cf. Cic. *de fin.* 4. 40, 41, 46.

attitude on this crucial point. This may be illustrated by three recent examinations of the problem, each proceeding by a different method.

Pohlenz stresses the difficulties that arise for the Stoia from the two-sidedness of man's nature, and shows how the split widened under the blows of criticism.¹ His standpoint seems to be that Zeno insisted on the development of the intelligent nature of man (i.e. the *λόγος*) as the goal, yet the Stoics refused to deny some value to the animal side, and *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν*, as some kind of standard for our everyday actions. 'Damit drohte sich ein Zwiespalt zwischen der Güterlehre und der Lehre vom naturgemäßen Handeln, von den Kathekonta, zu ergeben.'² Thus he argues that the reformulation of the *τέλος* up to Antipater was due to Carneades' criticism of the Stoic relation of *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν* to the End. He maintains, certainly, that Antipater held on to the self-sufficiency of virtue—'Man fühlt deutlich, wie er [i.e. Antipater] Karneades Zugeständnisse macht, aber um jedem Preis die entscheidende Position, die Autarkie der Tugend, retten will';³ but by the words *um jedem Preis*, he implies that the Stoia was being driven into a corner, and that new and desperate methods were being taken to save the position. Diogenes and Antipater, then, held on to Zeno's main position, but their attempts at new definitions were *fruchtlos* in the face of Carneades' criticism, because their methods were dictated by his point of view. There is a difference, however, with Panaetius, 'der unbekümmert um die bisherigen Versuche, neue Wege einschlug'.⁴ He, by departing from Chrysippus' intellectual interpretation of the soul, gave natural importance to the *όρμαι*, and while adhering to *τὸ καλὸν* as the true good for man, held that *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν* had real value. 'Er glaubte das sittliche Ideal nicht zu gefährden, wenn er sich zu dem ketzerischen Satze bekannte, die Tugend sei nicht autark, vielmehr gehörten zur vollkommenen Eudämonie auch Gesundheit, Kraft und eine gewisse Gunst der äußeren Lebensumstände'.⁵

Miss Reesor, by examining statements of the different members of the School, reaches the following conclusions: after Zeno 'the concept of the "indifferents" was modified by the later Stoics',⁶ for example, 'a right choice among the "indifferents" was emphasised in the definitions of the end of life used by Diogenes of Babylon and Antipater of Tarsus'.⁷ 'Panaetius was the first of the Stoic philosophers to argue that virtue was not sufficient for happiness'.⁸ 'In the first book [of the *de officiis*] position, wealth, and age, which were regarded as "indifferents" by the Old Stoia, are used to determine what actions should be considered fitting or appropriate (*decorum*)';⁹ and *decorum* is identical with *honestum*.¹⁰ The statesman is urged to exercise his virtue that he may win *gloria* and *fides*;¹¹ 'indifferents' thus being the goal towards which the virtues are directed.¹² Posidonius believed that the "indifferents" had a positive effect upon the emotions, and seems to have argued that they should be regarded as good or evil but not as a matter of indifference.¹³

Dr. M. van Straaten¹⁴ makes a detailed study of one Stoic philosopher,

¹ Pohlenz, 'Plutarch's Schriften gegen die Stoiker', *Hermes*, lxxiv. 23–26. Cf. *Die Stoia*, i. 186 ff.; 191 ff.

² *Hermes*, lxxiv. 23. Cf. *Die Stoia*, i. 186–90.

³ *Hermes*, lxxiv, 24. ⁴ *Die Stoia*, i. 189.

⁵ *Die Stoia*, i. 199; derived from D. L. 7. 128.

⁶ Margaret Reesor, 'The Indifferents in the Old and Middle Stoia', *T.A.P.A.* lxxxii (1951), 109.

⁷ Op. cit., p. 109.

⁸ Ibid. p. 110; based on the doctrine that the 'indifferents' were necessary, from D. L. 7. 128 (ibid., p. 106).

⁹ Ibid., p. 110.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 107.

¹¹ From Cic. *de off.* 2.

¹² M. Reesor, op. cit., p. 110.

¹³ Ibid., p. 110; based on the arguments of Edelstein, *A.J.P.* lvii. 308–9.

¹⁴ van Straaten, *Panaetius* (Amsterdam, 1946).

Panaetius, who is a crucial figure in this problem. He interprets Panaetius' definition of the *τέλος*¹ that human happiness is determined 'selon les aspirations et les tendances de la nature individuelle';² this comes from his reading of *de officiis* 1. In this the stress is shifted from *la nature cosmique* of the Old Stoic to *la nature humaine*, concentrating on the *όρμαι*.³ The *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν* are equated with 'ces objets qui sont conformes à la nature humaine'.⁴ They are the objective content of all acts, the 'what', and Panaetius stresses this rather than the mentality of the act, the 'how', underlined by the Old Stoic.⁵ In this Panaetius, although his method of formulation is the same, is saying something different from the Old Stoic up to Antipater, who agreed in substance although there was variation of formulae.⁶ For Panaetius thought it not only necessary for *εὐδαιμονία* to have 'la tendance vers τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, mais il exigeait aussi dûment la possession réelle de ces objets'.⁷ From such an interpretation v. Straaten summarizes three general points where Panaetius differs in stress from previous Stoics.⁸ (1) In the central doctrine of *φύσις*, Panaetius concentrates on the *φύσις* of human nature instead of *φύσις* in the cosmic sense. (2) He shifts from the subjective to the objective element in human actions (i.e. *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν*). (3) There is a change of accent from the functions of knowing to the *όρμαι* of the human *φύσις*. In spite of this v. Straaten holds that Panaetius did not differ so much from the Old Stoic as other scholars think,⁹ and in fact that he also maintained the essential dogma that only that which is morally good can make a man happy.¹⁰ But to bring this into line with the above interpretation, he is forced to give a new exposition of *ἀρετή* in which *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν* now play a decisive part.¹¹ Thus in the end, if Panaetius differs at all from previous Stoics in this problem, it is in the relation of *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν* to the good.

This brief account of three views on the subject is not, of course, meant to be an exhaustive survey of relevant modern scholarship; but the position can, I think, be illustrated thus by the conclusions reached through these three distinct methods. They seem to be based primarily on the following evidence: (1) The formulae of the *τέλος* given by the members of the School. (2) The precise statement of Diogenes Laertius, 7. 128. (3) Cicero, *de officiis*, 1 and 2 as a general source for Panaetius' ethical philosophy. (4) Passages showing that Panaetius and Posidonius, in opposition to Chrysippus, recognized an irrational element in the human soul, leading to a changed interpretation of human *όρμαι* and thus of *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν*, their objects. As for the conclusions themselves, it appears to be agreed that the attitude to *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν* changed. Diogenes and Antipater, in seeking to defend their position against Carneades' criticism of the importance of *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν* in moral action, brought *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν* more into prominence in their definitions of the End. In this they may or may not have deviated from the exposition of Zeno and Chrysippus. Panaetius certainly gave positive value to *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν* with regard to the moral act, and in consequence his whole ethical philosophy takes on a complexion different from that of his predecessors. There is a certain hesitation and reluctance to draw the conclusion that in this Panaetius was departing from the fundamental Stoic dogma of the moral ideal. But since the positive value assigned by Panaetius

¹ Fr. 96 of v. Straaten's collection of the fragments. ² Op. cit., pp. 140-1.

³ Ibid., pp. 143-4.

⁴ Ibid., p. 145.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 152-3.

⁷ Ibid., p. 154. The evidence for this is our old friend D. L. 7. 128.

⁸ Ibid., pp. 191-200. ⁹ Ibid., p. 191.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 191-2; 167.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 166 ff.

to $\tau\alpha\ katal\phi\nu$ was of the rank of $\deltaya\theta\alpha$, in that their attainment in the moral act, i.e. the $\tau\elos$ of human action, was necessary, while in the Old Stoic they were regarded as indifferent, it can hardly be denied that Panaetius held different views on the $\tau\elos$ from Zeno and Chrysippus, and that this difference lay in the position of $\tau\alpha\ katal\phi\nu$ with regard to the $\tau\elos$, where this position was decisive. Moreover, if the interpretation of the strenuous efforts of Diogenes and Antipater on this subject is correct, Panaetius' views would appear not only different in the sense of unorthodox, but contradictory in the sense of non-Stoic.

Now the Stoics did not regard their founder's views as divine sayings that held good for all time, like the Epicureans, and were philosophers enough to change ground if they thought previous dogmas were wrong; so the brilliant work which has shown these changes is an immense contribution to the disentangling of the Stoic skein. It is true, moreover, that in this particular context the form of the Stoic definitions of the End did alter. But there comes a time when one is led to ask the question, 'When is a Stoic not a Stoic?', and I for one would find difficulty over a member who contradicted the characteristic and fundamental tenet of the School, the *summum bonum*. I am further heartened in this by the backing of Cicero, who maintains that a School may diverge on other points but not on this.¹

This article then wishes to question the view that the Stoa changed on this fundamental point; and since the root of the matter has been shown to be $\tau\alpha\ katal\phi\nu$, to attempt to assess the position of this concept in Stoic philosophy, and its bearing on Stoic teaching.

The method suggested is (a) to examine the use and meaning of the various technical terms employed, and (b) to call in to assist another part of their philosophy, namely physics, without which their ethics cannot properly be understood.

II

Diogenes Laertius² gives a number of subdivisions of Stoic ethics classified by Chrysippus, but a more fruitful division for $\tau\alpha\ katal\phi\nu$ is the threefold specification of Cicero, *de fin.* 4. 39: 'naturalem enim appetitionem, quam vocant $\delta\mu\eta\gamma$, itemque officium, ipsam etiam virtutem volunt (sc. Stoici) esse earum rerum quae secundum naturam sunt'; fruitful because $\tau\alpha\ katal\phi\nu$ have some place in all sections, yet, as I would stress, each of the sections is distinct because of the different part played in each by $\tau\alpha\ katal\phi\nu$. The terms in the three divisions are familiar from the sources; the intention is to show their interrelation with respect to $\tau\alpha\ katal\phi\nu$ as briefly as possible.

$\tau\alpha\ pr\wedge\ta\ katal\phi\nu$, $\tau\pr\wedge\ta\ oik\epsilon\lo\gamma$ ³

$\tau\alpha\ pr\wedge\ta\ katal\phi\nu$, i.e. the initial natural impulses, are the springs of $\tau\alpha\ katal\phi\nu$.⁴ They are instanced in babies or young children,⁵ and therefore can have nothing to do with the logos, which according to the Stoics flowered late;⁶ on the contrary they seem centred on the body.

¹ Cic. *de fin.* 5. 14, 15.

² D. L. 7. 84.

³ In general v. S.V.F. (*Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, v. Arnim, cited by volume and number of fragment) 3. 178-89; Cic. *de fin.* 3. 16; *de off.* 1. 11; Sen. *Ep.* 121. 14 ff.; the

evidence catalogued by Pohlens, *Die Stoa*, ii. 65-66; R. Philippson, 'Das Erste Naturgemäße', *Philol.* lxxxvii. 445 ff.

⁴ Cic. *de fin.* 3. 20 ff.

⁵ S.V.F. 3. 178, 179, 181, 182.

⁶ S.V.F. 1. 149.

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2. τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀδιάφορα, προηγμένα, καθήκοντα¹

In this section τὰ κατὰ φύσιν occupy the position of prime importance, since they are the object of καθήκοντα, their base² and their ἀρχή,³ and the whole stress of καθήκοντα lies in the object of the act being achieved, as opposed to the attitude of mind of the agent.⁴

But such an act is not right action; it does not lie in the sphere of good or evil—*id officium nec in bonis ponamus nec in malis.*⁵ This follows for two main reasons:

- (a) τὰ κατὰ φύσιν are not ἀγαθά. Since they cover the triple sphere of τὰ περὶ τὴν φυχήν, τὰ περὶ σῶμα and τὰ ἔκτός,⁶ while having a certain amount of positive value and their opposites a negative value,⁷ this value is relative⁸ not absolute like virtue alone.⁹ Hence the introduction of the term προηγμένα, a kind of second rank of value, a *proxime accessit.*¹⁰
- (b) No account is taken of the agent's attitude of mind—only the object of the act is important.¹¹

It seems that the ἀξία of τὰ κατὰ φύσιν was formed objectively; for the stimulus for the agent is external.¹² I suggest that this external stimulus was in the form of a rule. καθήκοντα are expressly linked with *praecepta* in Cicero, *de off.* 1. 7.¹³ Again Seneca¹⁴ refers to M. Brutus' περὶ καθήκοντος in which 'dat multa praecepta et parentibus et liberis et fratribus'; while in *Ep.* 94. 32, he thinks that if the mind is 'inxercitatus ad inveniendam officiorum viam, admonitio', part of the *praeceptiva pars* of philosophy, points this out; the form of the rules is given in *Ep.* 94. 50, 'hoc vitabis, hoc facies'. In καθήκοντα these rules are laid down for the use of the agent for the attainment of a certain object, but do not apply to his attitude of mind in the performance of the act.¹⁵ The agent accepts

¹ For sources v. *S.V.F.* 1. 230–2; 3. 491–543.

² *proficiisci ab*, Cic. *de fin.* 3. 22, 60.

³ καὶ τίνα λάβω τοῦ καθήκοντος ἀρχὴν καὶ ὅλην τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἀφεις τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν; Plu. *comm. not.* 1069 e = *S.V.F.* 3. 491; cf. Plu. *op. cit.* 1070 a = *S.V.F.* 3. 123.

⁴ e.g. Cic. *de fin.* 3. 22.

⁵ Cic. *de fin.* 3. 58. Cf. *de fin.* 3. 59; *Acad. Post.* 1. 37 = *S.V.F.* 3. 231.

⁶ Stob. *S.V.F.* 3. 136; cf. *S.V.F.* 3. 117 ff.; Cic. *fin.* 3. 62 ff.

⁷ Cic. *de fin.* 3. 50–51; *S.V.F.* 3. 124–6.

⁸ nisi si quid impeditur, Sen. *de otio* 3. 2 = *S.V.F.* 1. 271; Cic. *de fin.* 3. 23.

⁹ D. L. 7. 107 = *S.V.F.* 3. 117; S. E. *adv. math.* 11. 59 = *S.V.F.* 3. 122; Plu. *de S. R.* 1048 c = *S.V.F.* 3. 123.

¹⁰ Cic. *de fin.* 3. 51–52; cf. Stob. *S.V.F.* 1. 192; *S.V.F.* 3. 126 ff.

¹¹ Cic. *de fin.* 3. 22.

¹² Shown by the application of the term καθήκον in its wider form to plants and animals (*S.V.F.* 1. 230), and the attempt at etymology in D. L. 7. 108.

¹³ Cicero classifies: 'omnis de officio duplex est quaestio: unum genus est quod pertinet ad finem bonorum' (this is *officium* in its wider sense as shown by the example given of this class, *omniana officia perfecta sint*. See previous note; in this sense in the human sphere καθήκον may be applied to perfect human action, but as such is always qualified by τέλεον in contrast to μέσον καθήκον. When unqualified it is always used in the narrower sense of a restricted technical term in human ethics—so *de fin.* 4. 39), 'alterum, quod positum est in praeceptis, quibus in omnisi partis usus vitae conformari possit'; and just below, 'quorum autem officiorum praecepta traduntur . . . de quibus est nobis his libris explicandum'.

¹⁴ Sen. *Ep.* 95. 45.

¹⁵ So Cicero, *de fin.* 3. 58–59: 'ut si iuste depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis ponatur depositum reddere; illo enim addito "iuste" fit recte factum, per se autem hoc ipsum reddere in officio ponitur'. Cf. Clemens, *S.V.F.* 3. 515; Sextus, *S.V.F.* 3. 516.

the rule, like the opinions of a legal expert,¹ but does not form them or think out the situation for himself.

It is from these two positions that the following objections in our sources are derived:

- (1) Sometimes the general rule is wrong.²
- (2) *καθήκοντα* may be done by a bad man or a good man, or without knowing, or for the wrong or insufficient reason.³
- (3) Owing to external circumstances it is not completely in our power to achieve or possess Intermediates.⁴
- (4) A man can possess any of the Intermediates and yet be unhappy;⁵ conversely, a man can be happy apart from these.⁶

Hence *καθήκοντα*, or acts performed for the attainment of *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν* guided by external rules as to which of these are *προγραμμένα*, are *ἀδιάφορα* with regard to happiness, good and evil.

3. ἀγαθά, ἀρετή, κατορθώματα, εὐδαιμονία

The objects of *κατορθώματα*, as *ἀγαθά*, are the virtues, or the right attitude of mind in any situation, as the only thing in our power. So the central Stoic dogma *μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν*.⁷ Yet *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν* have a part to play in this section also as the material with which moral intelligence works—its *hyle* or *materia*.⁸ In this *κατορθώματα* are like *καθήκοντα*, but the all-important difference is given by Plutarch;⁹ *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν* are also *τοῦ καθήκοντος ἀρχή*, they are merely *ὑλὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς*, not its *ἀρχή*. So the stress shifts completely in *κατορθώματα* to the attitude of mind;¹⁰ the result of the action, the attainment of *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν* is incidental and does not matter; *τέλος μὲν γάρ τὸ ἐκλέγεσθαι καὶ λαμβάνειν ἔκεīνα φρονίμως, ἔκεīνα δ' αὐτὰ καὶ τὸ τυγχάνειν αὐτῶν οὐ τέλος*.¹¹

¹ I take the anecdote in D. L. 7. 25 to apply here, where immediately after the sentence that Zeno is said πρῶτον καθῆκον ὄνομακέναι, καὶ λόγον περὶ αὐτοῦ πεποιηκέναι, the story follows that Zeno changed Hesiod, *Op.* 293 to κεῖνος μὲν πανάριστος δε εὖ εἰπόντι πιθῆται.

² Cic. *de off.* 1. 39, 59; Philo, *S.V.F.* 3. 513; D. L. 7. 102 = *S.V.F.* 3. 117.

³ Cic. *de fin.* 3. 59; S. E. *adv. math.* 11. 199 ff.; Sen. *Ep.* 95. 5, 39, 40, 43; Sen. *de ben.* 6. 11. 1-2 = Cleanthes *S.V.F.* 1. 579; Philo, *S.V.F.* 3. 512: ὁ φαῦλος ἔνα δρῦ τῶν καθήκοντάς οὐκ ἀφ' ἔξεως καθηκούντες, where by *ἔξεις καθήκοντα* is meant *ἔξεις λογική* and *ἔξεις καὶ διάθεσις εὐλόγιστος*.

⁴ Cic. *de fin.* 4. 15: 'hoc non est positum in nostra actione'; cf. Fronto *S.V.F.* 3. 196: 'nec quidquam quod in manu fortunae situm videat concupiscet'; cf. Epictetus *passim*.

⁵ Stob. *S.V.F.* 3. 510: ὁ δ' ἐπ' ἄκρου, φροί, προκόπτων ἀπαντα πάντως ἀποδίδωσι τὰ καθήκοντα καὶ οὐδὲν παραλέπει. τὸν δὲ τούτου βίον οὐκ εἶναι πω φροίς εὐδαιμόνα

⁶ D. L. 7. 104: ἐνδέχεται γάρ καὶ χωρὶς τούτων (i.e. πλοῦτος, δόξα, ἴσχυς, καὶ τὰ δομα) εὐδαιμονεῖν.

⁷ *S.V.F.* 1. 188; 3. 29-37, 129, 181, 498.

⁸ Plu. *comm. not.* ch. 23. 1069 ε: καὶ τίνα λάβω . . . ὅλην τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἀφεις τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν; Plu. *op. cit.* 26. 1071 b: ἀλλ' ὕστερη ὑλὴ τις ὑπόκειται; Cic. *de fin.* 3. 23: 'ab iisdem (principiis naturae) necesse est proficiisci ipsam sapientiam'; Cic. *de fin.* 3. 31: 'quid autem apertius quam, si selectio nulla sit ab iis rebus quae contra naturam sint earum rerum quae sint secundum naturam, tollatur omnis ea quae quaeratur laudeturque prudentia?'; cf. chs. 58-61, especially 'prima autem illa naturae sive secunda sive contraria sub iudicium sapientis et dialectic cadunt, estque illa subiecta quasi materia sapientiae' (ch. 61).

⁹ Plu. *op. cit.* ch. 23. 1069 c.

¹⁰ v. p. 185 n. 15. This is the force of the added *ιδε* of Cicero, the ἀπό φρονήσεως of Sextus. So Sen. *Ep.* 95. 43, forcibly: 'amicō aliquis aegro adsidet: probamus. at hoc hereditatis causa facit: vultur est, cadaver expectat. eadem aut turpia sunt aut honesta: refert quare aut quemadmodum fiant.'

¹¹ Plu. *op. cit.* ch. 26. 1071 b; cf. Cic. *de fin.* 3. 32. They are like the ball in a ball game, Epict. 2. 5. 15.

What follows from this brief survey of *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν*? It might be said that this is merely a presentation of orthodox Stoic doctrine, and is no argument against change in the later Stoa. But the point brought out is that *καθήκοντα* and *κατορθώματα* are distinguished precisely because of the different part played by *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν* in them. Elevate *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν* in *κατορθώματα* and the two sections are confounded. Yet all our sources regard the distinction between *καθήκοντα* and *κατορθώματα* as continuing to be fundamental to Stoic ethics.¹ Then if the position of *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν* is altered, the whole fabric of Stoic ethics tumbles, even their very technical terms lose meaning.

III

The second inquiry is how Stoic physics bear on their ethics. I take this to be an important point, because:

- (1) it is the reference-point of the definition of happiness;
- (2) whereas the Stoics laid down that ethics should be taught before physics, in practice they always prefaced moral questions with some physical explanation; Chrysippus said there can be no other ἀρχή for justice than from physics, and in one place indeed that speculation of nature was learned for nothing else;² further in one of their similes, ethics is the fruit of the trees of physics;³
- (3) Stoicism was noted for its internal unity and consistency all through.⁴

Of the two principles in the universe, active and passive, the active was the logos or the governing force of the universe.⁵ It was this, in terms of the four elements, as a *πῦρ τεχνικόν*⁶ with cosmic supremacy which was the substance of the human soul.⁷ The latter, therefore, could not be put on the same footing (like the additional Peripatetic fifth element) as the body in the *φύσις* of man, being a different nature altogether as part of the guiding force of the universe. Therefore the same holds for the goods of the soul and the body. So the logos in man as in the universe is all-important, and happiness depends on it alone.⁸ But the logos in the universe is the rational element, and therefore the duty of the logos in man is the development of his rational part in knowledge, and on knowledge are founded all the virtues.⁹ Moreover the logos in man being the same logos which is the governing force of the universe,¹⁰ the knowledge of man and his duties cannot be complete until it comprises the universe and man's place in it.¹¹ To put this in another way, as ὁ ὄρθδες λόγος . . . ὁ αὐτὸς ὡν τῷ Διῳ,¹² a man will never make sufficient progress until he has conceived a right

¹ So the title of Panactius' book is *περὶ καθήκοντος*.

εἰδάμονος ἀρετῆς. And virtue is *τελεότης τῆς ἔκαπτον φύσεως*, S.V.F. 3. 260.

² Plu. de S. R. 9; cf. Cic. de fin. 3. 73.

³ The authorities, D. L. 7. 39 f. and S. E. adv. math. 7. 16 ff., are much confused here between order of teaching and interconnection of the subjects.

⁴ S.V.F. 2. 41; Cic. de fin. 3. 74; 4. 54; 5. 83. This seems to me the point of Plutarch's method of criticism by contradictions.

⁵ e.g. S.V.F. 1. 85; 2. 299 ff.

⁶ e.g. S.V.F. 1. 120, 171; 2. 423, 774.

⁷ S.V.F. 1. 134.

⁸ D. L. 7. 88: ὁ νόμος ὁ κονός, δοπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὄρθδες λόγος . . . εἴναι δ' αὐτὸς τοῦτο τὴν

¹⁰ D. L. 7. 88.

¹¹ S. E. adv. math. 11. 13 = S.V.F. 2. 36:

^{τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἐπιστήμην θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρω-}

^{πίνων πραγμάτων; Epict. i. 10. 10: παρακαλῶ}

^{τοὺς πάρα Χρυστῖππου ἐπισκέψασθαι τίς ἐστιν ἡ}

^{τοῦ κόσμου διοίκησις καὶ ποιαν τινὰ χώραν ἐν}

^{αὐτῷ ἔχει τὸ λογικὸν ζῆν.}

¹² D. L. 7. 88.

idea of God.¹ This is what the Stoics mean by *φύσις*, and what they must mean by their common definition of the End for Man, *όμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν*. It must follow that in man the rational as displayed in the virtues is the only good, and compared with them *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν* are *ἀδιάφορα*. To contradict this would be to contradict their physics or their views on the universe, and blur the distinction between the Stoa and the Academy and Peripatos.

IV

If the previous sections are a correct account of the structure of Stoic philosophy, it is difficult to see how the logic of the system, both in physics and in the use of technical terms, could lead a Stoic to maintain anything else than that virtue and the right attitude of mind in action was the only good. Further, this seems the main point of the evidence. Cicero, who surely had some familiarity with the later Stoa, maintains this consistently throughout the *de finibus*,² with the strengthening view that this is the only point where members of a school may not differ.³

What positive evidence is there against this? In the first place we have different forms of the definition of the End; Diogenes and Antipater bring *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν* more into prominence in their definitions,⁴ no doubt because of Carneades' polemic; but this is no more than a recognition in the definition that *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν* are the *ὑλη* of *κατορθώματα*, not that they are their *ἀρχή*; that is, their formulae differ in form but not in meaning.⁵ Here again we may refer to Cicero: 'The Stoic definitions (of *bonum*) do indeed differ from each other in a very minute degree, but they all point in the same direction'.⁶ Even Antipater did not deny that virtue was sufficient for happiness,⁷ and Zeno presumably held *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν* were the *materia* of *phronesis* and human logos.

When we come to Panaetius we meet the one bald statement to the contrary: Diogenes, 7. 128, says in passing that Panaetius and Posidonius *οὐκ αὐτάρκη λέγονται τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἀλλὰ χρείαν εἶναι φασι καὶ ὑγείας καὶ χορηγίας καὶ ισχύος*.⁸ In the face of all the rest of the evidence, I find it not too difficult to disbelieve Diogenes. In the first place we do not know the context of this remark, and it seems to me more difficult to explain, if there was such a change of view, why continuous tracts of criticism, such as we find in Cicero and Plutarch, did not use this as a cudgel when dealing with this point;⁹ and continuous exposition is infinitely more valuable than isolated reference out of context. For without any context, one can see only too clearly from Plutarch, *de S.R. ch. 30*, how easily such a statement could arise. Plutarch digs up a quotation of Chrysippus,¹⁰ where the latter permits the use of customary language to the extent of calling *προηγμένα, ἀγαθά*, as long as one understands the meaning of what one is saying. Plutarch deduces from such evidence that sometimes to the Stoa *προηγμένα* are 'goods', sometimes 'indifferents'. The

¹ Sen. *Ep.* 95. 48.

² e.g. *de fin.* 3. 24, 34, 36, 40, 44; 4. 45.

³ Ibid. 5. 14; 15.

⁴ S.V.F. 3. 2. 44; 3. 3. 57.

⁵ So v. Straaten, op. cit., p. 152: 'une différence dans la façon de formuler'.

⁶ Cic. *de fin.* 3. 33: 'paulum oppido inter se differunt, et tamen eodem spectant'.

⁷ S.V.F. 3. 3. 56, 57.

⁸ Pan. fr. 110, v. Straaten. For its im-

portance as evidence, see v. Straaten, op.

cit., pp. 154 f., 159; moreover v. Straaten thinks the three objects named by D. L. are representative of the whole class of *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν*; Pohl. *Stoa*, i. 199; *Gött. Nachr.* i (1936), 4; Reeser, pp. 106, 109.

⁹ For Galen, see below.

¹⁰ Plu. 1048 a = S.V.F. 3. 137.

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Stoics seem to have been untechnical in their use of language on occasion, no doubt when forced to argue with opponents in their opponents' language.¹

It has been suggested to me by a correspondent that perhaps a closer explanation for the statement could arise from a point given by Alexander of Aphrodisias in his section *ὅτι οὐν αὐτάρκης ἡ ἀρετή πρὸς εἰδαιμονίαν*.² Here Alexander preserves an unwelcome dilemma doubtless offered to the Stoic in the course of the controversy: δίχα κειμένων ἀρετῆς τε σὺν τούτοις (i.e. προγμένα) καὶ ἀρετῆς μόνης, which would the wise man choose? And the Stoic answer given is *μηδέποτ'* ἀν τὸν σοφὸν τὴν κεχωρισμένην ἐλέσθαι, εἰ εἴη αὐτῷ δυνατὸν τὴν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων λαβεῖν. Now, either the conclusion drawn by the opponents of the Stoa and Alexander here, namely *εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὡς χρείαν* ὁ σοφὸς ἔξει τούτων, could be maliciously assigned to the Stoa itself, or through lapse of time taken to be part of the Stoic answer (the similarity of expression with *χρείαν* both here and in Diogenes is suggestive); or the Stoic phrase itself, *μηδέποτ'* ἀν τὸν σοφὸν τὴν κεχωρισμένην ἐλέσθαι, could be lifted out of context and come to be the father of the statement in Diogenes. The reason for choosing Panaetius and Posidonius as foster-parents should, I think, be clear from the rest of this paper. Such a line of reasoning seems to me very possible. On the whole, since the controversy in which, according to Alexander,³ the dilemma occurred—the reference-point of choice in action—was such a famous one,⁴ I am inclined to think tendentious misrepresentation rather less likely than an unguarded statement or careless language by Panaetius taken out of context. However it is not necessary for my purpose, nor indeed is it possible, to trace exactly the family tree of Diogenes' sentence, but merely to show that such a misstatement could quite reasonably occur.

Again for the customary ὄμολογουμένων τῇ φύσει ζῆν,⁵ Panaetius has a different formula, *ζῆν κατὰ τὰς δεδομένας ἡμῖν ἐκ φύσεως ἀφορμάς*.⁶ But in meaning this does not contradict previous Stoic thought.⁷

I see no departure from the view I put forward when hunting for Panaetius in the *de officiis*. For I take it that the general rules for *καθήκοντα* are merely classified under the headings of the different virtues, from which they may as rules be derived.⁸ Cicero seems to understand the position, and sums up well in *de off.* 3. 11 ff., in a passage where Panaetius' name occurs at the beginning, *honestum solum bonum est* (11), but the subject for discussion in the *de officiis* is not *perfectum honestum*, but *similitudines honesti*—‘atque illud quidem honestum, quod proprie vereque dicitur, id in sapientibus est solis neque a virtute divelli umquam potest; in iis autem, in quibus sapientia perfecta non est, ipsum illud quidem perfectum honestum nullo modo, similitudines honesti esse possunt.

¹ Cf. Plu. *de S. R.* ch. 15; Cic. *de fin.* 3. 52.

² *de anim.* p. 163, ll. 4 ff. Bruns = S.V.F. 3. 192.

³ Ibid. ll. 8–9 Bruns.

⁴ Cf. points (2) and (3) of Plutarch, p. 181.

⁵ Pan. fr. 109.

⁶ Clem. Pan. fr. 96.

⁷ Cf. Cleanthes *S.V.F.* 1. 566; Chrysippus, D. L. 7. 89 = *S.V.F.* 3. 228. v. Straaten, who thinks Panaetius is saying something different, although his method of formulation is practically identical with that of his predecessors (*op. cit.*, p. 152), notes, ‘on ne pourra

donner que difficilement une réponse à la question de savoir pourquoi Panétius a précisément choisi cette façon de formuler’ (p. 152, n. 3).

⁸ e.g. ‘quae quattuor quamquam inter se colligata atque implicata sunt, tamen ex singulis certa officiorum genera nascuntur’, 1. 15; ‘honestum, ex quo aptum est officium’, 1. 60; ‘sed ab iis partibus, quae sunt honestatis, quem ad modum officia derentur, satis expositum videtur’, 1. 152; cf. Sen. *Ep.* 94. 33: ‘et prudentia et iustitia officiis constat, officia praeceptis disponuntur’.

Haec enim officia de quibus his libris disputamus, media Stoici appellant' (13-14).¹ These *officia* are a kind of second rank moral goodness—‘haec igitur officia, de quibus his libris disserimus, quasi secunda quaedam honesta esse dicunt, non sapientium modo propria, sed cum omni hominum genere communia’ (15). Once again² Cicero stresses the subject-matter as if determined to prevent a mistake. What else can follow from this than that (1) *officium* is not *honestum*,³ (2) there is such a thing as *honestum*; (3) what is discussed in the *de officiis* (and therefore in Panaetius' *περὶ καθῆκοντος*) is not *honestum* but *officium*? The very title of Panaetius' book should have been sufficient to show this. In that case we must remember that in the *de officiis* we have Panaetius' views on *καθήκοντα officia*, but not on *κατορθώματα, ἀγαθά, honestum*. And indeed the statements and arguments of the *de officiis* bear the characteristic stamp of the *καθῆκον* group illustrated above. So the three general characteristics singled out by van Straaten,⁴ (1) the concentration on human nature and not on the physical *cosmos*; (2) the stress on the objective rather than the subjective element in human actions, that is, the importance of attaining *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν*; (3) a moral system based on the appetites of human nature instead of based on knowledge; all these if applied purely to the doctrine of *officium* do not seem to me to be a shift of stress and emphasis; and, as I said, Cicero seems to take pains to point out that the subject is *officium* and not *honestum*. Hence it appears to me false to relate Panaetius' stress on individual endowments to a new interpretation of the End. In van Straaten's argument,⁵ there seems to be a confusion as to the importance given to individual endowments and *universa natura*. For one must distinguish (a) which of the two is important to Panaetius for the moment in connexion with the type of philosophical problems with which he is dealing, and (b) which is of more basic importance, i.e. which in the last resort cannot be disregarded. In the latter sense, which after all must be the sense of the telos, Cicero says quite plainly *universa natura*.⁶ It is put first, and only *ea conservata* can we go on to take account of individual endowments.⁷ Then the *propria* are important here to Panaetius as a practical guide among *officia*—*τὰ κατὰ φύσιν*; that is, as part of the *materia* of the moral reason; but they are subordinate to reason and not to be assigned more importance in the End than *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν* with Antipater. It is the subject-matter which puts ‘la nature cosmique’ in the background.⁸ In the same way the stress on *appetitus* is natural in a study of *officium*, as *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν* are the developments of the *ὄρμαι*. But Cicero, *de off.* 1. 141, puts it in its proper place.⁹

Posidonius may have regarded riches and wealth and such *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν* in a different way from his predecessors because of his admittedly new theory of the emotions dependent on his new psychology;¹⁰ but however one interprets

¹ Cf. *de off.* 1. 46: ‘quoniam autem vivitur non cum perfectis hominibus planeque sapientibus, sed cum iis, in quibus praecclare agitur si sunt simulacula virtutis’.

² Cf. *de off.* 1. 7.

³ *officium*, that is, in its restricted technical sense in human ethics. v. *supra*, p. 185 n. 13.

⁴ v. Straaten, op. cit., pp. 191-200.

⁵ Op. cit., pp. 140 ff. ⁶ *de off.* 1. 110.

⁷ Cf. *de off.* 1. 107. We are invested by nature with two characters, ‘quarum una communis est ex eo, quod omnes participes

sumus rationis praestantiae eius, qua antecellimus bestias, a qua omne honestum decorumque trahitur, et ex qua ratio inventi officii exquiritur, altera autem, quae proprie singulis est tributa’.

⁸ v. Straaten, op. cit., p. 143.

⁹ ‘in omni autem actione suscipienda tria sunt tenenda, primum ut appetitus rationi pareat . . . horum tamen trium praestantissimum est appetitum obtemperare rationi.’

¹⁰ v. Edelstein, ‘The Philosophical System of Posidonius’, *A.J.P.* lvii (1936), 305 ff.

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D. L. 7. 103, *Ποσειδώνιος μέντοι καὶ ταῦτα* (i.e. πλοῦτον καὶ ὑγείαν) φῆσι τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι,¹ the fact remains that they are contrasted with ἀγαθά.² Posidonius himself discussed with Pompey 'graviter et copiose de hoc ipso, nihil esse bonum nisi quod esset honestum'.³ The End as before is τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν. But it is true that Posidonius recognized illogical virtues from the illogical faculties of the soul;⁴ yet the final point is the absolute control and importance of the rational faculty.⁵ So either D. L. 7. 103 is to be regarded with suspicion in the same way as D. L. 7. 128;⁶ in which case it is interesting to trace how the misinterpretation is taken a stage further by *Doxographi Graeci*, p. 593. 9: *Ποσειδώνιος Άπαντες ἔλεγε τὸ μέγιστον ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀγαθὸν εἶναι πλοῦτον καὶ ὑγείαν*; or, with regard to Posidonius' new psychology, it is to be interpreted in some such way as by Edelstein,⁷ but with reference to the illogical faculties of the soul, and as such wealth, health, and τὰ κατὰ φύσιν in general do not have positive value for *οἱ σοφοί*. We are told that Posidonius criticized Chrysippus strongly on the doctrine of the End;⁸ but the criticism was not directed against what Chrysippus thought the End was, but against Chrysippus' interpretation of the End, which was faulty in Posidonius' view because the earlier philosopher had recognized only the rational in the soul; he could not, therefore, rightly interpret the part played by the emotions for vice and virtue.⁹ Posidonius, on the other hand, held that one could only understand the End, if one understood the difficulty to mankind of the emotions, and they were to be explained by positing irrational faculties of the soul as well as a rational faculty. But the End lay in the complete supremacy of the rational faculty.¹⁰ Is there room here for making wealth, health, and other similar τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀγαθά in the Stoic sense of the objects of *οἱ σοφοί*, or for the conclusion that Posidonius thought virtue insufficient for happiness? Moreover Posidonius thought he was in all this interpreting Zeno and Cleanthes.¹¹ I am not arguing that Posidonius did not differ from former Stoics,¹² but only that as a Stoic (and he seems to have been regarded as one), he did not differ in the fundamental tenet. His whole approach to the problem seems to have been different, and consequently his view of τὰ κατὰ φύσιν may have been individual, but I suggest they were not regarded as ἀγαθά in relation to the *τέλος*.¹³

V

If there was no change of opinion in the Stoia on this point, one must ask how the confusion with regard to the position of τὰ κατὰ φύσιν arose. I suggest a principal reason may be the failure to appreciate the double nature of Stoic teaching exemplified by *καθήκοντα* and *κατορθώματα*.¹⁴ Perhaps a hint of how

¹ v. Edelstein, op. cit., pp. 308–10.

² e.g. Sen. *Ep.* 87. 35. 31.

³ Cic. *Tusc.* 2. 61; cf. Gal. *de plac.* 370, 3 M: *οἱ σοφοὶ μέγιστα καὶ δυνατέρητα νομίζοντες εἶναι ἀγαθὰ τὰ καλὰ πάντα.*

⁴ Gal. *de plac.* 446. 13 M.

⁵ Ibid. 449. 7; Clem. *Strom.* 2. 129.

⁶ v. *supra*, pp. 188–9. ⁷ Edelstein, loc. cit.

⁸ Gal. *de plac.* 449. 8 ff.; 450. 3 ff.; 451. 2–5 M. ⁹ Gal. *de plac.* 450 ff. M.

¹⁰ v. *supra* n. 5; also Gal. *de plac.* 451. 15–

452. 10 M, which ends *σοφίᾳ δὲ καὶ πᾶν δυον ἀγαθόν τε καὶ καλὸν ἄμα τοῦ λογικοῦ τε καὶ θείου*; also 453. 10 f. ¹¹ Gal. *de plac.* 456 M.

¹² Prof. Edelstein, op. cit., has shown his heresies.

¹³ Cf. O. Rieth, 'Über das Telos der Stoiker', *Hermes* lxxix (1934), 39–44.

¹⁴ Augmented, of course, by the fragmentary nature of our sources; e.g. we have quite a lot of information about Panaetius on *καθήκοντα*, but little on *κατορθώματα*.

this worked may come from the passage of Cicero referred to above,¹ when coupled with Seneca, *Epp.* 94, 95. In the *de officiis* the division between *honestum* and *similitudines honesti* (or *secunda quadam honesta*, i.e. *officia*) is referred respectively to *sapientes* and *ii, in quibus sapientia perfecta non est*.² Now Seneca considers in *Epp.* 94, 95 whether *praecepta* are important in moral training and if so how, and suggests that the Stoics were divided on this point. I have tried to show that *praecepta* are closely linked with *καθήκοντα* and thus bound up with *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν*, their *ἀξία*, and *προηγμένα*. But what purpose would *praecepta* serve for the *sapiens*? So Seneca,³ 'Precepts will perhaps help you to do what should be done; but they will not help you to do it in the proper way; and if they do not help you to this end, they do not conduct you to virtue. I grant you that, if warned, a man will do what he should; but that is not enough, since the credit lies, not in the actual deed but in the way it is done.' The wise man does not need *praecepta*, since he does not act by external rules, but by his internal logos, therefore *praecepta dare scienti supervacuum est*.⁴ Seneca does not argue against this dictum, but against the added *nescienti parum*. But if this part of our philosophy is to be *utilis*⁵ it must be so for Cicero's *ii, in quibus sapientia perfecta non est*. To the Stoics these were *οἱ προκόπτοντες*, and in our sources we find them specifically connected with this.⁶ Perhaps the best illustration is in Seneca, *Ep.* 94. 50-51, which I should like to quote in full. 'Furthermore what you mention is the mark of an already perfect man, of one who has attained the height of human happiness. But the approach to these qualities is slow and in the meantime, in practical matters, the path should be pointed out for the benefit of one who is still short of perfection, but is making progress. Wisdom by her own agency may perhaps show herself this path without the help of admonition; for she has brought the soul to a stage where it can be impelled only in the right direction. Weaker characters, however, need someone to precede them, to say: "Avoid this", or "Do that". Moreover, if one awaits the time when one can know of oneself what the best line of action is, one will sometimes go astray, and by going astray will be hindered from arriving at the point where it is possible to be content with oneself. The soul should accordingly be guided at the very moment when it is becoming able to guide itself. Boys study according to direction. Their fingers are held and guided by others so that they may follow the outlines of the letters; next they are ordered to imitate a copy and base thereon a style of penmanship. Similarly the mind is helped if it is taught according to direction. Such facts as these prove that this department of philosophy is not superfluous.'⁷ So in § 20 it is compared to doctors' advice in eye treatment of preparatory process, '... begin with darkness, and then go into half-lights, and finally be more bold, accustoming yourself gradually to the bright light of day'. Again it is a method referred to the *inexcitata mens*.⁸ Now Seneca tells us⁹ that Ariston denied any value to *praecepta*; but this fits in, for Ariston had no interest in *προηγμένα* or the *προκόπτων*, but only in knowledge and the *sapiens*. But if Ariston rejected *praecepta*, Zeno must have upheld them, and again we know Zeno was interested in *καθήκοντα*. Not only did he write a treatise *περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος*,¹⁰ but first introduced the term,¹¹ as he was also the first to use *ἀξία* and *ἀπάξια* in their technical sense,¹² and he was also

¹ *de off.* 3. 11 ff.² So also *de off.* 1. 46.³ Sen. *Ep.* 95. 40. ⁴ *Ibid.* 94. 11.⁵ Cic. *de fin.* 3. 58; Sen. *Ep.* 94. 21.⁶ e.g. *progressio* in Cic. *de off.* 3. 17.⁷ The translations of the Letters are from Gummere in the Loeb edition.⁸ Sen. *Ep.* 94. 29.⁹ *Ibid.* 94. 10. D. L. 7. 4, 25.¹¹ D. L. 7. 25. ¹² Stob. *S.V.F.* 1. 192.

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responsible for the term *προηγμένον* and its classification in 'the second place'.¹ Finally Chrysippus is not the first to deal with *οἱ προκόπτοντες*, but Zeno.² Cleanthes, his pupil, 'utilem quidem iudicat et hanc partem (i.e. the *praeceptiva pars*) . . . sed imbecillam nisi ab universo fluit,'³ and once more we know he wrote three books *περὶ τοῦ καθῆκοντος*.⁴

I suggest then that we have here a type of educative moral teaching not directed towards the *sapiens* but to the *προκόπτων*. For it must be true that the real way to educate the *sapiens* was by the logos-philosophy. So it seems to follow that *praecepta*, *καθῆκοντα*, *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν*, was a second-best philosophy, as the *de officiis*⁵ says, intended for the guidance of the *προκόπτοντες* who had not the training, opportunity, or brain for the logos-philosophy to be true *sapientes*.⁶ Then the Stoa had two philosophies, and from this one might be led to suggest, with Plutarch,⁷ two ends. But this is strenuously denied by the Stoics,⁸ apart from Herillus,⁹ whose position, however, at least gives some colour to the arguments above. This must mean that there is only the one true *τέλος*, which is led up to by various stages. In that case it is perhaps more informative to think of the three divisions examined above as three stages of progress in their human philosophy: (1) the child, governed by *πρῶτον οἰκεῖον*—*τὰ πρώτα κατὰ φύσιν*; (2) the adult, governed by *καθήκοντα*—*τὰ κατὰ φύσιν*; (3) the *sapiens* governed by *λόγος*—*ἀρετή*—*φύσις*. Something of the sort seems borne out by Philo,¹⁰ where he considers to which moral types words like *πρόσταξις*, *ἀπάγορευσις*, *ἐντολή*, *παράνεσις* belong. He classifies: *τῷ μὲν οὖν τελείῳ* (*scil. σοφῷ*) . . . *προστάττειν* *ἡ ἀπαγορεύειν* *ἡ παρανεῖν* *οὐχὶ δεῖ*: *οὐδενὸς γάρ τούτων δὲ τέλεος δεῖται*: *τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ προστάζειν* *καὶ ἀπαγορεύειν* *χρεία*: *τῷ δὲ νηπίῳ παρανέσειν* *καὶ διδασκαλίας*. Compare, too, Seneca, *Ep.* 121. 14 f. An objector asks, 'How then can a child, being not yet gifted with reason, adapt himself to a reasoning constitution?' The answer comes, 'unicuique aetati sua constitutio est, alia infanti, alia pueri, alia seni; omnes ei constitutioni conciliantur in qua sunt'. This is not quite the same, but it helps as a pointer.

If then the triple division be accepted, the different members of the Stoa could concentrate more on the second or on the third. I art without holding any different views on *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν*; Ariston certainly went to extremes on the third,¹¹ while Panaetus was more interested in the second.¹² This was sufficient to give him the reputation of being *mitior*.¹³ Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, I have tried to show, were interested in both, with perhaps more stress on the *sapiens*. Now since all sections refer to nature, but since either nature in each refers to something different, or at least the technical phrases in which the

¹ *Τὴν δευτέραν χώραν καὶ δέκαν ἔχον, συνεγγύειν πους τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φύσει*, Stob. *S.V.F.* 1. 192; cf. Cic. *de fin.* 3. 52: ' . . . sed eos qui in aliquo honore sunt quorum ordo proxime accedit, ut secundus sit, ad regium principatum, sic in vita non ea quae primo ordine [Madvig] sunt, sed ea, quae secundum locum obtinent, προηγμένα . . . nominentur.'

² e.g. Plu. *Mor.* 82 f.: *ἥξειν* (*sc. ὁ Ζῆνος*) γάρ ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνείρων ἔκαστον αὐτοῦ συναθένεσθαι προκόπτοντος; and what else is the comparison of Plato and the tyrant Dionysius in Cic. *de fin.* 4. 56?

³ Sen. *Ep.* 94. 4.

⁴ D. L. 7. 175.

⁵ Cic. *de off.* 3. 15; v. *supra* pp. 189–90.

⁶ Cf. Sen. *Ep.* 94. 30: 'hoc qui dicunt (i.e. that *praecepta nihil adiuvant*) non vident alium esse ingenii mobilis et erecti, alium tardi et hebetis, utique alium alio ingeniosiore'; cf. Epict. 1. 2. 33 f.

⁷ Plu. *comm. not. ch.* 26. 1071; v. *supra* p. 181.

⁸ Cic. *de fin.* 3. 22.

⁹ Ibid. 4. 40.

¹⁰ *S.V.F.* 3. 519; twisted typically by Plu. *de S. R. ch.* 11.

¹¹ Sen. *Ep.* 94. 2.

¹² Ibid. 116. 5 = Pan. fr. 114.

¹³ Cic. *de fin.* 4. 79 = Pan. fr. 55. Besides, Cicero seems more concerned with language and style, cf. *de off.* 2. 35 = Pan. fr. 62.

word *φύσις* occurs have different reference, the confusion of the first and second division with the third in criticism leads to a confusion between the spheres of teaching of *καθήκοντα* and *κατορθώματα*.

It may be objected here that with this difference of reference with respect to *φύσις*, we retain unanimity among members of the Stoic on a fundamental point of doctrine, at the cost of destroying internal unanimity within the system itself, which has already been stressed in this paper.¹ There may be two ways of facing this:

(a) With regard to the *sapiens*, *φύσις* means universal Nature in its broad sense; in *καθήκοντα*, *φύσις* in *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν* refers to human nature, *τὰ πρώτα κατὰ φύσιν* being the first springs of this. But Seneca, *Ep.* 121. 14 f., shows that human beings are regarded as having a different *constitutio* (i.e. nature) at different stages in life, and they are assigned to these by universal Nature. That is, human nature goes through several stages controlled by universal Nature; but this progression is designed to culminate in a human nature which is in complete unanimity with universal Nature, through the perfection of logos, that is *ὅμολογουμένων τῇ φύσει*. So in all stages, neither of the two senses of *φύσις* is completely lost sight of, and certainly neither contradicts the other. Man was not born perfect; it is Nature's decree that only gradually should his nature progress to the culmination where not only is it under Nature's direction, but hand in glove with Nature itself and most like its workings. The problem is like two converging lines, the second being gradually attracted by the first until the two meet.

(b) It might conceivably be argued that *φύσις* means the same in all sections, with the meaning of universal Nature, and that the difference lay between *κατά*, 'in accordance with the direction of', *secundum* of Cicero, and *ὅμολογομένων*, 'complete unanimity with', *convenienter naturae*. Some sources seem to point to this,² and it may have been sometimes intended by Stoic writers, but the bulk of the evidence seems to point to the first explanation.

At all events, in the details of exposition there is one common thread which runs through the three sections, namely *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν*. They are developed from *τὰ πρώτα κατὰ φύσιν* of the first section, form both the *ὑλη* and the *ἀρχή* of the second, and are the *ὑλη* of the third. Cicero noted the thread in *de fin.* 3. 23: 'cum autem omnia officia a principiis naturae proficiscantur, ab iisdem necesse est proficisci ipsam sapientiam . . . primo nos sapientiae commendari ab initiis naturae, post autem ipsam sapientiam nobis cariorem fieri quam illa sint a quibus ad hanc venerimus.' But the triple division remains distinct because of the different part *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν* play in each section. I suggest then that it was the failure to recognize this division in teaching that was the root of much subsequent confusion in criticism of the Stoic.

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¹ Prof. C. O. Brink pointed out this difficulty to me.

² e.g. Cic. *de fin.* 4. 14–15; Sen. *Ep.* 121. 16.

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THE SO-CALLED TZETZES SCHOLIA ON PHILOSTRATUS AND ANDREAS DARMARIOS

In the preface to their edition of the *Imagines* of Philostratus Minor¹ Schenkl and Reisch mention scholia of Tzetzes (presumably Joannes Tzetzes) on the *Imagines* of the elder Philostratus in Royal MS. 16 D XII of the British Museum. Their statement is repeated without comment in the histories of Greek literature of Schmid-Stählin² and Sinko,³ as well as by Solmsen in his article on the Philostrati in Pauly-Wissowa, *R.E.* 20. 174. 59 ff. Wendel, on the other hand, in his recent exhaustive treatment of Tzetzes in *R.E.* 2te Reihe 7. 1959–2012, knows nothing of the London manuscript, but says (col. 2005. 27 ff.): ‘Nur in den jungen Hs. Ambr. D 213 inf. (16. Jhd.) werden die Philostratos-Scholien T. zugeschrieben, die sonst anonym oder als Eigentum des Moschopulos und Planudes überliefert sind.’ It is perhaps worth looking into the matter a little more closely.

There are two bodies of late Byzantine scholia or technologiae on the *Imagines* of Philostratus, beginning respectively *rō dōpā̄c̄σθαι* (Techn. 1) and *ὅστις μὴ ἀσπάζεται* (Techn. 2). Kayser⁴ attributed Techn. 1 to Maximus Planudes and Techn. 2 to Manuel Moschopoulos. S. Lindstam,⁵ who describes and analyses both, reverses Kayser’s attribution. Lindstam’s view, which is in any case well argued, may derive some support from an Oxford manuscript—cod. Barocc. gr. 119, s. xv—on fol. 33 of which Techn. 1 is entitled *τοῦ Μούσχοπούλου τεχνολογία εἰς τὰς τοῦ Φιλοστράτου εἰκόνας, εἴτε ἐκλογαὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἀλλων*. Many manuscripts contain both commentaries—at any rate as far as I. 26, beyond which Techn. 2 does not extend (cf. C. Wendel, ‘Planudes’, *R.E.* 40. 2226)—Techn. 2 appearing in the margin, Techn. 1 in the writing space after each section of the text. Examples are cod. Vat. gr. 97, s. xiv; cod. Ambros. gr. Q 1 sup., s. xv; cod. Ven. Marc. 1228, s. xiv; cod. Lond. Add. 11889, s. xv. These are no doubt descended from a ‘variorum’ edition of the early fourteenth century. In another group of manuscripts the *Imagines* of Philostratus, accompanied only by Techn. 2, are followed by the poem *In Therasias Pythicas* attributed to Paulus Silentarius, but now shown to be the work of Leon Choirosphaktes,⁶ and by a collection of epigrams, each of these texts being accompanied by marginal scholia of late Byzantine origin. Examples are cod. Vat. gr. 20, s. xiv; cod. Vat. gr. 98, s. xiii; cod. Vat. Urbin. gr. 152, s. xiv; cod. Ambros. gr. 295, s. xiv/xv; cod. Paris. gr. 2562, s. xiv/xv. These examples do not exhaust the contexts in which these scholia appear, but they will suffice for the present. Many manuscripts also contain, either alone or in addition to one or both of the technologiae, interlinear glosses. Examples are

¹ *Philostrati Minoris Imagines et Callistrati Descriptiones*, rec. C. Schenkl et Ae. Reisch, Lipsiae, 1902, p. x.

² *Griechische Litteraturgeschichte*, ii. 2 (1924), 784.

³ *Literatur grecka*, iii. 1 (1951), 561.

⁴ *Flavii Philostrati quae supersunt*, ed. C. L. Kayser, Turici, 1844, praef. ad *Imagines*, p. vi, n. 11.

⁵ S. Lindstam, ‘Senbyzantinska epimerismsamlingar och ordböcker’, *Eranos*, xix (1919–20), 57–92; id., ‘Die Philostratos-Kommentare und die Moschopoulos-Sylloga’, *Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift*, 1925, 3, pp. 179–84.

⁶ Cf. S. G. Mercati, ‘Intorno all’autore del carme εἰς τὰ ἐν Πύθεια Θερμά’, *Rivista degli Studi Orientali*, x (1924), 210–48.

cod. Ambros. gr. M 34 sup., s. xv; cod. Ambros. gr. Q 1 sup., s. xv; cod. Berolin. gr. 1633 Phillips, s. xvi; cod. Vat. gr. 98, s. xiii; cod. Vat. Pal. gr. 143, s. xv.

There are apparently only two manuscripts in which scholia on the *Imagines* are attributed to Tzetzes: cod. Lond. Royal MSS. 16 D XII¹ and cod. Ambros. gr. D 213 inf.² both s. xvi. The latter is signed on fol. 52^v by Andreas Darmarios of Epidaurus (= Monemvasia); the former is in the handwriting of Darmarios.³ Neither manuscript is noticed in the studies of Darmarios by Graux⁴ and Schmidt.⁵

The manuscripts are identical twins, containing the same text laid out in the same way, with only the most trivial variations: e.g. the entry ἀρχή καὶ ἡ ἔναρξις, καὶ ἡ ἔξουσία in the Ambrosian manuscript fol. 2^v does not appear in the London manuscript. Both are entitled *Εἰκόνες Φιλοστράτου σχόλια εἰς τὸ περὶ εἰκόνων Φιλοστράτου ὑπὸ Τζέτζου*. Both contain scholia only, unaccompanied by text, on *Imagines* 1. 1–26, followed immediately (Ambrosian manuscript fol. 47^v, London manuscript fol. 261) by the text of the remainder of book 1, without scholia: in both manuscripts the beginning of the text is indicated by a marginal rubric ἄνω πρὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς τούτων τῶν ἔξηγήσεων, in the hand of Darmarios. Both manuscripts have, embedded in the text of *Imagines* 1. 28. 1, after the words κατακούειν τοῦ ὄμαδοῦ (p. 333; 13 K), an isolated scholion on στι. Both manuscripts omit the text of *Imagines* 1. 28. 5–29. 3 (p. 335. 1–337. 6 K) from ποδοστράβας καὶ ἄρκος τοιούτων ἀδηλοι χαίρειν. The scholia in these manuscripts are in fact a conflation of Techn. 1 and Techn. 2, so arranged that for each chapter of the *Imagines* all the Techn. 1 excerpts are given first, followed by all the Techn. 2 excerpts. The following sample of the scholia on *Imagines* 1. 1 will illustrate the procedure followed:

SIGLA: L = cod. Lond. Royal MSS. 16 D XII.
A = cod. Ambros. gr. D 213 inf.
B = cod. Lond. Add. MSS. 11889.

Συμπεσεῖν· τὸ συγκροῦσαι εἰς μάχην, ἐμπεσεῖν τὸ
ἰσταμένῳ τινὶ καὶ φεύγοντι ἐπιτεθῆναι.
Τὸ πλημμυρεῖν βαρυτόνως, δὲ καὶ πλημμύρειν
λέγεται· ἄφ' οὐ τὸ ἐπλήμμυρεν ἐπὶ οὗδας λέγεται

In margin of B
(Techn. 2).
In margin of B
(Techn. 2).

¹ Paper; 8½" x 10"; s. xvi; fol. 272. I. 'Tzetzes' *Antehomeric* etc. (fols. 1–5^v); II. Eusebius' *Onomasticon* (fols. 6–36^v); III. Scholia of 'Tzetzes' on the *Haliutica* of Oppian (fols. 37–156^v); IV. Paraphrase by 'Tzetzes' of the *Cynegetica* of Oppian (fols. 157–214^v); V. Scholia of 'Tzetzes' on the *Imagines* of Philostratus (fols. 215–65); VI. Gregorius Corinthius on Hermogenes *Περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος* (a fragment) (fols. 266–72). Items I, II, and III–VI are separate manuscripts, only brought together by an eighteenth-century binder. Items III–VI are in the same hand, but items III, IV, and V each have a separate series of quire signatures. There are no signatures in the last part.

² Paper; 29·7 x 21·7 cm.; s. xvi; fol. I, 52,

III. Scholia of 'Tzetzes' on the *Imagines* of Philostratus.

³ Cf. G. F. Warner and J. P. Gilson, *Catalogue of Western Manuscripts in the Old Royal and King's Collections*, ii (1921), 192. The cataloguers' identification of the hand can be confirmed by a comparison with other London manuscripts known to have been written by Darmarios, e.g. Royal MSS. 16 C XVIII, Add. 21095.

⁴ Ch. Graux, 'Essai sur les origines du fonds grec de l'Escorial', *Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Hautes Études*, xlvi (1880), 287–97.

⁵ S. L. Schmidt, 'Andreas Darmarios. Ein Beitrag zur Handschriftenkunde des 16. Jahrhunderts', *Centralblatt für Bibliothekswesen*, 3 (1886), 129–36.

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- 5 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ὅδωρ χεομένων ἀπὸ τούτου
πλημμυρίς καὶ πλημμύρα ἡ ἀνάχνωις τοῦ ὕδατος
εἰς γῆν ἄπαντα καὶ μακρὸν ἔχουσι τὸ ὑπό¹
ἀμπωτὶς δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον τῇ πλημμύρᾳ, ἡ ὡς
συστολὴ καὶ οἷον ἀνάπωσις.
- 10 Ἀμφὶ τὸν "Ηφαιστον, ἡ ὡς ὁ" Ἡφαιστος· τοιοῦτον
καὶ τὸ οἱ περὶ τὸν βασιλέα εἴπεν ἀντὶ τοῦ δ
βασιλεύς.
Κόμον ἔχων ὡς ἀνθρωπος γάρ ἦν ἐξωγραφισμένος.

In margin of B
(Techn. 2).

- Τὸ ἀσπάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ φίλειν ποτὲ μὲν δηλοῦσι τὴν
15 φιλικὴν διάθεσιν, καὶ ἔχουσιν ἐναντίον τὸ μισεῖν,
ποτὲ δὲ τὴν σωματικὴν ἐνέργειαν, ὅπερ οὐκ ἔχει
οὐδὲν ἐναντίον.

In margin of B
(Techn. 2).
After text in B
(Techn. 1).

- Σοφία φρονήσεως διαφέρει τῷ τὴν μὲν σοφίαν εἶναι
δύναμιν τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῆς φιλοσοφίας, τὴν φρό-
20 νησιν δὲ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ. ἴστεον δὲ ὅτι ἡ μὲν σοφία
ἐνέργει ὀπωδήποτε τῶν πραγμάτων ἔχοντων, ἡ φρό-
νησις δὲ ἀνενέργητος μένει, τῆς προνοίας ἀλλως
οἰκονομούσης τὰ πράγματα, ἡ τῶν διδασκομένων
οὐχ ὑπακούοντων ἡ οὐκ ἐπαινῶτων.

After text in B
(Techn. 1).

- 25 Σύμμετρον τὸ συμμεμετρημένον, καὶ μήτε ὑπερβολὴν
ἔχον μήτε ἔλλεψιν, καὶ τὸ ἀναλογίαν ἔχον πρός
τινα δόθεν καὶ ἀσύμμετρος ἡ τοῦ τετραγώνου διά-
μετρος τῇ πλευρᾷ, ἡ ὡς οὐδεμίαν ἀναλογίαν ἀριθ-
μοῦ πρός τὴν πλευρὰν ἔχουσα· καὶ σύμμετρον τὸ
30 ἵστον μέτρον ἔχον τινί, οἷον περὶ τὸν Νεῖλον
οἱ πήγεις ἀθύρουσι παίδια σύμμετρα τῷ ὄνόματι,
ἡ ὡς πηχαῖα.

After text in B
(Techn. 1).

- 35 'Ἐπαινεῖν τὸ διὰ λόγου ἐπαινεῖν καὶ τὸ ἀπο-
δέχεσθαι, οἷον ἐπαινῶ τὴν σιγήν, καὶ ἐπαινῶ
τὴν συμμετρίαν.
Ὑψηλή, τὸ ὑψηλὸν ὑάλος μὲν παρ' Ἀπτικοῖς ὁσ
ὑελος λέγεται παρὰ τοῖς κοινοῖς· καὶ ὑβρίζω, κτλ.

After text in B
(Techn. 1)

- 3 ὁ καὶ βαρυτόνων B. λέγεται πλημμύρειν AB. 5 ἀπὸ τοῦ B. 10–14 Ἀμφὶ²
τὸν "Ηφαιστον—ἐξωγραφισμένος ὁτ. LA. 14 τὸ ὁτ. B. δηλοῦν B. 25 μεμ-
τρημένον B. 28 ἥγουν B. 29–32 καὶ σύμμετρον—πηχαῖα ὁτ. B. 31 πέδια LA

It is clear that the 'Tzetzes' scholia were compiled, directly or indirectly, from a variorum manuscript such as has been described; and there is little doubt that in the matter of the titulature at least the culprit was Darmarios. He has often been suspected of forging titles,¹ and in particular of falsely attributing texts to Tzetzes.²

Two of the charges of false attribution laid against him concern the so-called

¹ Cf. Schmidt, op. cit., p. 136: 'Ebenso bestätigt sich auch der Verdacht, daß Darmarius vielfach seinen Abschriften falsche Titel gegeben hat'; Graux, op. cit., p. 287, quoting opinions of Valverde, Muratori, and

David Colvil, Scotus', librarian at the Escorial in the early seventeenth century.

² Cf. Wendel, 'Tzetzes', R.E. 2te Reihe 7. 1982. 42 ff.

Tzetzes scholia on the *Halieutica* of Oppian and on the Planudean Anthology.¹ It will not be irrelevant to turn for a moment to examine these. The scholia on the *Halieutica* occur in the London manuscript containing the Philostratus scholia, where they occupy fols. 37–156^v; they are there entitled Σχόλια εἰς τὰ Ὀππιανοῦ Ἀλιευτικά ὅπὸ Τζέτζου καὶ ἑρέων. They are found with the same title in other manuscripts copied by Darmarios, e.g. cod. Monac. gr. 134, cod. Matrit. gr. 39, and in at least one manuscript of his—cod. Sarag. Bibl. du Pilar 2027, written at Salamanca in November 1580—they occur with the title Τζέτζου σχόλια εἰς τὰ Ὀππιανοῦ Ἀλιευτικά ἀναγκαῖα τοῖς σπουδαῖοις. The text in all cases appears to be substantially that printed by Bussemaker in *Scholia ad Theocritum*, instr. F. Dübner, Paris, 1849, pp. 260–369.² Now much of the surviving scholia material on Oppian has at least been worked over by Tzetzes,³ and in cod. Ambros. gr. C 222 inf. s. xiii and xiv, fol. 258^v a commentary on the *Halieutica* is entitled τοῦ μακαρίου Τζέτζου ἔξηγησις. Darmarios may well have been acquainted with such a manuscript, and the charge of falsification cannot be proved against him in this case. It is clear, however, that he was not over-scrupulous, as the next item in the London manuscript, occupying fols. 157–214^v, and entitled Παράφασις (sic) εἰς τὰ τοῦ Ὀππιανοῦ Κυνηγετικά ὅπὸ Τζέτζου, is actually the work of one Euteknios.⁴ In cod. Sarag. Bibl. du Pilar 2027 it follows the ‘Tzetzes’ scholia on the *Halieutica*, but is not attributed to Tzetzes. In cod. Ambros. J 30 inf., also copied by Darmarios, it is attributed to Tzetzes.

The case of the ‘Tzetzes’ scholia on the Planudean Anthology is somewhat different. They are found in two manuscripts copied by Darmarios, cod. Lond. Royal MSS. 16 C XVIII, written in 1580, and cod. Paris. gr. 316, written in Venice in 1579. Both are entitled Σχόλια εἰς τὰ ἐπιγράμματα ὅπὸ Τζέτζου. John Tzetzes cannot of course have commented upon the Planudean Anthology, which was compiled long after his death. But he may well have occupied himself with the exegesis of the anthology of Constantine Cephalas, upon which Planudes drew indirectly for his own compilation. And in fact on fol. 4^v of the London manuscript we find the following passage: Παλαιμόνος ἐνρήται καὶ ἐν ὄρχῃ τῆς ἔξηγήσεως μον τοῦ Τζέτζου τῆς εἰς Λυκόφρονα τὸν ποιητὴν τοῦ αὐτοῦ Παλαιμόνος ἴστορίᾳ μερικῶς. The remark is in the manner of Tzetzes, and the reference is clearly to *Scholia Tzelzi ad Lycophronem* 22 (p. 22. 30 ff. Scheer). Darmarios has drawn the reader’s attention to this passage by writing in the margin opposite it Τζέτζου. I do not know whether the note and the marginal comment also occur in the Paris manuscript. The text which Darmarios has copied is apparently a variant of that edited by Wechel in 1600 from two Paris manuscripts.⁵ The Tzetzes quotation does not occur in Wechel’s text. What is

¹ Cf. Wendel, op. cit. 1982. 42 ff. and 2005. 32 ff.

² The passage at the end of the Life of Oppian in the London manuscript beginning Περοχῇ Ἀλιευτικῶν διαλαμβάνει ἐν μὲν τῷ πρώτῳ, and noted as unpublished in the Catalogue of Royal Manuscripts, vol. ii, p. 191, is actually printed by Bussemaker on p. 260.

³ Cf. Wendel, op. cit. 1982. 32 ff.; R. Keydell, ‘Oppianos’, R.E. 18. 703. 26 ff.

⁴ Edited by O. Tüselmann, Abh. Gött. Ges., N.F. iv. 1, 1900. Myoxoides and Schinas, Συλλογὴ ἀποσπουδάτων ἀνεκδότων,

Venice, 1817, published only book 1, which was reprinted by Bussemaker in his edition of the scholia on Oppian, pp. 370–5. Book 4 was first edited by Tüselmann in ‘Zur handschriftlichen Überlieferung von Oppians *Kynegetika*’, Progr. Königl. Klosterschule Ilfeld, 1890. On Euteknios cf. Cohn, R.E. 6. 1492. 33–63.

⁵ *Epigrammatum graecorum annotationibus Ioannis Brodaeii Turonensis, nec non Vincentii Obsopoei, et græcis in plerisque epigrammati scholiis illustratorum libri VI*, Francofurti, 1600.

most interesting is that in two manuscripts copied by Darmarios—cod. Escorial gr. 60 (R III 26) and cod. Matrit. gr. 39, both copied at Madrid in June and July respectively of 1577—these scholia on the Planudean Anthology are entitled *Σχόλια εἰς τὰ ἐπιγράμμata ὑπὸ διαφόρων (συναχθέντα)*. Evidently at this date Darmarios had not noticed the Tzetzes quotation, or not realized its importance. Here, too, the case against Darmarios fails.

There remain only two certain instances of false attribution to Tzetzes, the Euteknios paraphrase and the Philostratus scholia. Both occur together in the London manuscript, where they follow immediately after the Oppian scholia, for whose attribution to Tzetzes there is, as we have seen, some justification. Darmarios seems to have yielded to the temptation to extend the *réclame* of Tzetzes' name from the first item to the second and third. He then seems to have gone on to make a second, separate, copy of the Philostratus scholia, the present Ambrosian manuscript.

This reconstruction is conjectural, of course, since we do not know the date or place of writing of either of Darmarios' manuscripts of the Philostratus scholia. Their very close similarity suggests that they were separated by no long interval. The watermark of Royal MS. 16 D XII is the same as that of Royal MS. 16 C XVIII, which is dated by Darmarios on 1 June 1580 at Venice.¹ The Library of St. Mark at this time contained at least one manuscript of the *Imagines* of Philostratus, the present cod. Ven. Marc. gr. 514, s. xiv, given by Bessarion in 1468.² It does not appear that this manuscript contains scholia. In the library of the University of Salamanca, however, there is a manuscript (cod. 1. 2. 10) which, if not the exemplar from which Darmarios copied the Philostratus scholia, must be closely related to it. It is a fifteenth-century paper manuscript, containing the following items:

- I. Scholia on Hesiod's *Works and Days*, as published in Gaisford's *Poetae Graeci Minores*, ii. 36–447 (fols. 1–56).
- II. Grammatical poem, stated by E. Miller to be unpublished (fols. 57–80).
- III. Philostratus' *Imagines*, Book 1 (fols. 81–133). At the end of the text of 1. 26 there appears the following note: *τούτω τῷ τέλει ἀμέσως ἐπακολουθεῖ ἐκεῖνο τὸ μέρος τὸ πρὸ τῆς τελευτῆς τούτου τοῦ βιβλίου τριά φύλλα τούτῳ τὸ σημεῖον ἔχον Φ ἄνω πρὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς τούτων τῶν ἐξηγήσεων.* The remaining chapters of book 1 follow.
- IV. Scholia on the text of *Imagines* 1. 1–26, which appear from E. Miller's

¹ Darmarios observes in his colophon to this manuscript that the text is *ἐκ τῆς Βιβλιοθήκης Βησαρίωνος καρδιναλίου μεταγραφέθη*. Omont in his *Inventaire des mss. grecs et latins donnés à Saint-Marc de Venise par le Cardinal Bessarion en 1468*, Paris, 1894, records two manuscripts containing collections of epigrams: No. 373 'Item magna moralia Aristotelis et eiusdem moralia ad Eudemum, epigrammata diversa diversorum, in versu, pulchra, et in latino eloquio sanctus Thomas de ente et essentia, partim in pergameno et partim in papyro.' This manuscript is not traceable in Zanetti and Bongiovanni's catalogue, and has probably been split up into its component parts. No. 456, 'Item

liber epigrammatum in pergameno', is to be identified with cod. Ven. Marc. 481, Maximus Planudes' autograph of the Planudean Anthology, dated at Constantinople in September 1301. It does not contain scholia. It is therefore impossible at present to identify the exemplar from which Darmarios copied the London manuscript. And since he had already made two copies of the same scholia in Madrid three years earlier, it is possible that the reference to the library of Bessarion is mere mystification. On the unreliability of Darmarios' colophons cf. Graux, op. cit., pp. 293–4.

² Cf. Omont, op. cit., No. 460.

description to be the same as those in the London and Milan manuscripts (fols. 134–68).

V. Gregorius Corinthius on Hermogenes *Περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος* (a fragment) (fols. 169–73).

The resemblance of this manuscript to the London manuscript is striking: if it turns out to have the tell-tale lacuna in *Imagines* 1. 28–29, we may have found Darmarios' exemplar. He is known to have been in Salamanca in the autumn of 1580. The manuscript is signed on the fly-leaf *Λιάνωρος ὁ Βοῶνιεύς*, as are two other Greek manuscripts in the same library. Lianoro de' Lianori, 1425–78, pupil of Theodore Gaza and professor of Greek at Bologna, was Papal Nuncio in Spain in 1465, and Papal Collector in the Kingdoms of León and Castile from 1470 until his death.¹ It was no doubt at this time that some of his manuscripts found their way to the University Library at Salamanca.

We do not know for whom the 'Tzetzes' scholia on the *Imagines* were copied. Works of Tzetzes, authentic or not, were commodities for which a ready market existed in the sixteenth century. In October 1578 we find Darmarios working in Madrid on a manuscript of the scholia of 'Tzetzes' on Oppian's *Halieutica* for the Spanish bishop Antonio Agustín, one of his principal patrons. This manuscript is now in the Escorial, with the press-mark Ω IV 17.² It may have been for Agustín that the 'Tzetzes' commentary on Philostratus was prepared.

Be that as it may, we have seen in some detail how a clever copyist, who lived by his pen and his wits, rose to the occasion and supplied the demands of his noble patrons. In so doing he manoeuvred skilfully in the treacherous no-man's-land between honesty and dishonesty; he often stretched the truth, and occasionally actually falsified titles. But his falsifications are *oīa ἀν γένετο*, and he does not seem to have been guilty of the wholesale forgery with which he has so often been charged. This is a matter of some importance, as the tradition of several texts—in particular that of the *Historical Excerpts* of Constantine Porphyrogenitus—depends entirely on copies made by Andreas Darmarios.

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¹ On Lianoro cf. L. Frati, 'Lianoro de' Lianori, ellenista bolognese', *Studi e Memorie per la Storia dell'Università di Bologna*, x (1930),

163–77. Frati in his list of Lianoro's manuscripts (pp. 172–5) does not mention those in Spain. ² Cf. Graux, op. cit., p. 51.

NOTES ON PLUTARCH'S LIFE OF MARIUS

11. 9: οὐρανοῦ δ' εἰληφέναι καθ' ὁ δοκεῖ μέγα λαμβάνων ὁ πόλος ἔξαρμα διὰ τὴν ἔγκλισιν τῶν παραλλήλων ὀλίγου ἀπολείπειν τοῦ κατὰ κορυφὴν ἴσταμένου σημείου πρὸς τὴν οἰκῆσιν.

TRANSLATIONS¹ show an appreciation of the technical sense with which ἔγκλισιν is endowed in this passage but the terminology which they employ to express that sense is unfortunate. The English term 'declination'² when used technically in an astronomical context is irreconcilable with the connotations of the Greek term ἔγκλισις as used in this particular astronomical context.³ Allowing the technical meaning normal for it in such passages,⁴ upon Plutarch's wording, here compressed almost into incomprehensibility, the following construction must be put. If the globe is conceived as a circle with the equator as its horizontal diameter, the parallels of latitude, as one goes from the equator to the North Pole, meet the peripheral line of the circumference of the globe at points along an arc which curves on an ascending incline through an angle of ninety degrees. The angle made by each successive parallel of latitude, as one goes northwards to the Pole, with the horizon and the Pole Star respectively thus increases with the curvature of this arc (the globe) and the Pole Star may consequently be said to gain greatly in altitude διὰ τὴν ἔγκλισιν τῶν παραλλήλων 'because of the slope on which the parallels are'.⁵

23. 4: ὡς δὲ παραστραποδεύσαντες ἐγγὺς καὶ κατασκεψάμενοι τὸν πόρον ἤρξαντο χοῦν καὶ τοὺς πέρεξ λόφους ἀναρρηγνύντες, ὥσπερ οἱ γίγαντες, ἀμα δένδρα πρόριζα καὶ κρητιῶν σπαράγματα καὶ γῆς κολωνούς ἐφόρουν εἰς τὸν ποταμόν, ἐκθλίβοντες τὸ ρέῦμα καὶ τοὺς ἐρείδοντι τὰ ζεύγματα βάθροις ἐφέντες βάρη

¹ 'By reason of the declination of the parallels' Langhorne translation (Plutarch's *Lives: Roman*; section 1, p. 282—no date or editor's name given). So also Perrin (Plutarch's *Lives*, Loeb vol. ix, p. 491, 1920). The Langhorne translation appears to have introduced the rendering as North—ed. Henley, London, 1895, vol. iii, p. 175—and Reiske—'ex parallelorum inclinatione' (*Plutarchi Vitae Parallelae*, vol. ii, p. 822 foot, 1775)—both render it unobjectionably. Perrin also follows Langhorne's editor (and Reiske) in interpreting the immediately following αἱ θ' ἡμέραι βροχήτηται καὶ μέρει τοις κατανέμεσθαι τὸν χρόνον as '... divide the year into two equal parts' and consequently may be assumed to have adopted the former's rendering of ἔγκλισιν.

² Murray: *A New English Dictionary edited on historical principles*, 1897: 'the angular distance of a heavenly body (N or S) from the celestial equator, measured on a meridian passing through the body: corresponding to terrestrial latitude. Formerly also the angular distance from the ecliptic.'

³ L.S.J. gives ἔγκλισις inclination—of the earth, D. L. 2. 9; of the ecliptic, Arist. *G.C.* 336^b 4; of ground, id., *Pol.* 1330^a 39; Porph. *Antr.* 26. The second instance here involves the use of the word which might be interpreted by the English declination. As the genitive in this context defines ἔγκλισις as meaning a terrestrial slope the English term 'declination' is improperly used.

⁴ At *Moral.* 53 (De adulat. et amici discrim.), τὴν ἔγκλισιν τοῦ τραχήλου, the word is used in its non-technical sense. Instances of its use in a technical sense in an astronomical context elsewhere in Plutarch are lacking, but such usage is well attested in late Greek —cf. L.S.J. cited footnote 3. At *Moral.* 410 f—411 b Plutarch's grasp of astronomical theory—in a passage where some of the terminology of the present passage recurs—is demonstrably sound. It is therefore reasonable to assume for the word here its normal astronomical significance.

⁵ I am greatly indebted to the assistance of Dr. J. Willis, U.C.L., in reaching this conclusion.

μεγάλα, συρόμενα κατὰ ρῶν καὶ τινάτοντα ταῖς πληγαῖς τὴν γέφυραν, ἀποδειλίσαντες οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἔξελιπον τὸ μέγα στρατόπεδον καὶ ἀνεχώρουν.

Three renderings of the words *ἐκθλίβοντες . . . ἐφίέντες* in this passage are possible. The first is to take *ἐκθλίβοντες* as 'squeezing out' in the sense 'crowd out of its course'.¹ This interpretation is open to the criticism that it makes nonsense of the rest of the sentence in that if the river is diverted it will not carry rubble to the bridge which spanned its former course. Secondly *ἐκθλίβοντες* may be interpreted as 'squeezing out' in the sense of 'causing to overflow its banks'.² This interpretation also involves difficulties. If the river brims over at the point where the dam is, it will either return to its course with no appreciable addition to volume or impetus or it will not return to its course. In the first case there is nothing gained by the work expended on the dam and the second is open to the objection levelled at the first interpretation of these words. Thirdly the word *ἐκθλίβοντες* may be taken as meaning 'squeeze out' in the sense 'squeeze out to a narrow space'.³ This interpretation in turn is open to the objection that the effect of such a piece of engineering would be appreciable only at very short distance. So short indeed that the Romans in the two camps mentioned previously in the text⁴ could easily impede construction.

That there is a serious corruption somewhere in the text can be seen also from the divers interpretations of translators in their attempts to deal with this passage and from the existence of a well-attested variant reading in the manuscript.⁵ Reiske translates as follows: 'et terrae tumulos in fluvium ad elidendum eius cursum congesserunt, atque in tigna, quibus fulciebantur iuga pontis, ingentes moles immiserunt' (translating *ἐκθλίβοντες* as final and *ἐφίέντες*, and later *συρόμενα*, as a finite verb). Langhorne's editor has '. . . rolled in huge heaps of earth: These were to *dam up* the current. Other bulky materials besides these were thrown in *to force away* the bridge' (where both *ἐκθλίβοντες* and *ἐφίέντες* are regarded as final). Perrin 'and *crowding the current out of its course*; they also sent whirling down the stream' (where an additional word is inserted and the participle *ἐφίέντες* is represented as a main verb).⁶

ἐκθλίβοντες and *ἐφίέντες* cannot therefore be taken as actions resulting from the finite verbs of their temporal clause; that is to say that from a point of view of engineering they do not appear possible results of the stage of construction defined as attained. *ἐκθλίβοντες* most naturally represents a stage in construc-

¹ Perrin, p. 523; L.S.J. interprets Plut. *Sull.* 19 in this sense.

² A possibility suggested by Prof. H. A. Murray; given suitable topography such a scheme could possibly be effective but to assume that such was the case here is to read disproportionately more into a single word than the detailed treatment of the foregoing stages warrants.

³ The meaning 'squeeze into a narrower compass of space' is a natural development of the significance of the verb as can be seen from the fact that both Reiske and Langhorne's editor have given it such a meaning; for such a process must have been conceived

as preceding to emerge as the latter's interpretation 'dam up'. L.S.J. *ἐκθλίβει* 2, citing Xen. *Anab.* 3. 4. 19, gives a translation which is really only another form of this meaning. If the treatment of this verb in L.S.J. be compared to that of L.S.⁷ it will readily be seen how great a contribution the later editor has made.

⁴ Plut. *Mar.* 23. 2.

⁵ *ἀφίέντες* read by the common source of Cod. Palatinus Gr. 283 and Cod. Vaticanus Urbinas Gr. 97 as also by Cod. Marcianus Venetus Gr. 386.

⁶ Reiske, vol. ii, p. 845 foot; Langhorne, sect. 1, p. 290 and Loeb p. 525 respectively,

tion, a concept subordinate to that expressed in the previous finite verbs.¹ On the other hand ἐψύντες has no connexion either with the engineering work described to date or with the concepts embodied in those finite verbs. To construct it as subordinate to them requires an ellipse of detail and of thought which presents a major obstacle. Since Plutarch distinguishes the stages of the commencement of building and the portage of timber, it is illogical to assume that he omits to mention the breaking of the dam at all.

Construction as a finite verb² gives a picture of the event which, considered from a grammatical, logical, or engineering viewpoint, is less unusual and fraught with difficulty. The thought being: they began their dam; they put huge masses of rubble in it; they sent them downstream. The compression of thought and wording arises from the fact that the last concept embraces within it the process of dam breaking. An emendation to ἐφίέντο is consequently suggested. The significance of ἐκθλίψοντες in the passage suggests that it should be classed with L.S.J. 2 and the translation duly amended to cover both.

25. 3: τὸ γάρ εἰς τὸν σιδηρὸν ἔμβλημα τοῦ ξύλου πρότερον μὲν ἦν δυσὶ περόναις κατειλημένον σιδηραῖς, τότε δ' ὁ Μάριος τὴν μὲν ὀσπέρ εἶχεν εἴαστε, τὴν δ' ἑτέραν ἔξελῶν ξύλινον ἥλον εὐθραυστὸν ἀντὶ αὐτῆς ἐνέβαλε, τεχνάζων προσπεσόντα τὸν ὄσπον τῷ θυρεῷ τοῦ πολεμίου μὴ μένειν ὄρθον, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ξύλινου κλασθέντος ἥλον καμπήν γίνεσθαι περὶ τὸν σιδηρὸν καὶ παρέλκεσθαι τὸ δόρυ, διὰ τὴν στρεβλότητα τῆς αἰχμῆς ἐνεχόμενον.

The words *καμπήν* and *στρεβλότητα* are variously translated. A comparison of the interpretations of translators will show the variation of interpretation of their significance and integration within the passage. Reiske has 'sed fracto clavo ligneo secundum ferrum intortum redderetur, et hastile, recurvata cuspide ex obliquo adhaerescens dependerer'. Langhorne's editor has 'but that, the wooden peg breaking, and the iron pin bending, the shaft of the weapon should be dragged upon the ground, while the point (διὰ τὴν στρεβλότητα is not translated) stuck fast in the shield'. Perrin has 'thus allowing the shaft to bend in the iron head and trail along the ground, being held fast by the twist at the point of the weapon'.³

Technical works dealing with the process described in these words account for it with varying degrees of detail. Referring to it briefly, H. Stuart Jones⁴ says: 'ordered one of the two rivets by which the point was fixed to the shaft to be made of wood. This broke when the *pilum* pierced an enemy's shield, and as the point became bent it was impossible for the enemy to make use of the weapon.' Kromayer-Veith⁵ has 'Marius ließ zu diesem Zwecke die Klinge mit zwei Nägeln am Schaft befestigen, von denen der eine aus Holz war und nach dem Eindringen infolge Übergewichts des Schafates abbrach, so daß die

¹ The translations of Reiske and Langhorne's editor show this with the utmost clarity, by their construction of the participle as final in dependence on *ἐφόρουν*. In any case, the procedure involved in building a dam—works being built from both sides of the river to meet in the middle—has an effect which is exactly portrayed by the picture this verb presents; the river is squeezed out first to less volume then out of place and existence (as Langhorne's editor shows by his interpretation of the word's meaning).

² A measure suggested by the fact that there exists in the manuscripts a disputed reading of this word and also by the fact that all the translations discussed have been forced to take it as a finite verb.

³ Respectively Reiske, vol. ii, p. 848, foot; Langhorne, p. 291; Perrin, p. 53¹.

⁴ Companion to Roman History, Oxford, 1912, p. 198.

⁵ Kromayer und Veith, Heerwesen der Griechen und Römer, 1928, pp. 409–10; cf. Tafel 40 for diagrams of *pila*.

Waffe *abknickte*', a summary of admirable conciseness and intelligibility but which does not concern itself with the detail of the *στρεβλότης τῆς αἰχμῆς*. The fullest account is that of Schulten.¹ His translation gives a bold interpretation of this latter point, which, however, his prescribed space prevents him from justifying: 'Sein Zweck war, daß das Pilum, wenn es in den Schild des Feindes eindrang, nicht gerade blieb, sondern daß es, wenn der hölzerne Nagel abbrach, an der Einsatzstelle des Eisens sich *biege* und herabhänge, da es wegen der Krümmung der Spitze (des Widerhakens) festsaß.' An account follows² which though very full suffers from the compression of his argument through his space-restrictions. He demonstrates that the pilum cannot be constructed with a wooden joint fitting into a socket in the steel tip: 'aber die Verbesserung des Marius paßt nur auf ein Pilum mit Zunge, denn eine Tülle wäre, auch wenn der eine Nagel aus Holz war, noch fest genug mit dem Holze verbunden geblieben.' But his failure to specify the precise nature of the *Zunge* (i.e. whether it is wood or, as at col. 1352 l. 17, metal), coupled with his reference to the javelin tips found at Numantia, allows the reader to construe his remarks as indicating³ either a steel-tongued head or a wooden-tongued shaft.

From the information given by Plutarch and the reconstructions cited above the following reconstruction is possible. The javelin consists of a wooden shaft with a tongue of wood which fits into a steel spear-head, which is Y-shaped, the two side-pieces fitting along the sides of the wooden tongue. Through these two side-pieces and the wooden tongue in their centre go two nails, one of steel, one of wood. When the javelin strikes the shield the strain of the leverage exerted by the pull of gravity breaks the wooden nail and the wooden shaft then swings around on the steel nail and hangs vertically down (or swings from side to side: fig. 1).




FIG. 1.

As Schulten has seen, a right-angle bend in the coupling of wooden shaft with the steel tip cannot be described as a *στρεβλότης τῆς αἰχμῆς*. His interpretation of *στρεβλότης* as 'hooked-tip'—'der Krümmung der Spitze (des Widerhakens)'—makes sense out of Plutarch's description. However it entails an emendation of L.S.J. giving the word the concrete significance of 'barbed tip', 'barb', as well as its abstract one of 'being twisted', 'crookedness'.⁴

The translation will therefore be (from *τεχνάζων*) 'contriving that when the javelin made impact with the enemy's shield it should not remain straight, but that, because the wooden nail broke, there should occur a swinging about on

¹ R.-E. s.v. 'Pilum', 1357-8 with illustrations at coll. 1350 and 1355.

² Ibid., col. 1357, ll. 52-61.

³ Ibid. respectively col. 1357, ll. 58-61;

I. 59; 1355, Abb. 5, nos. 11 and 12.

⁴ L.S.J. cites only 2 examples, both from Plutarch, this one and *Moral.* 2. 968b of windings of roads in an ant-hill.

the iron nail and the wooden shaft should be dragged along beside, being kept in by the barbed tip of the spear point.'

25. 7: καὶ φαοὶ τὸν Μάριον ἐλπίσαντα τοῖς ἄκροις μάλιστα καὶ κατὰ κέρας συμπεσεῖν τὰς φάλαγγας, ὅπως ἴδιος ἡ νίκη τῶν ἐκείνου στρατιωτῶν γένοιτο, καὶ μὴ μετάσχοι τοῦ ἀγώνος ὁ Κάρλος μηδὲ προσμείξει τοῖς πολεμόις, κόλπωμα τῶν μέσων ὥσπερ εἴωθεν ἐν μεγάλοις μετώποις λαμβανόντων, οὕτω διαστῆσαι τὰς δυνάμεις.

Here κόλπωμα also entails emendation of L.S.J.¹ whose interpretation seems to stem from a misunderstanding of Reiske.² The sense demands, as both Reiske and Perrin have seen, the interpretation 'the curving back', 'bellying inwards'.

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¹ Under κόλπ-ω, κόλπωρ I has as its meaning 'the bellying or bulging out' of the centre of a line of battle—citing this passage.

² Vol. ii, p. 850, foot: 'ut in prominentibus solet frontibus et cornibus productis media

acie sinum faciente', where 'prominentibus frontibus', which in reality purports to translate μεγάλοις μετώποις, may have been mistaken for *sinum*, which really quite accurately translates κόλπωμα.

THE PROSODY OF GREEK PROPER NAMES IN -A IN PLAUTUS AND TERENCE¹

EDITORS and writers on the prosody of Plautus and Terence disagree about the prosody of the final -a in the nominative and vocative of proper names taken from the Greek First Declension. The fact that they are often quoted as examples of syllaba anceps either at the diaeresis of longer iambic lines or at *loci Iacobsohniani*² would seem to imply that they normally scan as Latin First Declension nouns with short -a in the nominative and vocative singular. So R. Kauer in the commentary of his edition of Terence's *Andria* (1930) on line 301 writes 'die griechischen Eigennamen auf -a (griech. -as)—Sosia,³ Byrria, Chaereia, Phaedria usw.—haben bei Terenz stets kurzes -a'. On the other hand, W. M. Lindsay (*Early Latin Verse*, p. 152) concluded 'But the evidence, such as it is, points to -ā'. S. G. Ashmore on *Phormio* 865 (*The Comedies of Terence*, 2nd edition, 1908) writes '**Sophronā:** Plaut. and Ter. usually preserve the long quantity of the nom. sing. of Gk. proper names in -a, provided such names consist of more than two syllables. Hence *Phaedriā* (830), *Sostratā* (.Ad 343); but *Getā* (usually)'. The latest edition of Terence (J. Marouzeau, Budé edition, 1947–9) follows Ashmore in vol. ii (Comm. Métriques on *Haut.* 406, *Phorm.* 179, 784, 865), but in vol. iii on *Ad.* 343 and 619 reverts to a non-committal attitude ('conservation de la quantité grecque à la finale d'un polysyllabe, à moins qu'on n'admette une monnaie de longue irrationnelle *Sostratā uide*').

The prerequisite of any attempt to remove or reduce this confusion is the collection of all those instances in Plautus or Terence where the metre allows us to determine the quantity of the final -a. These instances are not, in fact, very numerous, for most frequently the proper name is at the end of a line or its last syllable is elided; for example, all 29 instances of *Demea* in Terence's *Adelphoe* are so placed. In giving a list of the examples in other positions it will be convenient to give the examples from Plautus and Terence separately and to divide them, within each author's list, into a number of classes. It is worth while observing that there seems to be no distinction in the treatment either between the nominative and the vocative case or between masculine and feminine nouns.

PLAUTUS

1. Discussion of the few lyric examples may be left till later; the examples in Plautus are:

Casindā (*Cas.* 691), *Myrrinā* (*ibid.* 171), *Simiā* (*Pseud.* 944): *Palaestra* (*Rud.* 677) may have -ā or -ā.

2. Examples with a long penult are unlikely to help, since almost invariably

¹ I should like to thank Professor W. A. Laidlaw for his advice and comments on a draft of this article.

² Viz. 'at the fourth arsis of the iambic senarius (and the corresponding part of the trochaic septenarius) and at the second arsis

of a trochaic septenarius' (W. A. Laidlaw, *The Prosody of Terence*, 1938, p. 62).

³ *Sosia* does not occur in Terence except at the line end (or in elision), where the quantity of its final -a cannot be determined: for its quantity in Plautus see below.

the metre will allow either -a or -ā. In fact, only one of these examples needs considering, viz. *Merc.* 683:

Dorippa, mea Dorippa. quid clamas, obsecro?

If sound, this would have to scan *Dorip|pā quid clā|mas*, but most editors would agree with Lindsay's comment (Oxford Text ad loc.) *uix ferendum*. There is no convincing emendation, but anything that eliminates the dubious scansion *quid* is likely to leave the quantity of the final -a open.

3. Other examples may be considered under three headings: (i) disyllables scanning u x; (ii) longer polysyllables scanning (. .) u u x; (iii) longer polysyllables scanning (. . .) - u x.

- (i) *Getā*¹ (*Truc.* 577), *Syrā* (*Merc.* 808): *Scapha* (*Most.* 158, 166, 170, 194, 252); in the first five of these instances it occurs at the diaeresis of the iambic septenarius, where either *Scaphā* or *Scaphā* (with syllaba anceps) is possible: in 252 (troch. sept.) *Scāphā tām* the final -a must be short).
- (ii) *Ptolemaioria* (*Rud.* 481), *Eunomia* (*Aul.* 780), *Casina* (*Cas.* 428, 896, 977), *Staphyla* (*Aul.* 269, 350), *Phrygia* (*Aul.* 333) all may have -a or -ā.
- (iii) *Leonidā* (*As.* 740 -ā 2nd foot of iamb. sept.), *Saurea* (*As.* 417: -ā or -ā) (syllaba anceps) at diaeresis of iamb. sept.), *Sosīā* (*Amph.* 438, 439, 1024: 438 -ā 6th foot of troch. sept. 439 -ā at 3rd foot of troch. sept. 1024 -ā at 4th foot of troch. sept.).

Clearly the crucial cases are *Scapha* in 3 (i) and the examples in 3 (iii). For the latter category the only reasonable explanation—even if *As.* 417 is omitted since it may be an instance of syllaba anceps at diaeresis—is that the final -a is long. The case of *Scapha* in the *Mostellaria* is more difficult. Two solutions may be suggested:

- (a) since the -a must be short in 252, it should be regarded as naturally short in the five other cases, which will then be instances of syllaba anceps at diaeresis;
- (b) that in the five other cases the naturally long -a is retained in *arsi*, and that in 252 the -a is shortened in *thesi* (possibly by the operation of Iambenkürzung).

This second suggestion involves accepting that metrical ictus enables a Greek iambic word in -ā to resist the operation of the Latin tendency to make such words pyrrhic. That this may be the case is possibly supported by *An.* 860 where Lindsay (Oxford Text ad loc.) scans *Drōmō Drō|mō* (but the line may be iambic *Drōmō | Drōmō*) and *Pseud.* 1066 where Lindsay has *Simō quid est?* (Simo del. Bentley (seq. SIMO)).

TERENCE

1. There is only one example in lyrics, *Sōstrātā* (*Ad.* 616), in a choriambic line. Note, however, that in six lines (*Ad.* 610 a-15) Terence can write *obici*, *consili*, *suspicio*, scensions without parallel in his non-lyric metres.

2. There are no examples with long penult.

3. (i) Disyllables scanning u x: only one noun (*Geta*) is involved. In five of six occurrences the final -a does not bear the ictus and must scan short, viz.

¹ Contrast Menander, *Her.* 309 *Férā*.

Phorm. 72, 219, 781; *Ad.* 506, 891. In *Phormio* 179 (troch. oct.), where the final -a bears the ictus, the scansion requires discussion:

nullus es, Geta, nisi iam aliquod, etc.

Are we to scan *Ge|tā nīsi* (-ā in *arsi*), or *Ge|tā nīsi* (with irrational caesura of tribrach in a trochaic line¹)? Instances of this type of resolution are uncommon in the 3rd *arsi* of trochaic lines, but cf. *Haut.* 879 and 898 (a close parallel, since two pyrrhic words are juxtaposed):

sed ille tuom quō|quē Sýrus | idem.

(ii) There are no examples with short propenult.

(iii) The non-lyric examples with long propenult are comparatively numerous. In each case the final -a bears the metrical ictus. The full list is given below: the figure in brackets indicates the foot in which the final -a falls, an asterisk that there is hiatus after it; for the sake of completeness I have given the rest of the foot in trochaic lines and the whole of the next foot in iambic lines.

<i>An.</i> 301	<i>Byrrī a</i> (3) <i>daturne</i> (troch. oct.)
<i>Ht.</i> 406	<i>Clinia</i> (4) <i>salue ut</i> (senarius)
688	<i>Clinia</i> (4) * <i>age da</i> (iamb. sept.)
695	<i>Clinia</i> (4) <i>tui in tu to</i> (iamb. sept.)
<i>Eun.</i> 465	<i>Phaedria</i> (2) . — <i>quid sta mus</i> (senarius)
558	<i>Chaere a</i> (2) <i>quid est</i> <i>quod</i> (troch. oct.)
707	<i>Chaere a</i> (4) <i>tuam</i> (troch. sept.)
<i>Ph.</i> 154	<i>Phaedri a</i> (2) <i>patrem ut</i> <i>ex-</i> (troch. sept.)
484	<i>Phaedri a</i> (2) <i>tibi ad est</i> (troch. sept.)
784	<i>Nausistrata</i> (4) <i>fac illa ut</i> (iamb. sept.)
830	<i>Phaedria</i> (4) <i>potere tur</i> (iamb. oct.)
865	<i>Sophro na</i> (2) <i>modo</i> (troch. sept.)
1037	<i>Nausistrata</i> (3) <i>prius</i> (troch. sept.)
<i>Hec.</i> 243	<i>Philumena</i> (4) <i>neum ius</i> (iamb. sept.)
325	<i>Philumena</i> (4) <i>mea nunc</i> (iamb. sept.)
830	<i>Myrrina</i> (4) * <i>in digi to</i> (iamb. sept.)
<i>Ad.</i> 343	<i>Sastrata</i> (6) <i>uidē quam</i> (iamb. oct.)
619	<i>Pamphila</i> (4) <i>quid agat</i> (iamb. oct.)

Many of these examples can be (and have been) explained as instances of syllaba anceps at the diaeresis of longer iambic lines or as *loci Jacobsohniani*, most of the rest can be treated as instances of irrational caesura (...|˘, ˘˘) in trochaic lines, while *Eun.* 465 can be labelled 'syllaba anceps at change of speaker'. But the significant thing is that in no line is the scansion -ā necessary; in every line the most natural scansion is to accept long final -ā, the more so since -ā has been shown to be Plautus' scansion in such cases.

The simplest hypothesis that will account for all examples in both Plautus and Terence would be to say that final -a is retained as long in *arsi* in every case, and is (or may be²) shortened to -ā in *thesi*. This hypothesis, in addition

¹ Cf. E. Fraenkel, *Iktus u. Akzent im lat. Sprechvers*, c. viii (Die 'aufgelösten Hebungen' des Typus *diceré uolui*), esp. p. 266, footnote 3.

² There is not sufficient evidence to show whether -a in *thesi* must always be short. In all the cases where it is certainly short

Iambenkürzung may be at work. Where Iambenkürzung cannot operate, viz. in nouns with a long penult, there is no case where the quantity of the final -a can be determined with certainty (*vid. supra* on *Dorippa* in *Merc.* 683 and *infra* on *Palaestra* (in lyrics) in *Rud.* 677).

to simple side, from that have -ā or -ā in one short penult with short vowel perhaps in Greek endings

Two always surely both hiatus in Greek simpler examples

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to simplicity, has the advantage of covering the examples, so far left on one side, from lyrics; all the examples (three from Plautus and one from Terence) that have certain -ā are *in thesi*. *Palaestra* (*Rud.* 677), where metre admits either -ā or -ā̄, is also *in thesi*. As it stands, the hypothesis may seem to lack precision in one respect. If -a *in thesi* may be shortened (even if we limit it to cases with short penult, where Iambenkürzung may operate), a scansion such as *Sosidā*, with short final -a, would seem theoretically possible in non-lyric metres, provided that the -a did not bear metrical ictus. No such scansion does occur, perhaps because it was discouraged by the general rules of Plautine and Terentian prosody that so severely limit the use of unelided dactyl words or word-endings.

Two small points perhaps support the suggestion that naturally long -a is always retained *in arsi*: (i) *Eun.* 107 (cf. Laidlaw, op. cit., pp. 7, 44): *Sāmīdā* is surely better than *Sāmīdā m̄[hi* or *Sāmītā*? (ii) Terence has no certain instance of both hiatus and syllaba anceps at the diaeresis. But if -ā is the normal quantity in Greek names, we are asked to admit two examples (*Ht.* 688, *Hec.* 830). It is simpler, surely, to assume naturally long -a; these two instances are then examples only of hiatus at diaeresis.

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THE ASOTODIDASKALOS ATTRIBUTED TO ALEXIS

In Athenaeus 8. 336 d we read:

Ἄλεξις δὲ ἐν Ασωτοδίδασκάλῳ, φησὶ Σωτίων ὁ Αλεξανδρεὺς ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν Τίμωνος σύλλαων (έγώ γάρ οὐν ἀπήρτησα τῷ δράματι· πλείστα τῆς μέσης καλουμένης κωμῳδίας ἀναγνοῦς δράματα τῶν ὀκτακοσίων καὶ τούτων ἐκλογὰς ποιησάμενος οὐ περιέτυχον τῷ Ασωτοδίδασκάλῳ, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἀναγραφῆς ἀξιωθέν των σύνοιδα· οὗτε γάρ Καλλίμαχος οὗτε Άριστοφάνης αὐτῷ ἀνέγραψαν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ οἵ τας ἐν Περγάμῳ ἀναγραφὰς ποιησάμενοι)—ό δὲ Σωτίων φησὶν ἐν τῷ δράματι Σανθίαν τινὰ οἰκέτην πεποιησθαι προτρεπόμενον ἐπὶ ηδυπάθειαν ὄμοδούλους ἑαυτοῦ καὶ λέγοντα·

τί ταῦτα ληρεῖς, φληραφῶν ἄνω κάτω
Λύκειον, Ἀκαδήμειαν, Ὁμείον πύλας,
λήπρους σοφιστῶν; οὐδὲ ἐν τούτων καλόν.
πίνωμεν, ἐμπίνωμεν, ὡς Σίκων *(Σίκων)*,
5 χαίρωμεν, ἔως ἔνεστι τὴν ψυχὴν τρέφειν.
τύρβαζε, Μάνη γαστρὸς οὐδὲν ἥδιον.
αὐτὴν πατήρ σοι καὶ πάλιν μήτηρ μόνη.
ἀρετὰί δὲ πρεσβεῖαι τε καὶ στρατηγίαι
κόμποι κενοὶ φοβοῦνται ἀντ' ὀνειράτων.
10 φύξει σε δάίμων τῷ πεπρωμένῳ χρόνῳ.
ἔξεις δὲ σος ἀν φάγης τε καὶ πίησι μόνα:
σποδὸς δὲ τάλλα, Περικλέης, Κόδρος, Κίμων.

From these words of Athenaeus, the majority of scholars¹ have come to the conclusion that the *Asotodidaskalos* was not, despite what Sotion says, composed by Alexis, but is a forgery; and some even go so far as to attribute the forgery to Sotion himself. Yet nowhere do they support their views with sufficient arguments; nowhere has the question, in the light of all the evidence, both external and internal, been fully considered. Meineke (*Fragmenta Comicorum Graecorum*, i. 397 f.) has indeed given clear reasons for his belief that the play was not written by Alexis, in objecting to three usages in the cited fragment as unnatural (see II below); but these objections are not all justifiable, as Kock has shown in the case of *ἥδιον* (*Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta*, ii. 307), or together conclusive enough to make us reject the fragment out of hand. Further, no one has attempted to solve the question why, if the *Asotodidaskalos* was a forgery, Sotion should claim the authorship for Alexis. It is the purpose of this essay to examine all the available evidence that we have in order to decide whether after all Alexis could have written the *Asotodidaskalos* from which the fragment is cited by Sotion, and then, if we conclude that it must be spurious, we shall attempt to discover the reason for the forgery and for Sotion's attribution of it to Alexis.

¹ Markland (*Eur. Suppl.* 127 n.); Wakefield (*Silva Critica*, iv. 73); Larcher (*Herodotus* vii. 103 n.); Porson (in Walpole, *Comici Graeci*, p. 88); Dobree (*Adv. ii.* 317); these appear to cite Sotion as the author,

with no mention of Alexis. Meineke, op. cit., and Kaibel (*R.E.* 1. 1469, and *Hermes*, xxiv (1889), 43, n. 2) reject the work as a forgery; Kock, op. cit., believes it genuine.

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I. THE EXTERNAL EVIDENCE

In considering the external evidence, we must begin by looking at the words of Athenaeus himself: 'Alexis in the "Asotodidaskalos", says Sotion of Alexandria in his book on Timon's Lampoons. I myself have not come across the play. I have read more than eight hundred plays of the so-called Middle Comedy, and made excerpts from them; but I have not met with the "Asotodidaskalos", nor do I know of any one who considered it worth cataloguing. Neither Callimachus nor Aristophanes has catalogued it, nor even the compilers of the catalogue at Pergamum.' Our first task is to find out what likelihood there is of Sotion having been right, in the face of Athenaeus' testimony.

Sotion (see Stengel, *R.E.* 2/iii. i. 1235) was a Peripatetic philosopher of Alexandria, living early in the second century B.C., when Aristophanes was in charge of the library there. His main work was the *Διαδοχή τῶν φιλοσόφων*, in which he apparently presented each philosopher and philosophic school as links in a chain, connected in their theories directly both with what preceded and with what came after them. The work was known to Athenaeus, who mentions it in 4. 162 e (cf. 11. 505 c and 8. 343 c), though perhaps it was no more than a nodding acquaintance. His 'Spezialschrift' on the 'Silloi' or Lampoons of Timon, in which Sotion attributed the *Asotodidaskalos* to Alexis, must have dealt with the satirical poem on dogmatic philosophy written by Timon about the middle of the third century. As Sotion lived within a century of Alexis' death, and came from a city where he would have full opportunity to conduct his researches in literature and philosophy, his evidence cannot be idly dismissed as if it were only the empty gossip of a scoundrel. We must assume therefore that he was either speaking the truth or misled into believing in the authenticity of a spurious work. The third possibility, which has been assumed by previous scholars without any warrant, namely that Sotion may wilfully have been passing off a forgery, seems less likely than the other two possibilities, although of course it cannot be entirely ruled out.

It seems very difficult, however, to accept Sotion's statement as the truth, when we realize the amount of trouble that Athenaeus appears to have taken in order to verify whether the play was genuine or not. His own reading of over eight hundred plays of the Middle Comedy must have comprised practically the whole of those comedies extant in his time; if we add together the total number of plays that we know of today in the Middle Comedy, basing our figures on Suidas¹ wherever possible, and on the sum of titles known where Suidas fails, we do not arrive at a number greatly in excess of eight hundred. Further, Athenaeus claims to have checked the *ἀναγραφαὶ* of books in the libraries of Alexandria and Pergamum; this means that he was able to discover whether there were any records of the *Asotodidaskalos* and its authorship extant in his day, even though the play itself had by then become lost or unobtainable. In asserting that Callimachus had not catalogued it, Athenaeus leads one to believe that the play was either unknown to or unacceptable by a man who was already about thirty years old when Alexis died.² It seems hardly

¹ Except for Antiphanes, where the figure of 260 plays given by an anonymous commentator seems more likely than Suidas' 365.

² Callimachus b. 310–300: *R.E.* Supp. V, p. 387 (Herter); Alexis d. some time after the wedding of Ptolemy Philadelphus and

his sister Arsinoe, which took place 278–273, since this marriage is mentioned in Alexis fr. 244 (K. ii. 386). There is no reason to suppose that Alexis could not have survived long enough to write this; Plutarch (*Mor.* 420 d) attests that he lived to a great age

likely that records of an accredited play of Alexis should have been lost as early as that, if the play had ever been put on the stage, and not merely been written for the study; and we have no information that Alexis ever wrote for anything but the stage. Callimachus' ignorance of the play as a genuine work of Alexis is supported, too, by Aristophanes of Byzantium and the Pergamene school of grammarians. This combined evidence proves that the work was unknown or unaccepted shortly after Alexis' death, at Alexandria and Pergamum. As Sotion himself lived at Alexandria, and presumably made use of the library there to conduct his own researches, it seems unlikely that he would have access to work unknown to the librarians of Alexandria; we must therefore presume that the work that Sotion claimed to be Alexis' *Asotodidaskalos* was rejected by the scholars of Alexandria. The only alternative to this, that Sotion was intentionally concealing from the library a genuine Athenian play which would have been of considerable financial value to him, seems quite absurd. Why then should Sotion claim the genuineness of a work considered spurious by the scholars of Alexandria? The reason may have been that Sotion was misled by some unscrupulous person; but before we consider this question, it would perhaps be best to turn to the fragment attributed to Alexis itself, and see whether we ourselves after examining it agree with the scholars of Alexandria and Pergamum in rejecting the play as not of Alexis.

II. THE INTERNAL EVIDENCE

The text that is printed at the head of this essay is Kaibel's, except in line 9, where I prefer the manuscript reading *κενοὶ ψοφοῦσιν* to Kaibel's *κενὰ ψοφοῦστες*. I shall assume that the reader is acquainted with Kaibel's apparatus criticus and the notes of Meineke (op. cit. iii. 394) and Kock (op. cit. ii. 306) on the fragment. Fortunately, it appears to be free from serious textual difficulties, unless there is a crux at the end of line 2 (but see below).

When the passage is analysed, we notice immediately (1) the lack of conjunctions and other connecting words to link the sentences and clauses together; (2) the striking shortness of the phrase units. In consequence, the style is jerky, and the thought of the passage advances more in a series of explosive phrases than in a flowing and connected argument. There are also (3) certain noteworthy tricks of diction and technique: (a) the use of three proper names juxtaposed in order to emphasize a particular point (ll. 2 and 12); (b) the repetition of the stem of a word in *πίνωμεν ἐμπίνωμεν* (l. 4); (c) the shortening of the iota in *ῆδιον* (l. 6); (d) the unusual use of *τύρβαζε* (l. 6) and *ψύξει* (l. 10); and (e) the rather curious phrase *ἀρέται . . . κόμποι κενοὶ ψοφοῦσιν ἀντ' ὄνειράτων* (ll. 8–9). Let us examine each of these features in turn, and see whether they are in accord with Alexis' usual practice, always remembering, however, that because so little of Alexis' work has come down to us it is impossible to condemn as un-Alexidean any single usage or trick of style by itself; we can only comment that such and such a word is not found in Alexis, or that the general practice of Alexis does not seem to agree with this or that particular usage.

1. *The lack of connecting particles*

There are seven major pauses in the passage: at *σοφιστῶν*, *καλόν* (l. 3); *τρέφειν* (l. 5); *ῆδιον* (l. 6); *μόνη* (l. 7); *ὄνειράτων* (l. 9); and *χρόνῳ* (l. 10); and though we have no information regarding his birth date, his first datable play need

not be placed before the late 360's: see Schiassi, *R.I.F.C.* lxxix (1951), 222.

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and yet connecting particles are used only twice:¹ δέ in ll. 8 and 11. We cannot of course count οὐδέ in l. 3, since οὐδὲ ἐν is no more than the common emphatic form of οὐδέν. Alexis, however, follows the normal Greek practice of connexion, linking together his sentences usually by particles, occasionally by demonstrative pronouns and similar words. We can see this in two fragments picked out at random, frs. 9 (K. ii. 299) and 46 (K. ii. 314), which illustrate his usual practice. In the former, Solon's speech from ll. 3 to 12 consists of four clauses, each connected to what precedes in the ways mentioned above: respectively by γάρ, γάρ (l. 4); τοῦτο (l. 8); and γάρ (l. 11). The latter passage also consists of four clauses, each one linked to its predecessor as before: respectively by δέ (l. 3), γάρ (l. 5), and ὥστε (l. 7). Nevertheless, although generally the fragments of Alexis do in fact coincide with these two in the matter of connexion, it is still possible that for some particular reason, such as perhaps the portrayal of an impetuous character, the poet on one occasion did not choose to practise his usual methods of connexion. We cannot therefore argue from this feature of the *Asotodidaskalos* passage alone that it was not composed by Alexis.

2. The shortness of the phrase units

This is perhaps the most noteworthy of all the points that strike one on reading the passage, and at the same time the most un-Alexidean. The thought seems to progress by a series of short leaps and bounds, especially between ll. 3 and 7: οὐδὲ ἐν τούτων καλόν. / πίνωμεν ἐμπίνωμεν, ὡς Σίκων, *(Σίκων.)* / χαίρωμεν, ἔως ἔνεστι τὴν ψυχὴν τρέφειν. / τύρβαζε, Μάρη. / γαστρὸς οὐδὲν ηδιον. If we compare this with the flowing utterance and long sentences in fr. 45 (K. ii. 313), which seem to me to be far more characteristic of Alexis, we notice the difference immediately. Alexis' lines run on, without being end-stopped, without being punctuated by those frequent stops that characterize the fragment of the *Asotodidaskalos*, without spurts, without jerks. Yet here again, although a flowing style, enjambment, and sentences that tend to be longer than those of the suspect fragment are the typical marks of Alexis' verse, he may yet have written in the staccato style of that fragment for a particular purpose; and so again we can do no more than say that the style in the *Asotodidaskalos* fragment is uncharacteristic of Alexis.

3. Tricks of style and technique

(a) *The juxtaposition of three proper names to emphasize a point:* Λύκειον, Ακαδήμειαν, Ὡδεῖον πύλας (l. 2); and Περικλέης, Κόδρος, Κίμων (l. 12). That this trick should occur twice in so short a space of lines may possibly be coincidental, but seems rather to be a special trait of style. The choice of names seems in both cases unusual for a poet writing in Athens at the time of Alexis. Let us take the example in l. 2 first. There Λύκειον and Ακαδήμειαν are irreproachable, being just such haunts of the philosophers as we should expect to be mentioned in the fourth and early third centuries; but what are the Ὡδεῖον πύλας, and why are they mentioned? Wachsmuth, examining the question in *Die Stadt Athen*, i. 676, n. 1, without being able to arrive at a solution, avers that the Odeon had no gates. It is possible, however, that the expression may refer (perhaps paratragically, as Professor Webster has suggested to me) to the Propylaeum which apparently formed the chief entrance to the Odeon (see

¹ For the purpose of this paragraph, I take phrase punctuated by full stop, colon, or the word 'clause' as referring to all units of question mark.

Robertson, *Greek and Roman Architecture*, 2nd ed., p. 174). Yet the expression seems to me rather curious, and it has caused some scholars to prefer the reading '*Ωδεῖον, πύλας*', which is found in some of the manuscripts: a reading, indeed, even harder to defend than the other, and requiring an explanation of *πύλας*. The chief objection, however, to the expression, whether one reads '*Ωδεῖον πύλας*' or '*Ωδεῖον, πύλας*', lies in the actual mention of the Odeon itself. I have not been able to discover anywhere any mention of it in connexion with philosophy before and during the lifetime of Alexis. The most likely explanation, therefore, as it seems to me—if we may be allowed to anticipate our conclusion, and consider the *Asotodidaskalos* to be a forgery—is that the expression '*Ωδεῖον πύλας*' was little more than a stopgap, put in after *Λύκειον, Ακαδήμειαν* by the forger of the play, who knew well enough the philosophical reputation of the Lyceum and the Academy, but was at a loss for a third haunt of philosophy which he might mention as flourishing in Alexis' days.

The other trio of names, in l. 12, is also rather curious: Pericles, Codrus, Cimon; an early hero of Athens, that is, sandwiched between two fifth-century leaders; a curious collocation certainly, but not perhaps impossible for an Athenian author.

If we compare this trick of style with Alexis' own juxtaposition of proper names to emphasize some point, we see little resemblance between them. In fr. 97 (K. ii. 328), we have a list of diners' nicknames; in fr. 108 (K. ii. 334) a list of wine-bibbers in a joke against Timocles; in fr. 135 (K. ii. 345) a list of authors. In all these places Alexis juxtaposes three or more names without worrying one with such peculiar expressions as '*Ωδεῖον πύλας*' or such combinations as that of Codrus with the two fifth-century leaders. If the objection is raised that in fr. 108 we have a historical Timocles set side by side with the mythical Maron, Oinopion, and the otherwise unknown *Κάπηλος* (this last may possibly be a corruption of the name of some divinity connected with wine), the answer here is easy enough: the purpose as I have said is a joke against Timocles. No such explanation is possible to account for Codrus' insertion between Pericles and Cimon. Alexis, therefore, we may conclude, tended to make lists of proper names in rather a different way from that we find in the *Asotodidaskalos* fragment.

(b) *The repetition πίνωμεν ἐμπίνωμεν* (l. 4). I have been unable to find a similar repetition in Alexis, or elsewhere in Greek comedy. The nearest parallel, which Professor T. B. L. Webster was kind enough to show me, seems to be in Menander, *Epitrep.* 558 (Körte, ed. 3): *ὑπομαίνθ' οὐτρος, νὴ τὸν Απόλλωνα, μαίνεται*, where, however, the compound precedes the simple verb and the two words are not placed directly together.

(c) *The shortening of the iota in ηδιον* (l. 6). This is a rare but well-attested usage both in tragedy and in comedy. Nauck (*Mélanges gréco-romains*, St. Petersburg, vi. 97) cites the following instances of it: Ar. *Eq.* 1264, Eur. *Bach.* 877 and 897 (lyrics); Eupolis fr. 20 (Demianczuk), Aeschylus fr. 309 (Sidgwick), Eur. *Suppl.* 1101, and fr. 546 (Nauck 2), *Tragicus Adespotus* fr. 320 (Nauck 2). We cannot therefore deny the possibility that Alexis also may have shortened the iota in this form of the comparative adjective.

(d) *Peculiarities of vocabulary:* (i) *τύρβαζε* (l. 6), intransitively, in the meaning 'revel'. Elsewhere it is found in this sense only in the middle voice (Ar. *Pax* 1007). In the active it means 'stir up' (a city, Ar. *Eq.* 311; mud, Ar. *Vesp.* 257), and is used transitively.

(ii) *ψύξει* (l. 10). To make sense of this word here, we must translate it 'will lay low', 'will freeze to death', and interpret it as a colloquialism. There is no parallel in Greek literature for this use of the word *ψύχω*; Kock's comparison of Plato, *Phaedo* 118 a is completely irrelevant, since there Socrates is literally being frozen by the hemlock.

Yet before we condemn the passage out of hand on the strength of the objections to these two usages of vocabulary, as Meineke does (see above: Meineke's objections are limited to these two words and the shortening of the iota in *ἡδον*), we must remember that Alexis was a favourite quarry for the Atticists and lexicographers, who often illustrated new formations and extensions of meaning by citing Alexis (cf. fr. 23 (K. ii. 305); fr. 44 (K. ii. 313); fr. 60 (K. ii. 317)). It does not seem impossible that he might therefore have used *τύρβαζε* in the above-mentioned sense, nor perhaps that he used the bold metaphor in *ψύξει*. And yet, assuming that he did write the *Asotodidaskalos*, and used these two words thus, it seems to me that the usages would have attracted the attention of Phrynicus or some other of the Atticists and their comments. And so it does seem likely that Alexis was not the author of the fragment: likely, but from this evidence alone, not certain.

(e) *The phrase ἀπειρ . . . κόμποι κενοὶ ψοφοῦσιν ἀντ' ὄνειράτων*. This is a very forced way of saying 'The virtues sound like empty boasts, as dreams.' The awkwardness is caused mainly because *ἀντ'* *ὄνειράτων*, which must here be interpreted as 'in the way of dreams', 'like dreams', would more naturally and with less straining be taken to mean 'instead of dreams', though here such an interpretation would be nonsensical. This kind of forced expression does not appear to be characteristic of Alexis.

To sum up, therefore, this examination of the internal evidence, we can say that the lack of connecting particles, the shortness of the phrase units, and the above-mentioned tricks of style are generally uncharacteristic of Alexis; and although each individual feature of style that has been discussed would not suffice to damn the fragment as spurious, the cumulative weight of them all must do so. We can, then, conclude that the internal evidence as well as the external leads us to believe that the *Asotodidaskalos* from which this fragment is cited by Sotion was not written by Alexis. In fact, since several of the stylistic features are definitely unattic, we may even go so far as to say that the play was not written by any Athenian author.

III. THE FORGING OF THE ASOTODIDASKALOS

Having established the fragment to be spurious, we are now left with the problem of trying to discover why Sotion should have claimed that it was genuine. My belief is that Sotion was deceived by a forgery, perpetrated by someone who hoped for financial gain by passing off his own composition as a genuine play of Alexis. Let us examine the evidence in support of this view.

First, it seems to me that the fragment itself may well give us a little information regarding the circumstances of its composition. We have already noted that the most likely explanation of the words *'Ωδείον πύλας* (l. 2) is that they were written by a man who was not fully cognisant of the philosophical haunts of Athens in the days of Alexis. That the author was not an Athenian nor completely conversant with Attic idiom is suggested by the stylistic evidence, which we have examined above. Yet, on the other hand, in dealing with the

phrase πίνωμεν ἐμπίνωμεν (l. 4) we have seen that the nearest parallel to this form of stem repetition occurred in Menander. That this similarity to Menander may not merely be coincidental is suggested by a comparison of the *Asotodidaskalos* fragment with Menander, *Epitrep.* 74 ff. (Körte, ed. 3). In the Menander we see that same shortness of phrase units and omission of connecting particles as has been observed above in the fragment. And so, although as a whole its style seems uncharacteristic of Menander, it may well have been composed by a man whose own style was influenced by his knowledge of that poet.¹

The reason why this unknown forger should have composed the *Asotodidaskalos* is suggested by a passage of Galen,² 15. 105 (ed. Kühn): πρὶν γὰρ τὸν ἐν Αλεξανδρείᾳ καὶ Περγάμῳ γενέσθαι βιβλίεis ἐπὶ κτῆσι βιβλίων φιλοτιμηθέντας, οὐδέπω (!) φευδῶς ἐπεγέγραπτο σύγγραμα: λαμβάνειν δ' ἀρέαμένων μισθὸν τῶν κομιζομένων αὐτοῖς σύγγραμμα παλαιοῦ τινος ἀνδρός, οὗτος ηδὴ πολλὰ φευδῶς ἐπιγράφοντες ἔκομέν. Compare also 15. 109. These passages, it is true, refer specifically to the forgeries of medical works, but it seems likely that the Alexandrians, in collecting their library, offered money for copies of other works also, including Athenian comedy. We could therefore suppose that in the case of the *Asotodidaskalos*, the forgery was made by some one who hoped to persuade the Alexandrian library officials into giving him money for a play they believed to be a genuine work of Alexis; and that though he successfully imposed on Sotion, he failed to convince the authorities of Alexandria. This theory would certainly explain why Athenaeus, when seeing the fragment quoted by Sotion as by Alexis, was unable to trace it in any of the catalogues of Alexandria or Pergamum, and had never met it in his own extensive reading of Middle Comedy. As soon as the Alexandrians recognized it to be a forgery, it would be worthless and have been forgotten long before the time of Athenaeus. It may be objected by some that if the Alexandrians rejected the work as a forgery, there is no reason for supposing that Sotion would not do likewise, living as he was himself in Alexandria. Against this, we must remember that presumably the library of Alexandria had at hand scholars trained in the detection of forgeries, an art which one cannot expect Sotion to have possessed. Further, Sotion was a philosopher, not a student of Comedy; so that he may have lacked that interest in the *Asotodidaskalos* as a whole, when he was citing from it, which would have caused him to check the authenticity of it. After all, the probability is that this citation from the play was not an essential part of his argument, and may have been no more than a relatively unimportant illustration, too unimportant, in fact, to be worthy of checking. And besides, even experts made mistakes; Heraclides Ponticus, for all his scholarship, was deceived into believing in the authenticity of a forged play of Sophocles (Diogenes Laert. 5. 92).

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¹ Un-Menandrian details include the use of φύκει and τύρβαζε in the sense required by the fragment, and the awkward ἀπεραι . . . κόμποι κενοὶ φοβοῦνται ἀντ' ὀνειράτων phrase; and the general style of the fragment is more

pompous and affected than Menander's ever seems to be.

² Cited by Sandys, *History of Classical Scholarship*, i. 112. The exclamation mark after οὐδέπω is Sandys's.

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THREE PASSAGES IN ARRIAN

MELAMNIDAS, MENOETAS, AND MENIDAS

ARRIAN (4. 7. 2) tells us that while Alexander was in winter quarters at Bactra (329/8 B.C.) ἡκον δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ Ἐπόκιλλος καὶ Μελαμνίδας [so all MSS.] καὶ Πτολεμαῖος ὁ τῶν Θρακῶν στρατηγὸς ἀπὸ θαλάσσης, οἱ τὰ τε χρήμata [τὰ] ξὺν Μένητι πεμφθέντα καὶ τοὺς ξυμάχους ὡς ἐπὶ θάλασσαν κατῆγαν.¹ But he later (4. 18. 3) writes that Alexander sent from Nautaca, where he wintered in 328/7, Σώπολι δὲ καὶ Ἐπόκιλλος καὶ Μενίδαν ἐς Μακεδονίαν . . . τὴν στρατιὰν τὴν ἐκ Μακεδονίας αὐτῷ ἀνάζοντας. It is a remarkable coincidence that we hear of the arrival of Epocillus and Melamnidas at Paectra and a little later of the departure of Epocillus and Menidas from Nautaca. It is the more remarkable, even allowing for the incompleteness of our information, in that Melamnidas is mentioned here only. Droysen (*Gesch. d. Hell.* i. 2. 68) therefore conjectured long ago that *Μενίδας* should be read for *Μελαμνίδας* but his suggestion has, strangely enough, failed to win acceptance. Berve (*Das Alexanderreich*, ii. p. 248, n. 1) remarks 'Natürlich ist der Name des Melamnidas . . . nicht mit Droysen in "Menidas" zu ändern'. But why 'natürlich'? Not only does Arrian himself afford grounds for doubt but Curtius (7. 10. 11) also deals with the same events at Bactra and describes them in such similar terms that it is beyond dispute that he is following the same source as Arrian, i.e. Ptolemy.² His version of Arrian 4. 7. 2 runs as follows: 'eisdem fere diebus Ptolomaeus et *Maenidas* [so all MSS.] peditum quattuor milia et equites mille adduxerunt.' It is true that Hedicke (followed by Rolfe in the Loeb edition) altered *Maenidas* to *Melamnidas* but this is simply to bring Curtius into line with Arrian. Palaeographically *Maenidas* is much nearer to *Menidas*; in fact it can scarcely be called an emendation. Berve himself shows the weakness of his position when he writes (op. cit., ii. p. 258): 'Wenn weiter Arrian (4. 18. 3) berichtet, Menidas sei . . . im Winter 328/7 von Nautaka gesandt worden, so muß er zuvor von Ecbatana ins Hoflager des Königs gezogen sein, und man wird annehmen dürfen, dass er mit dem großen Söldnertransport 329/8 (Arrian 4. 7. 2; Curtius 7. 10. 11–12) ins Hoflager kam.' Menidas should, therefore, remain in Curtius and *Μελαμνίδας* should be altered to *Μελαμνίδας* at Arrian 4. 7. 2. Melamnidas is a mere phantom and should disappear from modern histories and from Pauly-Wissowa.

While Alexander is at Memphis an army arrives from Antipater including μισθοφόροι Ἑλλῆνες ἐς τετρακοσίους, ὃν ἤγειτο Μενοίτας ὁ Ἡγούμενος (Arr. 3. 5. 1). It is a little surprising that Droysen's suggestion to read *Μενίδας* for *Μενοίτας* should have been accepted so readily by editors. We do at least hear of a Menoetas later (Diodorus 19. 47) as Berve remarks. He further points out that Menidas does not elsewhere, so far as we know, command infantry. But are the 400 mercenaries infantry? Four hundred seems to me too small a

¹ Arrian is in error here. Menes is sent with about 3,000 talents from Susa to the coast (Arr. 3. 16. 9) while Epocillus takes the Thessalians to the coast from Ecbatana on their discharge (Arr. 3. 19. 6). The instructions to Menes (ἐνδιτεῖτε δὲ καὶ Μένητι)

in the latter passage are presumably by letter.

² 'Curtius too used Ptolemy, and sometimes to good purpose' (Tarn, *Alexander the Great*, ii. 102).

number and certainly in no other case is so small a number of infantry reinforcements recorded (see Berve's tables, i. pp. 179 and 182). They must be cavalry and probably formed part of the force which Menidas commanded at Gaugamela (Arr. 3. 12. 3). Editors are therefore correct in reading *Menidas* while Menoetas too must disappear.

THE HYPASPISTS

When we come to look into the armament of the hypaspists we find that we have to take into account two apparently contradictory factors. On the one hand, as Tarn (vol. ii, p. 153) rightly emphasizes, the hypaspists shared all the heavy infantry work. They are not, therefore, peltasts. But that the phalanx and the hypaspists were armed alike is not proved by a reference to the 'mercenaries' source'. That this source did not distinguish between them at Gaugamela is immaterial since Arrian (3. 11. 9) did not do so either. On the other hand, the frequent use of the hypaspists with the Agrianians and other light-armed troops suggests, even if it does not prove, that they were not as heavily armed as the phalanx (cf. Berve, op. cit., i. p. 125). Arrian (2. 4. 3) strongly supports this latter view—*Παρενίσσω μὲν αὐτοῦ καταλείπει σὺν ταῖς τάξεσι τῶν πεζῶν ὅσοι βαρύτεροι ὀπλισμένοι ἦσαν*, as in the following sentence we are told that Alexander took with him the hypaspists, i.e. they are not included in *ὅσοι βαρύτεροι ὀπλισμένοι ἦσαν*. Tarn (op. cit., p. 153, n. 4) is certainly correct in maintaining that we are not entitled to argue from the expression *τοὺς κουφοτάτους* that the hypaspists were lighter-armed. He clearly shows that this expression means 'more active' (cf. Arr. 3. 23. 3; 4. 6. 3). Nevertheless on the evidence set out above I think it would be fair to conclude that although the hypaspists were not light-armed their armament differed in some material fashion from that of the phalanx. Tarn has, however, pointed to a piece of evidence which, if his interpretation is correct, must be conclusive in favour of his view. 'Alexander', he writes, 'when he had to mount some infantry to accompany his cavalry on his great forced march in pursuit of Darius, took either phalangites or phalangites and hypaspists indiscriminately'. But let us examine the relevant chapters in Arrian. When Alexander sets out from Ecbatana he takes with him *τὴν φάλαγγα τὴν Μακεδονικήν* (Arr. 3. 20. 1). Though the hypaspists are not expressly mentioned they are included in the phalanx.¹ After passing the Caspian gates he hurries on *τὸν ἑταίρον μόνον ἔχων ἀμφ' αὐτὸν καὶ τὸν προδρόμον ἵππεας καὶ τῶν πεζῶν τὸν εὐρωτοτάτους τε καὶ κουφοτάτους ἐπλεξάμενος* (Arr. 3. 21. 2). Here again the hypaspists are included in the *πεζοῖ*. Finally (Arr. 3. 21. 7), after dismounting 500 of the cavalry, Alexander orders *τὸν ἥρεμόνας δὲ τῶν πεζῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπλεξάμενος τὸν κρατιστεύοντας* to mount the horses *οὕτως ὅπως οἱ πεζοὶ ὀπλισμένοι ἦσαν*. It is this passage upon which Tarn relies. But the following sentence shows, I think, that the men now mounted were not phalangites and that this passage, so far from being conclusive in favour of Tarn's view, really provides additional support against it. It runs as follows: *Νικάνορα δὲ τὸν τῶν ὑπασπιστῶν ἡγεμόνα καὶ Ἀτταλὸν τὸν τῶν Ἡγριάνων . . . τὸν ὑπολειφθέντας ἀγειν ἐκέλευσε καὶ τούτους ὡς*

¹ Tarn admits this possibility. They are similarly included in the phalanx at Arr. 4. 28. 8: *αὐτὸς . . . ἀναλαβὼν τὴν Κοίνου τάξιν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἄλλης φάλαγγος ἐπιλέξας τὸν*

κουφοτάτους . . . , as is proved by 4. 29. 1 (of the same force): πέμπει Πτολεμαῖον . . . ἀγορὰ τῶν ὑπασπιστῶν ἐπιλέκτους (cf. 4. 30. 3).

κονφότατα ἐσταλμένους, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους πεζούς ἐν τάξει ἔπεσθαι. The first thing to be observed is that two groups are left behind, *τοὺς ὑπολειφθέντας* and *τοὺς ἄλλους πεζούς*. Who made up these groups? The names of the commanders, I suggest, give the answer. Nicanor and Attalus are to lead on the remainder of the *hypaspists* and the *Agrianians* (i.e. the members of these units who did not accompany Alexander) while the phalangites are to follow on behind. The force, therefore, which Alexander took with him for the final stage of the pursuit comprised (apart from cavalry) only hypaspists and Agrianians. It did not include phalangites because they were more heavily armed.

ALEXANDER'S LETTER TO CRATERUS, ATTALUS, AND ALCETAS

In chapter 55 of Plutarch's *Alexander* we are told that immediately after the conspiracy of the pages at Bactra in 327 Alexander sent a letter to Craterus, Attalus, and Alcetas, informing them that the pages alone had been implicated in the conspiracy. As Arrian (4. 14. 1) writes that Ptolemy and Aristobulus agree on the guilt of Callisthenes in urging the pages to conspire against Alexander it is obviously of no small importance to determine whether the letter mentioned by Plutarch is genuine or not. In order to have any chance of being genuine the letter must, of course, have been sent to these generals when detached from Alexander at this time. Now it is true that there is no occasion in 327 when only these three generals were detached, but Arrian (4. 22. 1) tells us that Craterus was sent 'with his own brigade and those of Polyperchon, Attalus, and Alcetas against Catanes and Austanes' (cf. Curtius 8. 5. 2 who mentions only Craterus). This would fit the time well since Alexander returned to Bactra in the spring of 327 after sending off Craterus and the conspiracy took place shortly after. Though Polyperchon is not mentioned in the letter this is unimportant;¹ moreover as Curtius (loc. cit.) remarks that Polyperchon reduced Bubacene at this time he may have been away from the main force. But in the spring of 328 Alexander had left Craterus in Bactria with four battalions, those of Polyperchon, Attalus, Gorgias, and *Meleager*, and Tarn maintains that these were the four battalions which Craterus led against Catanes and Austanes.² It follows therefore, he argues, that Arrian has written Alcetas by mistake for Meleager. 'This is the sole mistake we have found, or shall find, in Arrian in the phalanx; and it may be only a mistake in transmission' (Tarn, loc. cit.). 'More probably it is connected somehow with the first of the two forged letters in Plut. *Alex.* lv' (loc. cit., n. 3). But it is no more than an assumption that the four battalions are the same in 328 and 327. One might naturally conclude from Tarn that Craterus had remained in Bactria at the head of the four battalions until rejoined there by Alexander in the spring of 327. A closer examination of Arrian's text will prove otherwise. It is unnecessary to attempt a detailed reconstruction of the operations in Bactria and Sogdiana in 328 from Arrian's meagre narrative and I shall confine myself to those operations which bear directly upon the point in question. Spitamenes, the rebel leader, had escaped into Scythia and had joined

¹ Even Kaerst (*Philologus*, 1892) admitted this and he did not admit much in favour of the letters of Alexander.

² 'When Alexander returned [to Bactria], he sent Craterus to reduce Catanes and Austanes and the hill country; he had still

four battalions with him, which *must* [my italics] have been the same four, but which are called those of Polyperchon, Attalus, Alcetas and "his own" (iv, 22, 1). "His own" is obviously Gorgias.' Tarn, op. cit., p. 145.

up with the Massagetae. In 328 he invaded Bactria and defeated a scratch Macedonian force left in the capital Bactra (Arr. 4. 16. 7). On receiving news of this Craterus¹ hastens against the Massagetae, but although he defeats them not far from the Scythian desert the majority escape. Arrian then turns to the operations in Sogdiana. We learn that before proceeding to winter quarters at Nautaca Alexander leaves Coenus to winter in Sogdiana (presumably near the Scythian border) with orders to try to catch Spitamenes. Coenus has his own battalion and that of Meleager. But it will be remembered that Meleager was one of the generals left with Craterus. Arrian has evidently omitted to mention that Meleager and his battalion have been transferred from Bactria to Sogdiana. It appears certain that Coenus, who had been sent against the Scythians (4. 16. 3), had linked up with Craterus when the latter pursued the Massagetae towards the desert. The main danger from Spitamenes would now appear to threaten Sogdiana, and Meleager, instead of returning to Bactria with Craterus, must have remained in Sogdiana to reinforce Coenus. However, the murder of Spitamenes (4. 17. 7) removed the threat to both Bactria and Sogdiana, and Coenus and Craterus with their forces were withdrawn from these areas and joined Alexander in winter-quarters at Nautaca (4. 18. 1). After the capture of the Sogdian rock (early 327) Alexander returned to Bactra while Craterus and his force were sent against Catanes and Austanes directly after this achievement. The assumption that Craterus must have commanded the same battalions as in 328 is quite unfounded and Meleager no doubt remained with Coenus.² We are not entitled to assume that Arrian has made a mistake in writing Alcetas, even although he has not previously been mentioned in command of a battalion. He is certainly found in command of this same battalion a little later (4. 27. 1). There is, however, one difficulty (and one only) in accepting Arrian's list of the battalions at 4. 22. 1.³ In 4. 24. 10 Ptolemy is assigned *tῆν Φιλόποιο καὶ Φιλώτα τάξιν*, i.e. a *τάξις* of light-armed and a battalion of the phalanx.⁴ Tarn has shown conclusively that there were only six battalions of the phalanx at this time and that therefore the battalion of Philotas is that later (4. 27. 1) commanded by Alcetas. The sequence of command in this battalion then (according to Arrian) runs as follows: Philotas (3. 29. 7), Alcetas (4. 22. 1), Philotas (4. 24. 10), and finally Alcetas (4. 27. 1 and subsequently), i.e. the mention of Alcetas at 4. 22. 1 interrupts Philotas' command. The most natural explanation is that Alcetas is here a deputy-commander, that he was second-in-command of the battalion and quite naturally succeeded Philotas. This seems preferable to supposing that Arrian has here made his sole error regarding the phalanx. Of Philotas we know nothing after 4. 24. 10 and the frequency of the name makes conjecture worthless.⁵

¹ F. Schachermeyr, *Alexander der Grosse*, p. 285 and n. 187 (p. 515), suggests that Craterus was at this time engaged in Margiane. His arguments are attractive and the fact that Craterus made for the northwest of Bactria and not for Bactra itself may support this.

² Perhaps both battalions required rest: certainly they had had a stiff fight against Spitamenes (4. 17. 6).

³ The difficulty does not, of course, arise if we accept the view of Berve and others

that Alexander had as many as ten battalions at the same time. Tarn has, however, disposed of this misconception.

⁴ See Tarn's brilliant analysis, op. cit., p. 144.

⁵ That Arrian does not mention Philotas' subsequent history (?death) is hardly surprising in view of the scrappiness of his narrative. As Thirlwall remarks (vol. vi, p. 358, n. 1): 'It seems as if Arrian, like Alexander, was impatient to reach India.'

If this view is correct Alcetas was detached with Craterus during the pages' conspiracy as the letter in Plutarch implies. This letter should not, then, be rejected merely because of the addressees nor is it, I think, unnatural that Alexander should have wished to dispel any rumours which might reach Craterus and thus allow him to complete the operations on which he was engaged. If the letter is to be rejected it must be on the ground that its contents run counter to Ptolemy and Aristobulus, i.e. to the official account. This brings us, of course, to the (perhaps insoluble) question 'How far does the official account preserve the truth?' I will merely say that other writers were present during the conspiracy, e.g. Chares, and must have known the truth. They, however, did not admit the complicity of Callisthenes.

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PLATO'S USE OF EXTENDED *ORATIO OBLIQUA*

THERE are in Plato's dialogues several examples of long-continued oblique narration, which may repay study in relation both to his syntactical usages and to the development of his literary style. Two dialogues are based upon this construction. In the *Symposium* the whole framework, after a brief dramatic introduction (172 a–174 a), is in reported form; the *Parmenides*, after a shorter narrative introduction (126 a–127 a), sustains *O.O.* up to 137 c, continuing as a dramatic interchange of speeches without covering construction. At *Phaedo* 108 e–111 e there is a descriptive section in *O.O.*, which passes (the subject-matter continuing) into *O.R.*. *Republic* 614 b–621 b, the myth of Er, is a narrative in *O.O.* marked by intricate detail of description and action, interspersed with passages of conversation in *O.R.*; it is Plato's most elaborate essay in this form. At *Timaeus* 21 a–23 d, in the introductory part of the dialogue, there is a shorter passage of reported conversation. *Republic* 359 d–360 b (the story of Gyges), *Republic* 393 d–394 a (re-telling of *Iliad* 1. 15 ff.) and *Charmides* 156 e–157 a (a report of theory of Zalmoxis, first part in *O.O.*) are much briefer examples of continued reported speech.

As regards syntax, the chief points of interest are lapses into *O.R.*, the use of pronouns, and in some passages the frequent attraction of relative clauses into the infinitive construction. In point of style, the sections under review give interesting matter for comparison between Plato's middle and later manners of writing.

The *Symposium* (174 a onwards) is, in view of its length, a *tour-de-force* of oblique narration. Apollodorus gives the report as he received it from Aristodemus, and the introductory ἔφη γάρ . . . is to carry the whole story. Most of this consists of conversation; and while the infinitive construction is in the main preserved, there are from the outset lapses into *O.R.* for the quoted verbs of speaking. Thus 174 a, b, d, § 8' ὅς, . . . ἔφη, . . . ἔφη, . . . There are also repetitions of the original opening ἔφη (sc. Ἀριστόδημος), e.g. 174 c, εἰπεῖν ἔφη, 174 d, σφᾶς ἔφη . . . λέγαι. At 175 a, ἔφη . . . φάναι τὸν Ἀγάθωνα . . . is followed at once by § 8' ὅς, of Agathon. This kind of thing is to be found throughout the narrative, and the sense must distinguish (for example) where ἔφη is the main verb repeated or is used of a quoted speaker. The *O.O.* of the covering story serves to set in clear relief the long speeches, which are all in *O.R.* without any verbs in parenthesis, but with occasional vocatives interposed. The interest in the animated interchange of talk, and in the persons involved, is fully maintained to the end of the work. There are at the outset of the *O.O.* two instances of relative attraction, 174 d ἐπειδὴ δὲ γενέσθαι (sc. σφᾶς) . . . and 174 e, ως ἰδεῖν τὸν Ἀγάθωνα, Ω, φάναι . . .

In the *Parmenides*, the use of *O.O.* is apt for a conversation recalled from the far past. Cephalus describes a visit to Antiphon, whom he records as quoting Pythodorus' narrative of the talk between Parmenides, Zeno, and Socrates when young. The *O.O.* which starts at 127 a is the framework for conversation in *O.R.*, with little description or action introduced. Most of the speeches carry φάναι parenthetic, with or without its subject expressed in the accusative; a number of them carry no verb at all. There are a good many irregular lapses

into the indicative, e.g. 131 a, *εἰπεν*, 131 d, *ἔφη*, 134 d, *ἔφη ὁ Παρμενίδης*. At 135 d-136 a there is a broken succession of these—*εἰπεν*, *ἔφη*, *ἔφη*, *φάναι*, *ἔφη*, *ἔφη*. At 136 d, e we have returns to the original formula—*τὸν Ζήνωνα ἔφη . . . φάναι . . . , ἔφη ὁ Αὐτίφων φάναι τὸν Πυθόδωρον*. At 137 c, after a sequence of correctly-used infinitives, the framework of *O.O.* is abandoned for the bare interchange of speeches—or rather, mainly for speeches with brief rejoinders—without any use of parenthetic verb or indication of the speaker's name; this much longer part of the dialogue (137 c-166 d) proceeds to the end in this form. Interest in background and in persons has been entirely lost, and abstract argument takes its place.

There is here no instance of relative attraction.

In the *Phaedo* (108 e ff.) *O.O.* is used to give the effect of hearsay. Socrates offers his description of the real earth as an account he has received and accepted—*ώς ἐγώ υπό τινος πέπειομαι*. The same verb *πέπειομαι* begins the *O.O.* itself, with an irregular construction—108 e, *πέπειομαι τούνν . . . ώς . . . μηδὲν αὐτῇ δεῖν . . . ἀλλὰ ἵκανήν εἶναι . . .* The reported description is twice broken by a brief interlude in *O.R.*—109 a-b, *πρῶτον μέν, ή δ' ος, τούτῳ πέπειομαι*. *Καὶ ὅρθως γε, ἔφη ὁ Σιμύνας. 110 α, ηδὲ μὲν γάρ ή γῆ καὶ . . . διεφθαρμένα ἔστιν . . . ἀξιούσια, ὁ Σιμύνα, . . . Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, ὁ Σιμύνας . . . ηδέως ἂν ἀκούσαιμεν.* The resumed *O.O.* is continued from 110 b to 111 e, where in the middle of a sentence it is abandoned for *O.R.*—*ταῦτα δὲ πάντα . . . κινεῖν . . . ὥσπερ αἰώνα . . . ἐν τῇ γῇ· ἔστι δὲ ἄρα ή αἰώρα διὰ φύσιν τοιανδε τινά*. The exposition of the subterranean currents and streams goes on in *O.R.* to 114 c; at 114 d Socrates sums up with *τούτων δὲ οὕτως πεφυκότων*, and proceeds to describe in *O.R.* the fate of souls.

It seems clear that the reversion to *O.R.* for the concluding part of this description is due mainly to the intricacy of the subject-matter; also, perhaps, in part to a sense of difference in tone between the reputed beauties of the real earth, poetically described, and this quasi-scientific account of the waters beneath.

There are here, in the *O.O.* passage of continuous description, ten instances of relative attraction—a convenient stretch of syntax to avoid breaking the tenor of long and involved sentences. All but one follow relative pronouns—e.g. 109 b, *κοῦλα . . . εἰς ἀ ἔννερρηρηκέναι . . .* The exception is at 109 e, *ἐπεὶ εἰ τις . . . κατιδεῖ ἄν . . .* The suggestion of hearsay is maintained by frequent use of *δή*—109 b, c, d, 111 c, e; also in the ensuing *O.R.*, 112 b, c, 113 c; and *ἄρα*, 111 e, 112 e.

In *Republic* 10. 614 b ff. Socrates relates in *O.O.* Er's report of his experiences after death. The oblique construction enhances the impression of tidings from afar. The short passages which quote conversation in *O.R.* (615 d-616 a, 617 d-e, 619 b) stand out clearly from the main narrative. There are several interposed comments by Socrates, e.g. at 615 c a parenthetical note about Ardiaeus, and at 618 b-619 b an extended ethical application—*ἔνθα δή, ὁ φίλε Γλαύκων, ὁ πᾶς κίνδυνος . . .* In the *O.O.* narration there is only one irregular shift from infinitive to indicative—616 a, *ἔνθα δή φόβων ἔφη . . . τοῦτον ὑπερβάλλειν . . . καὶ ἀμενέστατα . . . ἀναβήναι*. This sentence unmistakably belongs to the report, begun in *O.R.*, for *ὁ ἐρωτωμένος*, the returning traveller quoted by Er; *ἔφη* is thus incorrect for *φάναι*, as part of Er's narrative. Jowett makes the point clear by continuing: 'These, said Er, were the penalties . . .'

Here, as in the *Phaedo* passage, relative attraction is found convenient and frequently used. There are eleven instances, five being introduced by pronouns, one by *ὅθεν* and five by *ἐπειδὴ*. The first of these, 614 b, *ἐπειδὴ οὐ ἐκβῆναι τὴν φυχήν*, is quoted by grammarians as a stock instance of the construction (e.g. Goodwin, *M.T.* 755). 619 d, *ὡς δὲ καὶ εἰπεῖν*, is clearly not to be included as an attraction ('according to Er's account', D. and V.), but to be rendered (with Adam) 'broadly speaking'.

The use of pronouns in this passage is interesting. While cases of the indirect reflexive *ἔ* and *σφᾶς* are frequent, other pronouns can also refer to Er, the reported speaker, e.g. 614 d, *ἴαντοῦ δὲ προσελθόντος εἰπεῖν*, *ὅτι δέοι αὐτὸν ἄγγελον γενέσθαι . . . καὶ διακελεύσωτο οἱ ἀκούειν*. At 617 e, *τὸν . . . πεσόντα ἔκαστον ἀναιρεῖσθαι, πλὴν οὐ· ἐ δὲ οὐκ ἔτιν* (sc. *τὸν προφήτην*), *ἔ* is the object of *ἔτιν*, the change of subject being clear from the sense. (The same phrase occurs at *Symp.* 175 c, where *ἔ* is irregularly used of the subject and speaker—*τὸν οὐν Ἀγάθωνα . . . κελεύειν . . . ἐ δὲ* (sc. Aristodemus) *οὐκ ἔτιν*.)

In the *Timaeus*, in the course of the introductory conversation, a narrative by Solon is reported in *O.O.* (21 e ff.) as part of a speech quoted in *O.R.* Critias tells of the reminiscences of the older Critias, his grandfather, who is represented as relating Solon's visit to Egypt. Here, as in the *Parmenides*, the use of *O.O.* helps to throw the scene far back in time. The passage in reported construction is in fact brief, and serves mainly as framework for the long speech of the aged priest, quoted in *O.R.* (22 b–25 d), with a brief interposition of *O.O.* (Solon relates his interruption and the priest's resumption) at 23 d. The curious feature, in style, of this passage is the failure either to round off Solon's narrative with a final passage of *O.O.* or to return to the elder Critias' original speech. At 25 d the priest's quoted story of the fate of Athens and of Atlantis comes to an end, and in place of any such resumption Critias the younger gathers up the position with a formal sentence in the main dialogue—*τὰ μὲν δὴ ὥρθεντα, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὅπο τοῦ παλαιοῦ Κριτίου κατ' ἀκοήν τοῦ Σόλωνος . . . ἀκήκοας*. This is indeed perfectly clear, but it lacks any suggestion of a dramatic interest in the origin of the story just told.

There are here no relative attractions or other irregularities; the style of the *O.O.* is unremarkable.

The formality of this passage in the *Timaeus*, and the somewhat colourless character of the *O.O.* in the *Parmenides*, along with its early disappearance as a frame for the dialogue proper, stand alike in contrast to the ample, detailed, and richly varied use made of the construction in the *Symposium*, *Phaedo*, and *Republic*. The *Timaeus* instance may be thought of special interest in view of present discussions upon the date of that dialogue. Occurring as the passage does in the conversational introduction, before the dialogue becomes in Mr. G. E. L. Owen's words 'an exercise in essay style',¹ its formal tone, lack of animation, and stiffness of arrangement are surely contributory evidence against assigning to the *Timaeus* a place 'at the end of the *Republic* group'.² In that group, as we have seen, the literary possibilities of extended *O.O.* are fully savoured and exploited; here, its grace and elasticity are gone, and Plato's style has settled into the weight and formalism of a later period.

DOROTHY TARRANT

¹ *C.Q.*, n.s. iii (1953), 80.

² loc. cit., p. 94.

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THRESHING-FLOOR OR VINEYARD

THE word ἀλωῆ is generally regarded as having two distinct and separate meanings: (1) threshing-floor, and (2) garden, orchard, or vineyard. Like the classical ἀλως the word must originally have denoted a threshing-floor.¹ How the second, and apparently incongruous, meaning became attached to it has never been explained. Both are found in Homer. In the *Iliad* the horses of Achilles trample down the dead like oxen treading the barley on the well-built threshing-floor;² the arrow rebounds from the breastplate of Menelaos like beans or chickpeas flying off the blade of the winnowing shovel on the great threshing-floor;³ the dust of the conflict that lay white on the Achaeans is likened to the whitening heaps when the wind drives off the chaff on the holy threshing-floors when men are winnowing and Demeter separates the chaff from the grain.⁴ In some passages ἀλωῆ refers unmistakably to a vineyard. On the shield of Achilles Hephaistos has wrought a fair ἀλωῆ in gold, laden with grapes; the clusters are black, the poles silver.⁵ In other places an orchard with fruit trees is indicated. Artemis in her anger at being slighted by Oeneus sent a wild boar which did much damage in his ἀλωῆ, uprooting tall trees.⁶ Occasionally the passage does not clearly indicate the nature of the ἀλωῆ—the course of a river in spate is not checked by bridges nor by the fences ἀλοάων ἐριθηλέων⁷—though the adjective makes it fairly certain that plants grew in it, as also in the τέμενος τεθαλυά τ' ἀλωῆ of Nausikaa's father⁸ that lay outside the town of the Phaeacians.

The most illuminating account of an ἀλωῆ is the passage describing in detail the gardens attached to the palace of Alkinous within the town. Outside the courtyard, but near to the gates, was a fenced orchard with rows of tall trees: pear, pomegranate, apple, fig, and olive. There (that is, presumably, within the same fence) Alkinous had a πολύκαρπος ἀλωῆ in which his vines grew.

ἔνθα δέ οἱ πολύκαρπος ἀλωῆ ἐρρίζωται,
τῆς ἔτερον μὲν θειλόπεδον λευρῷ ἐνὶ χώρῳ
τέρσεται ἡλιῷ, ἔτερας δ' ἄρα τε τρυγόωσιν,
ἀλλας δὲ τραπέοντος . . .⁹

Grapes are not specifically mentioned, but the feminine objects of *τρυγόωσιν* and *τραπέοντος* can hardly be anything else. In the δέ clause, then, men are gathering grapes (evidently in a vineyard) and treading others (in a winepress). In the μὲν clause there is a θειλόπεδον (v.l. θειλόπεδον) drying in the sun. Again the grapes are not mentioned, but the natural and accepted interpretation is that the θειλόπεδον, or εὐλόπεδον, is the floor on which grapes are dried.¹⁰ This was the purpose of the θειλόπεδον in a dedicatory epigram in the Anthology¹¹ which tells how Komaulos slew a hedgehog τῷδε¹² ἐπὶ θειλοπέδῳ¹² because it had caught up on its spines some grapes (which had obviously been laid out

¹ For the philological evidence see Boissacq, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque*, s.v. ² 20. 495 f. ³ 13. 587 f.

⁴ 5. 499 f. ⁵ 18. 561 f. ⁶ 9. 533 f.

⁷ 5. 87 f. ⁸ *Odyssey* 6. 293.

⁹ *Ibid.* 7. 122 f.

¹⁰ Liddell and Scott, s.v. θειλόπεδον; Ameis-Hentze, Stanford, ad loc.

¹¹ 6. 169.

¹² Translated in the Loeb edition 'in this vineyard', but this rendering misses the point.

there to dry). With poetic justice Komaulos dries the dead body and dedicates it to Dionysos. We find then in the ἀλωή of Alkinoos three processes going on simultaneously: grapes are drying, are being gathered, and are being trodden. So this ἀλωή was not merely a vineyard, but an enclosure containing on the one hand a vineyard and a winepress, on the other a drying-floor. Drying of grapes, both for making *vinum passum* and for winter food, is likely to have been an important part of the early cultivator's economy. It is, of course, an important part of the economy of Greece today. The place where currants are dried is in modern Greek ἄλων, a word that is obviously a descendant of the ancient ἀλωή or ἀλώς through the New Testament form ἀλων.¹ Άλων is also the word used today for the traditional circular threshing-floor. The *aloni* upon which currants are dried on a large scale for the market shows little resemblance to a threshing-floor, although it bears the same name. It is rectangular, and carries a structure specially designed for the drying of fruit. But where grapes (or figs or any other fruit) are dried in a small way for domestic use it is customary to take them to the threshing-floor. One draws the conclusion that the original and normal place for fruit drying was the threshing-floor, and that the modern specially constructed *alonia* used by the currant growers have retained the name of the primitive drying-floor in spite of the fact that modern needs have developed it beyond recognition. It seems then by no means improbable that far back in antiquity also the threshing-floor served as a drying-floor,² the requirements being practically the same for both purposes—a smooth floor, a site that catches the breeze,³ and a sunny aspect—and that the ἀλωή of Alkinoos contained near to his vines on a piece of level ground, λευρῷ ἐν χώρῳ, a threshing-floor, or something very closely akin to one.

Support for this may be found in the verb to which ἀλωή is subject in the passage quoted above: ἀλωή ἐρπίζωται. The word is interpreted as πεφύτευται by the scholiast, following whom Liddell and Scott translate 'is planted with trees'. But the meaning of ἐρπίζωται is 'is rooted', and the word is used not only of plants but of buildings and the like. Sophocles⁴ has a threshold χαλκοῖς βάθρουσι γῆθεν ἐρπίζωμένον, 'rooted to the earth with steps of bronze'. Poseidon rooted, or made immovable, the ship of the Phaeacians ὅς μων λάσιον θῆκε καὶ ἐρπίζωσεν ἔνερθεν.⁵ In an inscription from Adana in Kilikia⁶ commemorating the rebuilding of a bridge over the turbulent Kydnos—a marvellous bridge, strong enough to resist the swollen torrent in winter, with foundations clamped with iron, and upon it a wide roadway—we find the phrase ὑπὲρ ἀψίδων

¹ e.g. St. Matthew iii. 12.

² Compare the Latin *area*, threshing-floor, derived by Varro from *arescere*, to dry: *ubi frumenta secta, ut terantur, arescant*, *L.L.* 5. 38. See also his *R.R.* 1. 54 where, immediately after his account of the threshing, he describes the grape harvest. Some clusters are specially selected for eating and are dealt with in various ways, including a primitive kind of refrigeration, the grapes being put in a jar coated with pitch and plunged into water. The treatment of the final batch is the one that is significant in this connexion: *alia (sc. wa) quae in ara in carnarium escendant*. *In ara* is emended to *in aream* by Keil, who interprets it as *locus in carnario ad uvas acci-*

piendas factus. Following Keil the Loeb editor translates 'others go up to their place in the larder'. A variant is 'to a shelf in the larder' (Storr-Best). But *area* would be a curious word to use for a small space in an indoor store-room. It would surely be more satisfactory to give it its ordinary meaning and translate 'others go up to the threshing-floor for the larder', i.e. go to the threshing-floor to dry with a view to storing in the larder.

³ Cf. Hesiod, *W. and D.* 599, χώρῳ ἐνεσται καὶ ἐντροχάλῳ ἐν ἀλωῇ, and Varro on Italian threshing-floors, *R.R.* 1. 51.

⁴ O.C. 1591. Cf. Hesiod, *Theog.* 811 f.

⁵ *Odyssey* 13. 163.

⁶ Kaibel, *Epigr. Gr.* 1078. 7.

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αιώνιος ἔρπιζωται, 'is rooted upon its arches for ever'. These examples are enough to show that the word was familiarly used of massive stonework. Now the Greek threshing-floor was, and is, a flat circular floor, sometimes paved with stones, sometimes incorporating the smoothed surface of an outcrop of rock, sometimes floored with rammed earth.¹ A modern *aloni* is often surrounded by a low wall or kerb to contain the heaps of corn during the threshing, and this too may have been an ancient practice. In any case the structure had to have a certain solidity in order to stand up to the trampling of the oxen or horses, and, when paved, the stones would need a firm foundation. An adjective that is applied more than once to the ἀλωή is εὐκτιμένη, 'well built'.² It has been suggested by Merry and Riddell³ that the word ἔρπιζωται 'is rooted', in the sense of 'fixed firmly', possibly points to 'the excavations and solid foundations made for the winepress, if not also to an encircling κάπετος, which, as going deep below the surface, are regarded as the "roots" of the ἀλωή'. If to the winepress we add a well-built threshing-floor or drying-floor, the word ἔρπιζωται gains still more in significance.

We know very little about the θειλόπεδον. The word is apparently made up of *θειλ- and πεδον, the latter making it clear that a flat surface or floor of some kind is intended, while the meaning of the former is wholly unknown. The reading θ' ειλόπεδον from εἱλη, the heat of the sun, is generally preferred by modern scholars.⁴ The corruption θειλόπεδον had, however, become current by the first century A.D., for Dioscorides has θειλοπεδεύειν σταφυλήν, to dry grapes in the sun, and later we have the epigram referred to above, where the grapes became attached to the hedgehog on the θειλόπεδον, where they had presumably been spread out to dry. Assuming that the original form was ειλόπεδον, we may note that 'the heat of the sun' is not the only meaning given to εἱλη. Hesychius, s.v., adds others, which are not usually quoted in connexion with the compound ειλόπεδον. The second meaning is ἄχυρα, chaff, and the third τῶν ὄσπριων ἡ καλάμη, beanstalks, or bean refuse. Both these meanings are appropriate to a floor on which the chaff is separated from the grain, and where 'the dark-skinned beans or chickpeas fly off from the winnowing shovels, driven by the whistling wind and the winnower's toss'.⁵ It may be objected that chaff does not lie on the floor but is carried away by the wind, but ἄχυρα, though commonly meaning chaff, is sometimes used for grain and chaff together, after the threshing and before the winnowing,⁶ and 'grain-floor' is a conceivable interpretation. If the testimony of Hesychius on this point is regarded as dubious, nevertheless the fact remains that a threshing-floor was a likely place for drying grapes, and we have it on Homer's authority that Alkinoos dried his on a ειλόπεδον. We may therefore venture to assume that ειλόπεδον is more or less synonymous with the Attic ἀλως, and that the term ἀλωή, while sometimes used as the equivalent of ἀλως, meaning merely a circular threshing-floor, as in the first three passages quoted from the *Iliad* above (p. 225), can also have a wider connotation, embracing both the ἀλως or ειλόπεδον and the cultivated land (vineyard, orchard, and arable) that lay around within the same enclosure.⁷ It is doubtful whether it is ever used

¹ Cf. for Italian threshing-floors Varro, R.R. 1. 51; Columella, R.R. 1. 6. 23.

² *Iliad* 20. 496, 21. 77.

³ Homer's *Odyssey*, p. 293.

⁴ Bechtel, *Lexilogus zu Homer*, s.v.; Hof-

mann, *Etymologisches Wörterbuch*, s.v.; Leumann, *Homeriche Wörter*, p. 44.

⁵ *Iliad* 13. 588 f.

⁶ See A. S. F. Gow on Theocritus 10. 49.

⁷ A little farm like this would closely

simply and solely of a vineyard. In cases where it seems to be so we may take it that the part is standing for the whole; that, for example, in the description of the shield of Achilles, where only the vines and their supporting poles are mentioned, the artist has selected the most suitable part of the *ἀλωῆ* for representation on the shield. The *ἀλωῆ* whither Laertes repaired to sleep¹ need not have been exclusively given up to vines. In the circumstances a well-built threshing-floor would have been an amenity, but, as Homer does not particularize, this passage can only be regarded as inconclusive. On the other hand, the view here put forward of the composite nature of the *ἀλωῆ* finds support in the comprehensive definition of Hesychius: *ἀλωῆ· ἡ ἄλως. καὶ ἀμπελόφυτος χώρα. καὶ ἡ οιτοφόρος. καὶ ὁ κῆπος. καὶ τὰ σύμφυτα τῶν χωρίων, ἡ ἄρουρα.*

The floor upon which grapes were dried comes naturally within the sphere of the grape god Dionysos.² If this floor was generally, or even only occasionally, identical with the threshing-floor, we might reasonably expect to find that this came to some extent under his patronage. It is true that until lately there has been little in either literature or art to connect Dionysos with the normal activities of the threshing-floor, and in one passage of the *Iliad* it is Demeter herself who separates the grain from the chaff when men are winnowing.³ However, within recent years the University of Reading has acquired a fifth-century Corinthian pyxis⁴ which shows a horned figure who can hardly be other than Dionysos, holding in one hand an object which looks like a winnowing fan of the shovel variety⁵ and in the other a winnowing fork.⁶ The figure is flanked on one side by a pig with straws in its mouth, and on the other by a basket of fruit. This vase by itself would seem to indicate that Demeter had Dionysos as an assistant in the winnowing, and it is supported by a reference to a golden winnowing fork, *θρῖναξ*, which occurs in a papyrus containing fragments of what appears to be a *Thebaid*, recently published by Professor E. G. Turner.⁷ Dionysos is not named in these fragments, but the mention of a dithyramb and other features make it probable that it is he who is associated with the golden *thrinx*. Such an association may be seen also in the title Dionysos Liknites. This name is explained by Hesychius as referring to the infant Dionysos cradled in a *liknon*, a winnowing fan of the basket variety, which was occasionally used as a bassinet. For example, an Attic red-figured cup of the first quarter of the fifth century shows baby Hermes sitting up in a *liknon* surveying the cattle he has stolen from Apollo.⁸ Representations of *likna* in use in the rites of Dionysos are not uncommon, and occur as early as the

resemble the neat compact *κτήματα* that one sees in the neighbourhood of Athens today. A typical specimen of these smallholdings consists of a walled enclosure of about three acres, intensively cultivated. Near the house grow fruit trees, olives, and vines, and the rest is given over to corn crops. Unfortunately under the impact of the machine age the threshing-floor is beginning to disappear.

¹ *Odyssey* 11. 193.

² Cf. *Anth. Pal.* 6. 169, quoted above.

³ *Iliad* 5. 500.

⁴ *J.H.S.* lxix (1949), 18 f., figs. 2a, 3; lxxii (1952), 121; *C.V.*, Reading i, pl. 16. 4a, b, c.

⁵ For the two kinds of winnowing fan see

J. E. Harrison, *J.H.S.* xxiii (1903), 292 f., xxiv (1904), 241 f.

⁶ The shovel and fork on the vase can both be matched by those in use in Crete today, except that the modern Cretan fork has a long handle, while that on the Reading vase apparently has none. Similarly the broom used in Greece for domestic purposes is sometimes provided with a broomstick, but more often has none.

⁷ *P. Hibeh* II 177, line 14. My thanks are due to Professor Turner for very kindly sending me information about this papyrus.

⁸ By the Brygos painter, Beazley, *A.R.V.* 246, no. 6; J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena*, fig. 149.

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fifth century. A well-known *chous*¹ by the Eretria painter, of about the middle of the second half of the century, shows a mask of Dionysos lying in a *liknon* placed on a table. Two women approach with offerings, one bringing a *kantharos* full of wine which she has just drawn from a *krater* that stands on a side table, the other carrying a tray that contains two large bunches of grapes and other fruit. The majority of the scenes that show ritual acts involving *likna* belong, however, to the Hellenistic age or later,² and discussions of the epithet Liknites tend to concentrate on the ritual and beliefs of this period.³ But there is no need to assume that the title originated so late, nor that it was always applied exclusively to a baby Dionysos in a *liknon*, though this may have been the only aspect of Liknites known to Hesychius. The word *λικνίτης* would seem to be more appropriate to one with a *liknon*, and wielding it, than to one *inside* a *liknon*. Stephanus of Byzantium⁴ regards *λικνίτης* as bearing the same relation to *λίκνον* as *σπλίτης* to *σπλόν*, and *σπλίτης* can only mean 'a man with a weapon'. Similarly we have *αἰχμήτης*, 'a man with a spear', and *κορυνήτης*, 'a man with a club'. The title Liknites would be very appropriate to Dionysos the Winnower, if he existed. Now the Reading *pysis* is proof (unless the interpretation of the scene here given is entirely mistaken) that a Dionysos Winnower was known in Corinth in the fifth century, though it is true that his implement is the shovel, *ptyon*, and not the basket, *liknon*. Neither Liknites nor *liknon* is found in Homer, but the verb *λικμάω*, which is akin to *λίκνον*, occurs in the *Iliad*,⁵ and men who winnow are *λικμητῆρες*, although the implement they use is the *ptyon*.⁶ There is nothing but the *argumentum ex silentio* to show that the conception of a Dionysos Liknites, Winnower, using either *ptyon* or *liknon*, was not current earlier, possibly many centuries earlier, than that of the infant Dionysos in his mystic *liknon*-cradle.

In Greece today the threshing-floor has various uses. It is a place where the village folk gather⁷ for merry-making and in particular for dancing, for which purpose its smooth surface and circular shape make it eminently suitable. There is no reason to think that this would not also be the case in antiquity. If in remote times villagers wished to engage in a choral dance, it is highly unlikely that they would proceed laboriously to level and pave yet another circular piece of ground, rather than use one of the threshing-floors that were ready to hand. So we should not be surprised to find the ox-driving dithyramb⁸ (whatever that adjective may mean) performed on the floor where the oxen had recently been driven over the corn.⁹ Similarly, when the acting of folktales was added to the choral dance, it would naturally be on the threshing-and-drying-floor, which was the precinct of Dionysos, Winnower and grape god, that they would hold their performances. When in the course of time the

¹ Van Hoorn, *Choes and Anthesteria*, no. 271, fig. 38.

² J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena*, figs. 146, 147, 150, 152; *A.J.A.*, 1933, pl. XXXII, XXXIII.

³ For the most recent discussion of Liknites see M. P. Nilsson, *Bull. Soc. Royale des Lettres, Lund*, 1951-2, pp. 1 f.

⁴ s.v. *Xytrón*.

⁵ 5. 500.

⁶ 13. 590.

⁷ The Chinese also apparently use the threshing-floor as a place of assembly. 'There

on the threshing ground before the assembled squatting peasants was laid out the topography of K'ang Chuang's economy' (*New Statesman*, 11 Oct. 1952, p. 411).

⁸ Pindar, *Ol.* 13. 25 f.: *ταὶ Διωνύσου πόθεν ἔξφανεν σὺν βοηλέτῃ χάριτες διβνράμβῳ*;

⁹ The verb *ἔλανειν* normally used of the animals employed in threshing. *οἴκοιν*, *ἔφηται μὲν* (sc. *βοῦς*, *ἵμερόν*, *ἴππους*) *ήγει τοσοῦτο μόνον εἰδέναι, πατεῖν τὸν σῖτον ἔλανύμενα*; Xen. *Oec.* 18. 4. Cf. also *Anth. Pal.* 9. 301.

village play developed into the city festival¹ with its austere tragedies on epic themes, it was still in the precinct of Dionysos that the drama was enacted, and the orchestra still retained much of the character of the ancient threshing-floor.²

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¹ So Bury, *History of Greece*, p. 201, and this seems to be the logical sequence. Professor Nilsson, on the other hand, regards the rustic Dionysia and the plays performed at them as borrowed from the city Dionysia,

Oxford Class. Dict., s.v. Dionysia.

² I am much indebted to Professor E. R. Dodds and to Professor C. J. Fordyce for very helpful criticism and suggestions.

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THE GREATER ALCIBIADES

THE *Greater Alcibiades* has been dismissed as spurious by a great many scholars including most of the major Platonists,¹ and for a variety of reasons. Many of these reasons are to my mind extremely weak, and would apply with equal force to some of the undoubtedly genuine dialogues: Bluck has argued that nearly all can be met by supposing that Plato wrote it for some special purpose, for instance as a reply to Polycrates' attack on Socrates.² It is noteworthy that several scholars, while rejecting the work, do so with reluctance and a hint of misgiving. Shorey,³ for instance, sees touches worthy of Plato himself, and de Strycker⁴ thinks the work may actually have been revised by Plato.

The view I wish to put forward is, I believe, in harmony with these opinions, though it propounds a rather different solution of the problem. I suggest that the first two-thirds of the dialogue are the work of a pupil or follower of Plato, while the last part is by Plato himself, written in his middle period at some time after the *Republic*. Thus I accept some at least of the arguments directed against the authenticity of the first part, but believe that the marked change of style and the originality of thought in the last part show it to come from Plato's own hand.

I will deal first with the stylistic evidence because this is the most objective and the most easily judged.

Lutoslawski⁵ says that while the contents of the dialogue place it among the earlier ones, on stylistic grounds it would have to come later, at least after the *Symposium*. Ritter⁶ gives a list of typical later forms found in it, but neither he nor anyone else seems to have noticed that nearly all these are concentrated in the last part, from about 126 onwards.

The point comes out particularly with regard to the answer-formulae. In this last part we find clustered all the cases noted by Ritter: 5 τι μήν, 2 δῆλον, 3 ὁρθῶς, 2 ἀληθῆ, and 1 καὶ πῶς.⁷ I propose to discuss this point at some length. But it is not an isolated one. It happens to be outstanding in this case because the passage with which we are dealing is comparatively short and a great many stylistic tests are therefore inconclusive. I have, however, gone over the dialogue applying a number of tests and have found practically nothing out of harmony with, and much minor evidence to support, the view that the last part was written by Plato in his middle period.⁸

The answer-formulae noticed by Ritter are all ones that occur seldom or never before the *Republic*, but are frequently found thereafter. And in the Platonic corpus as a whole, with the exception of this passage, they occur in any numbers only in certainly genuine works of Plato's middle and later period.⁹

¹ A list of scholars ranged on either side is given in Bidez, *Eos, ou Platon et l'Orient* (1945), p. 102, following de Strycker.

² C.Q. n.s. iii (1953), 46.

³ *What Plato Said* (1933), p. 415.

⁴ In Bidez, op. cit., p. 121.

⁵ *Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic* (1897), p. 197.

⁶ *Untersuchungen über Platon* (1888), p. 89.

⁷ To these may be added one παντάσαι μὲν

οὖν, one Ἐμοι γοῦν δοκεῖ, and one Οὐ γὰρ οὖν which are all much more frequent in the later period.

⁸ The only points at all surprising are the absence of superlative answer-forms like ἀληθέστατα and ὁρθότατα and the low number of prepositions—11·5 to a page of Didot.

⁹ For this I rely on the tables in Ritter's *Untersuchungen*, pp. 56–57, corrected from his *Platon*, i (1910), pp. 236–7.

They are not found at all in *Alcibiades II*, *Hipparchus*, *Erastai*, *Theages*, *Io*, *Mino*s, or any of the Apocrypha.¹ In addition they do not appear, so far as I have been able to discover, in any of Xenophon's dialogue passages.² I am inclined to conclude from this that in his later years Plato developed certain idioms of his own which were not quite those of ordinary Attic conversation, and which would not come naturally to the pen of an imitator. An imitator might adopt them consciously, but in this case, if we are dealing with the work of an imitator, we have to account for the fact that he began to use them only when he was two-thirds of the way through, and at a point when, as I hope to show, other changes also occurred. It is important to notice too that we have here not just one or two, but five different forms, which are a fair selection from those that Plato began to use at this period. Only the superlative forms are noticeably missing, and in a passage as short as this one that is not surprising.

So far we have an indication that the passage is Plato's, but other stylistic evidence is needed to establish two points, (1) that it belongs to Plato's middle, not his late period, and (2) that there is a change at about 126,³ and that what comes after this is consistently middle-Platonic.

I. The following points, given that the writer is Plato, indicate the middle rather than the late period of his work.

1. Hiatus is not avoided—though in the peculiar circumstances I am postulating this is unimportant. For if the dialogue had been begun in this way, we would expect Plato to continue on the same lines. In any case, since Owen's discussion of the *Timaeus*,⁴ the value of hiatus as dating evidence is doubtful.
2. Billig's rhythms are not prominent.⁵
3. Expressions typical of the *Laws* and other late dialogues are infrequent.⁶
4. Some expressions not found in the latest group are present, e.g. *μάλιστα* and *μάλιστά γε*, used as answers, and *ἡ οὐ?*⁷
- 5 and 6. The proportions of various synonyms and of different types of answers also indicate the middle period.⁸

II. 1. The most important single piece of evidence in favour of Plato's authorship is that already discussed, the presence of five answer-forms almost entirely confined to Plato's later work.

2. I shall later give figures to show that this part, compared with the first

¹ The *Clitophos* has no answer-formulae.

² On my calculations he uses 60 different short affirmative answers on 213 occasions, and 22 negative answers on 54 occasions, but uses none of these 4 affirmative and 1 negative forms. In general, he tends to use Plato's earlier forms much as Plato does himself, except that he uses many more expressions of the form *Nαι μὰ Δια*, *Nη̄ Δια*, etc. The passages I have examined are: *Memorabilia*, i. 2, 34-48, 3, 8-4, 12, ii. 1, 1-12, and 2-10, and the whole of iii and iv, the *Economicus* and the *Symposium*.

³ I have chosen 126 as a convenient but arbitrary dividing line. It is not a point on which certainty is possible, but if a division is to be made it must come hereabouts. It is interesting that Taylor (*Plato, the Man and*

*His Work*⁶ (1949), p. 525) notes confusion of exposition and an abrupt transition at 127 d.

⁴ C.Q. n.s. iii (1953), 80.

⁵ J. Philol. xxxv (1920) 225-56. These are markedly prominent in the *Sophist* digression and later dialogues. But see below.

⁶ For these I have used the relevant parts of Lutoslawski, *Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic*, pp. 76-140.

⁷ Ritter, *Untersuchungen*, p. 57.

⁸ For some examples see below. I have used also Dittenberger (corrected by Ritter) whose figures are given by Lutoslawski, op. cit., p. 104, and Ritter, *Untersuchungen*, p. 58, corrected from Bursian's *Jahresbericht* 187 (1921), 48. The relevant points are the usages of *μήν* and the consistent use of *δῆλον* *δτι* and *ώστερ*.

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- two-thirds of the dialogues, is remarkably free from points that one scholar or another has regarded as suspicious.
3. In countless details the style resembles that of Plato's middle period, with a consistency which we would not expect of an imitator. I give later a list of statistical differences between the first and second parts of the dialogue, and nearly all the figures for the second part are close to those of Plato's middle period: to these I would add the late position of *πον* at 129 b 3, 129 c 2, and 133 b 5¹—to which there is no parallel in the first part—and the use of *ἐπριθη* at 130 d 3.²
 4. I shall give later a list of stylistic peculiarities of the writer of the first part: these are absent in the second part.

The first two-thirds of the dialogue lack the latish answer-formulae, and differ in several other ways from the last part. Much of the evidence is inconclusive, because in Plato's middle period there was a considerable overlap in his use of early and late forms, and the presence of some of both here proves nothing. I have, however, noticed one very late form—*μῶν οὖν*—at 120 d, an expression used by Plato only in *Sophist*, *Statesman*, *Philebus*, and *Laws*³ and seemingly replacing *ἢ οὖν* which is found in all earlier dialogues. It is worth noting that *ἢ οὖν* occurs, consistently, twice in the last part of the *Alcibiades*. There are, further, a number of statistical differences which, taken together, probably have some significance, though I do not vouch for their value individually.⁴

	103-125	126-135
Proportion of personal pronoun answers to all answers ⁵	10 %	6·7 %
Proportion of <i>τεπι</i> +Gen. to <i>τεπι</i> +Acc. ⁶	7:1 (57:8)	2:1 (7:3)
Proportion of <i>ναι</i> , <i>πάνυ γε</i> , and <i>πάνυ μὲν οὖν</i> to all affirmative answers. ⁷	1:2 (67:129)	1:3 (37:100)
Proportion of interrogatives used as affirmative answers to all interrogatives. ⁸	3·75 % (11:296)	8·5 % (12:145)
Proportion of interrogatives in <i>ἀρι</i> to all interrogatives. ⁹	9 % (19:222)	15 % (15:103)

In addition, my friend, Colin Strang, has found a difference between the two parts for Billig's clausulae rhythms.¹⁰ He gives 46 per cent. for the first part (to 126 d) and 58 per cent. for the second.

In general, with some marked exceptions, the style of the first part seems to be nearer to Plato's earlier style, and it might be supposed that the difference between the two parts is due only to the fact that Plato left the dialogue unfinished for a considerable time and then wrote the last part, but other

¹ Denniston, *The Greek Particles* (1934), p. 493, gives a number of similar cases.

² See Lutoslawski, op. cit., p. 123, no. 336.

³ Ibid., p. 119, no. 303, from Kugler.

⁴ It is not possible to give a tidy list. I have selected these tests from Lutoslawski, and the figures I give should be compared with those given by him and his authorities. As might be expected, some tests show no significant difference between the two parts, and many have no application to this dialogue.

⁵ Lutoslawski, p. 122, no. 318. Cf. Ritter, *Untersuchungen*, pp. 16-17, and table p. 56.

Plato's figures show an overall decline. Ritter gives *Rep.* 5·5 per cent.

⁶ Lutoslawski, p. 130, no. 391, from Lina. Plato in all has about 5 *τεπι*+Gen. to 2 *τεπι*+Acc. But the figures given above may be a freak result.

⁷ Ibid., p. 137, no. 448, from von Arnim. Plato's figures fall overall.

⁸ Ibid., p. 137, no. 451, from von Arnim. Plato's figures gradually increase. *Rep.* 1·35 per cent. *Theat.* 11·5 per cent.

⁹ Ibid., p. 12, no. 378, from Siebeck. Plato's figures increase. *Theat.* 17 per cent.

¹⁰ For these see *J. Philol.* xxxv (1920), 225 ff.

considerations seem to me to rule out this possibility.¹ I would prefer to explain what similarity of style there is by the fact that in his earlier years Plato wrote a less individual style than he developed in his later years.

A study of the objections to the work's authenticity made by various scholars on stylistic grounds is also instructive. The vast majority of points which they have regarded as suspicious are in the first part.²

		103-125	126-135
<i>Shorey</i> : ³ 'Expressions which jar on the ear'	.	14	1 (126 c)
<i>Bluck</i> : ⁴ (a) Repetitions and awkwardnesses	.	6	0
(b) Peculiarities—chiasmus and mixed conditions	.	12	0
(c) Colloquialisms	.	6	0
(d) Late Platonic features	.	24	3
(e) Poetic words	.	15	1
<i>De Strycker</i> : ⁵ (including some of Shorey's points and 12 cases of <i>συμφέρον</i> used absolutely)	.	17	0
(Bluck notes one more.)			

Shorey also gives a list of points expressed in other dialogues, and of these sixteen are in the first part and only one in the second (134 e). For the dating of the work it should be noted that of the whole sixteen only one (122 c 5) is from a dialogue later than the *Republic*, and this, a phrase used also in the *Laws*, may be an accidental similarity, or the *Laws* use may be in imitation of the *Alcibiades*.⁶

I may here review what little other evidence there is for dating:

1. A comparatively early date is indicated by the minute details of the life of Alcibiades which are given. They do not all seem to be drawn from earlier literary sources. For instance, Plutarch gives this dialogue as the source for his information that the name of Alcibiades' tutor was Zopyros, in a passage where he refers to the *Alcibiades* of Antisthenes for the name of his nurse.⁷
2. I shall have more to say later about the passage⁸ containing the word *ἐνοπτηρόν*, which may be a compliment to Eudoxus. This would only be effective if the passage was written during the lifetime of Eudoxus, i.e. some time before his death about 355, and probably before the appear-

¹ e.g. the weakness of characterization noted by Bruns *Das literarische Porträt der Griechen* (1896), p. 339, the grotesque situation with which the dialogue opens, and the linguistic objections to its authenticity and the philosophical objections to an early dating, both discussed below.

² The ratio of the two parts, based on the Didot edition, is 17:8.

³ *What Plato Said*, p. 652.

⁴ In unpublished papers, which he has been kind enough to let me see. I have learned much from them.

⁵ In Bidez, *Eos ou Platon et L'Orient*, pp. 104, 115.

⁶ I should add a general caution that defenders of the *Alcibiades*, in particular Vink (*Plato's Eerste Alcibiades* (1939)), have questioned the value of these so-called imitations,

and rightly point out that there are many similarities of thought and phrasing between undoubtedly genuine dialogues. However, in this case the indebtedness to other works seems so great that I am inclined to believe that the general effect of copying cannot be discounted. Similarly the imitations of Aeschines, Antisthenes, and possibly Xenophon found by Dittmar (*Aischines von Sparta* (1912), pp. 163-77) should probably be accepted, though it might be better to call them reminiscences rather than imitations. Wilamowitz too (*Platon*, ii (1919) 325-6) notes the influence of the early dialogues, but can find no trace of the effects of the later ones. He thinks also that the *Theages*, probably a fourth-century work, is dependent on the *Alcibiades* which would give that a fairly early date. ⁷ *Vit. Alc.* i. ⁸ 133 c.

ance of his *Phainomena*, which must largely have superseded his earlier work, the *Enoptron*.¹

3. A number of the arguments against the authenticity of the *Alcibiades* have been aimed at showing that it could not be one of Plato's early dialogues, as it was assumed that, if genuine, it must be one of these.

The following arguments may be noted.

De Strycker thinks that:

- (a) Socrates is shown as too subservient to God. But this is a feature that develops in Plato's later dialogues;²
- (b) the treatment of the four cardinal virtues at 121 c-122 a presupposes the *Republic*;³
- (c) the distinction of soul and body at 130 c presupposes the *Phaedo*;⁴
- (d) the treatment of soul found here is a step on the way from the *Phaedo* to Aristotle's *Eudemus* written about 353.⁵

Bluck argues that:

- (e) Plato does not regard the mind as intelligible, as it is here, before *Timaeus*, 37 a;⁶
- (f) there is nothing like the parallel between visual and mental perception at 132 d-133 c before the *Republic*.⁷

Vink notes that:

- (g) the interest in politics shown in this dialogue appears first in the *Meno* and the *Gorgias*.⁸

Bluck has recently⁹ developed an argument which, if valid, would show that the *Alcibiades* must be later than I have suggested, and would place it about the time of Plato's death. He takes the expression *αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτόν*, used twice¹⁰ of the soul, and argues that if Plato had written this he must have faced the question whether the soul is a form, which in fact he never did.

On this I have two comments:

1. I agree with Friedländer¹¹ that the phrase occurs naturally in its context and need have no technical implication. Plato freely used technical terms non-technically where it suited him, and to say what is said here must have used some such expression.
2. Better still, Plato did in fact use another technical term with even stronger implications in connexion with the soul at about the time I suppose the *Alcibiades* to have been written. In *Theaetetus* 184 d we read: *εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἴδεαν, εἴτε φυχὴν εἴτε ὅτι δεῖ καλεῖν, πάντα ταῦτα συντείνει*. The natural way to deal with this is to say that *ἴδεαν* is not here being used technically, but if we can do that we can do the same with the *Alcibiades* passages. There are also several similar cases in the *Phaedrus*.¹²

¹ Eudoxus' life is very obscure. I follow Hultsch in *R.E.* vi. 913-14 in supposing that the *Enoptron* was based on observations made at Cyzicus before he joined Plato in Athens, and the *Phainomena* on observations made from Athens.

² In Bidez *Eos*, pp. 113-14.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 116-17.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 120-1.

⁶ In unpublished papers.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Plato's Erste Alcibiades*, p. 138. Vink defends the work's authenticity.

⁹ *C.Q. n.s.* iii. 46-52.

¹⁰ 129 b, 130 d.

¹¹ *Der Grosse Alcibiades*, ii. 17.

¹² e.g. 251 b.

It is, however, perhaps worth our while to examine this point a little more closely, as the usage is a trifle puzzling in whatever way we deal with it. As I see it, *aὐτὸν ταῦτά* at 129 b does not refer to the soul as such. The argument runs as follows: Socrates asks if the Delphic command 'Know thyself' is an easy one to obey, and Alcibiades replies that he cannot make up his mind. Socrates says that in any case it is only *γνόντες αὐτόν* that we can understand *τὴν ἐπιμελείαν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν* which is what we are seeking. *Αὐτόν* seems to mean no more than 'it' here. Then Socrates asks 'In what way can *aὐτὸν ταῦτά* be found?'—and *aὐτὸν ταῦτά* seems to mean something like 'what exactly self is'.¹ The vagueness is continued with a following *τούτου ὅτες ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ*. It is only after all this that the distinction between body and soul and the identification of a man with his soul is developed. Almost immediately after that comes the second occurrence of *aὐτὸν τὸ αὐτόν*, in a rather puzzling context. Socrates asks 'Do you need a clearer demonstration that *ἡ ψυχή ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος*?', and Alcibiades says he thinks it is sufficiently clear. Socrates says that is good enough: 'for we shall have a rigorous proof when we find out what we have just passed by because it needed a lengthy examination'.

Alcibiades: What is that?

Socrates: What I put something like this just now, that first we must examine *aὐτὸν τὸ αὐτόν*. *νῦν δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αὐτὸν ἔκαστον ἔσκεμμεθα ὅπις στρι!*²

The text of *ἀντὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αὐτόν*, the reading of Stephanus, is doubtful, but no reading is either fully satisfactory or alters the sense very much. I find it difficult to give a clear meaning to the passage, but at least I do not think that it leads us necessarily to conclude either, as Bluck believes, and Aristotle seems to have said during Plato's lifetime in the *Eudemus*,³ that the soul is a form or, what may be very different, that there is a form of soul. Bluck, placing the *Alcibiades* as late as he does, thinks that *aὐτὸν τό . . .* is here used in the Aristotelian sense.⁴

In any case, the problem of the relationship between souls and forms is so obvious that Plato must have been aware of it; and the fact that he never defined it precisely—although he came near to doing so in the *Phaedo* and approached the subject again in the *Sophist*—must be due to some other reason than that the question had never occurred to him.

Before considering the philosophical importance of the later part of the *Alcibiades*, I must say something about the disputed passage at 133 c. Here ten lines are missing from the manuscript⁵ but are given by Eusebius and Stobaeus. Scholars⁶ who believe that Plato wrote the *Alcibiades* have tended to reject these lines as a neo-Platonist interpolation, but this is unlikely. R. Wiggers⁶ has pointed out that in Stobaeus the lines immediately after the doubtful passage—

¹ Croiset (*Œuvres complètes de Platon*, i, 1920) translates: 'ce que c'est au juste que *soi-même*'.

² Croiset translates: 'il fallait chercher d'abord ce que c'est que "soi-même". Or, au lieu du "soi-même" en sa totalité, nous avons cherché ce qu'est chaque "soi-même" en particulier.' He takes this to mean that till now we have simply distinguished body

and soul in man, but must now go on to distinguish the parts of the soul. This explanation is not a satisfactory one, but I can think of none better.

³ Frag. 46.

⁴ In unpublished papers.

⁵ e.g. Friedländer, *Platon*, ii (1930), 243–4 and Croiset, *Œuvres complètes de Platon*, i.

⁶ *Philologische Wochenschrift*, lii (1932), 700–2.

Tὸ δὲ γυγνώσκειν . . . Πάντα γέ—are found repeated before the passage as well as after, and he suggests that when this had occurred it would be easy for the lines to fall out by homoioteleuton.¹ As these lines complete the simile introduced at 132 d and are probably referred back to in *τὸ θεῖον καὶ λαμπρόν* at 134 d 5 it seems safer to keep them. I do not think it impossible to suppose that Plato wrote them.

Some scholars have also found a difficulty in the words *θεόν τε καὶ φρόντην* at 133 c 5. I am inclined to accept the solution of Haret,² who would read *θέαν* for *θεόν*. The change is a simple one, involving only a single letter,³ and can easily be explained by the occurrence of *θεωτέρον*, *θεῶ*, and *θεῖον* in its immediate context. *θέαν* is a good Platonic word, but is not so common that it might not undergo corruption.

I can now tackle the problem whether the teaching of the last part of the *Alcibiades* is consistent with the views which we know Plato to have held at the time at which I suppose it to have been written. A certain amount of it is of course only a logical development and rounding off of the argument of the first part, but there are two main new topics introduced with which I shall have to deal.

1. The difficulties about friendship and treating justice as minding one's own business.
2. The important passage dealing with knowledge of oneself through the love and knowledge of others and of God, illustrated by the simile of the mirror.

The criticism of justice as minding one's own business centres on the difficulty that there can be no unity or common interest or friendship between people who are each engaged on their own differing activities. And yet justice, which means minding one's own business, seems to be closely connected with friendship.

For a similar approach we may look at the end of the *Lysis*,⁴ which culminates in a problem about the nature of friendship. One difficulty is that we would normally say that friends are those who are alike, but on the other hand that which is dear to us is that of which we are in need, and is therefore different from us. No solution of this problem is proposed.

In the *Alcibiades*,⁵ I suggest, Plato returns to the problem, bringing in, in addition, the definition of justice he has suggested in the *Republic*. Those who have felt that his treatment of it in that work is not entirely satisfactory may be glad to suppose that here he is showing his uneasiness. Here, as in the *Lysis*, no direct answer is given to the problem raised, but we may perhaps agree with Bluck⁶ that a solution is given by implication in what follows, and that a reconciliation of the interests of others and of ourselves is to be found by a knowledge of our own souls and of those of our friends.⁷

Before discussing the mirror simile, I must make my position clear on a few general points.

¹ On the other hand the disturbance in Stobaeus might be an indication that the text had been tampered with.

² *Rev. de Philol.* xliv (1921), 87–89.

³ Similar errors occur in the manuscripts, e.g. at *Symp.* 190 e 8, 191 a 2, and 202 a 5.

⁴ 218 d onwards.

⁵ 126 b–127 d.

⁶ *C.Q. n.s.* iii (1953), 50.

⁷ It is worth noting that the *Clitopho* tackles the same difficulties in much the same way.

It is useless to look in the dialogues for a completely consistent and fully developed theory of which we can pick out a piece here and a piece there which will fit together as exactly as the pieces of a well-made jig-saw. It is also a mistake to examine everything Plato says in minute detail and bringing out all its uttermost implications, as one might the text of a law or the theorems of a mathematician. The dialogues are *dialogues* and in them Plato was arguing sometimes with others and sometimes with himself, and seeking for the truth through argument, not stating it dogmatically.

Secondly, we must bear in mind that the problems of the nature of God and of the soul are among the most difficult philosophers have to face, and that Plato was perfectly well aware how difficult they are. So we may expect to find that at different times he made very different approaches, more or less tentative, to these matters. And it follows from this that it is very difficult to say of any passage that it contains something that Plato could never have written.

I hope, however, to be able to produce something more positive than this, and to show that, while the last part of the *Alcibiades* has its elements of originality, it fits in well with the assumptions lying behind passages from the *Phaedrus*, *Timaeus*, and *Theaetetus*, dialogues which I assume are near in time to it.

The implications of the mirror passage¹ I take to be these:

1. It is possible to get to know one's own soul by studying that of someone one loves.
2. It is also possible to get to know oneself by studying God.
3. God, then, resembles human souls, and they resemble each other, at least so far as *nous* is concerned.

The myth of the *Phaedrus*² contains some extremely difficult passages, many of which were almost certainly not intended to be examined too closely. But I believe that the general view of Eros, the soul, and God expressed here is similar to that of the *Alcibiades*. We even find the mirror simile itself in miniature,³ a point overlooked by Bluck in his discussion.⁴

I note the following points:

1. The souls of men and of gods are similar except that one of the horses in the souls of men is of an inferior breed.⁵
2. The exception to the general rule that it takes a soul ten thousand years to return to the heights is the soul *τοῦ φιλοσόφου τοῦ ἀδόλως η παιδεραστήσαντος μετὰ φιλοσοφίας*. Love and the sight of beauty are powerful forces in awakening the soul to the memory of things eternal.
3. Lovers, keeping their gaze fixed on their own peculiar god *διὰ τὸ συντόνως ἡγαγκάσθαι πρὸς τὸν θεὸν βλέπειν* mould their beloved one into the likeness of that god.
4. The lover thinks he feels *φιλία* not *ἔρως*.

¹ 132 d-133 c.

² 245 b-257 a.

³ 255 d: *ώσπερ δὲ ἐν κατόπτρῳ ἐν τῷ ἔρωντι ἔαντὸν ὄραν*.

⁴ C.Q. N.S. iii. 47.

⁵ 246 a-c. The relationship between the twelve astronomical gods of the *Phaedrus* and the single god of the *Alcibiades* and other dialogues is an obscure one, which I shall discuss later.

To this I add from the *Timaeus*:¹

5. By studying the movements of the heavens we may get to know our own minds and by imitating the movements of God we may correct those of our own souls.

And from the *Theaetetus*, which harks back to the *Republic* on this point:

6. By being righteous we become like God.²

My view is that all these passages, as well as the last part of the *Alcibiades*, were written at a time when Plato was struggling to express his ideas about the nature of God and his relation to human life, and that the variations of view found among them are due to his uncertainty and his own awareness of it. The *Alcibiades* passage fits well into such a period, for the mythological treatment of the matter by means of the mirror simile indicates that Plato was not prepared to put his conclusions in more rational form.³

The big question here is the interpretation of the remarks about the 'fairest mirror'⁴ which is God. If it is legitimate to interpret this in the light of the passages I have mentioned above, I think it must refer to the heavens. The suggestion is that we should use astronomy as a way to the knowledge of god and of ourselves, a practice which is recommended also, and with fuller details, in the *Timaeus*. There it is made clear that man is to god—the world-soul—as microcosm to macrocosm, and that by studying the serene movements of the stars we shall at the same time bring order to the similar movements going on in our own minds.⁵

Again, in the *Phaedrus* we are told that by looking at their common god—one of the twelve—a lover moulds the one he loves into the likeness of the god. The relationship between the twelve gods and the signs of the zodiac is obscure, but I do not think it impossible that Plato here had thoughts of astronomy—if not even astrology—at least at the back of his mind.

The connexion between these astronomical divinities—or the one divinity of the *Timaeus*—and the god of the *Theaetetus* whom we can make ourselves resemble by acting righteously is not easy to understand, but it does not follow

¹ 47 b, c. I follow G. E. L. Owen (*C.Q.* N.S. iii (1953), 79–95) in placing the *Timaeus* much earlier than has been the accepted practice. It must come after the *Republic*, but may be before the *Theaetetus* and the *Phaedrus*.

² 176 b–c. Cf. *Rep.* 613 a. *Theaet.* 173 e–174 b is also noteworthy, showing that for Plato at this time one of the philosopher's chief interests was astronomy.

³ For further discussion of these matters, see E. R. Dodds, 'Plato and the Irrational' in *J.H.S.* xl (1945), 16–25. I note in particular his suggestion (p. 24) that Plato underwent a second religious conversion under the influence of Eudoxus.

⁴ 133 c.

⁵ Bluck (*C.Q.* N.S. iii. 49) would like to see in ἑνόπτερον (133 c) a reference to the *Enoptron* of Eudoxus, an astronomical work written probably before he joined Plato in Athens. The weakness of this attractive view

is that there seems to be no necessity for it: ἑνόπτερον is called for naturally by the context, where κάτοπτρον cannot be repeated. And a study of the occurrences of these two words leads me to believe that κάτοπτρον was reserved almost exclusively for mirrors, i.e. objects manufactured for that purpose, while ἑνόπτερον means any reflecting surface, and would therefore be the right word in the passage under discussion. (The distinction can be maintained, I believe, though it is not necessary, in the long passage of Aristotle, *Περὶ Ἐννυμάτων* 459 b–460 a.) However, Bluck's other interpretation of the *Alcibiades* passage is unsatisfactory, because it would not fully complete the simile. We have begun with reflections in mirrors and in the eyes of our friends; we should end, by chiasmus, with reflections in the souls of our friends and in something much larger, i.e. God. Hence, I would prefer the astronomical interpretation with or without Eudoxus.

that there is no connexion. We are only faced in a more pointed form with the difficulty we meet already in the *Republic*, how a study of mathematics and astronomy, even followed by dialectic, can lead to the kind of wisdom that issues in virtuous action. And I do not find it impossible to suppose that as the result of getting to know Eudoxus—and perhaps through him becoming acquainted with Persian thought—Plato may at this time have moved at least a step in this—to us—rather unprofitable direction.

I will end with a few remarks about the first part of the dialogue and its author. He must have been a member of the Academy, well read in the works of Plato and probably of the other Socratic writers, and I suggest that he died leaving his work unfinished and that Plato, with his usual affection for his pupils and associates, decided to finish it. It would follow from this that Plato approved of the arguments employed, but I do not think we need suppose that he accepted every biographical detail about Socrates and Alcibiades.

Style.

I have noticed a few peculiarities of style which may be characteristic, though with such a short passage it is hard to be certain. These are not shared by any other of the doubtful or spurious works of Plato.

1. *Tί oὖν*; standing by itself, is very frequent. I have counted 10 examples in 17 pages—well over 1 in 2 pages. Plato uses it far more sparingly, ranging between 1 in 3 and 1 in 20 pages in the dialogues I have examined.¹
2. *Γάρ* is sometimes placed late in the sentence.²
- 3 and 4. Bluck has noticed his use of chiasmus and of mixed conditions.³
5. The unusual preponderance of *περί* with the Genitive noted above may be characteristic.⁴

I have at present no great hopes of identifying this unknown writer. The only member of the Academy known to have died about the right time is Theaetetus, and what little we know of him does not suggest that he would have written a thing like this. But we really know so little of what was going on in the Academy that we cannot be certain what he may have done.

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¹ *Theaet.* 7 in 50, *Soph.* 4 in 40, *Pol.* 5 in 43,
Phaedr. 2 in 39, *Parm.* 10 in 31.

² 115 c 7, 124 c 9, 124 e 13.
³ Above, p. 234. ⁴ Above, p. 233.

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M. CALIDIUS AND THE ATTICISTS

THE object of this paper is to question the established view that the orator M. Calidius was an Atticist.¹ I propose to argue (i) that the term 'Atticist' should be reserved for the coterie centring on Calvus, which attacked Cicero, and was attacked by him in *Brutus* and *Orator*, and (ii) that our evidence for the oratory of Calidius does not warrant the inference that he was in any way associated with, or a forerunner of, that coterie.

A. ROMAN ATTICISM

'Atticism' first appears in our sources as the slogan of Calvus and his followers—'isti novi Attici' of *Or. 89*—whose characteristics are fully set out in *Brutus* (esp. 284–91) and *Orator* (esp. 28–32, 75–90). Many attempts have been made to find respectable antecedents for this movement, which was in fact the short-lived aberration of a group of highbrows, e.g. in Stoic rhetorical theory, the Scipionic Circle with its interest in *Latinitas*, and so forth. Half a century ago Wilamowitz in a famous article² showed that these attempts had little foundation, but this has not prevented the questionable views of his predecessors from remaining current and new views such as those of Heck and Hendrickson from being advanced. Yet those who have sought to trace the main line of Atticist development have erred in their basic assumption. Atticism of Calvus' type was not on a main line at all, but a sidetrack, which proved to be a cul-de-sac. The worthwhile elements in those earlier influences (Hellenistic grammatical studies and controversies, Stoic rhetoric, the *Latinitas* of the Scipionic Circle) were absorbed in the main stream of Roman rhetorical theory and practice which runs from the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* through Cicero to Quintilian. From this tradition there are deviations to this side and that, but these do not represent a separate single trend. An historical survey, dogmatic for brevity's sake, will elucidate this view.

After the great days of Attic oratory its traditions were diffused over the Hellenistic world, often growing corrupt in the process, though the Stoic and Peripatetic philosophers tried to maintain higher standards. But exponents of Hellenistic oratory regarded themselves as following in the footsteps of the Attic masters, however ludicrous these pretensions seemed to later critics. Thus Hegesias, who according to Strabo 14. 1. 51 ἦρξε μάλιστα τοῦ Αἰγανοῦ λεγομένου ζῆλου, παραφθείρας τὸ καθεστηκός ἔθος τὸ Ἀττικόν, claimed to follow Lysias, or Lysias' disciple Charisius (*Brut. 286*, *Or. 226*). The young Cicero took the situation as he found it and made the best of all worlds by being trained in

¹ Without qualification in, for example, Schanz-Hosius, i. 391; Heck, *Zur Entstehung des rhetorischen Attizismus* (Diss. Munich, 1917), 26, 32; Oxf. Class. Dict., art. 'Calidius'; Atkins, *Literary Criticism in Antiquity*, ii. 16. With varying degrees of hesitancy in R.-E. iii. 1353–4 (Münzer); T. Frank, *Life and Literature in the Roman Republic*, 166; G. L. Hendrickson, *A. J. Phil.* xlvi (1926), 237–8; Kroll (R.-E. Supp.-Bd. vii. 1106); D'Alton,

Roman Literary Theory and Criticism, 217—in fact in almost any writer who mentions Calidius: the last sceptic appears to have been E. Rohde (*Rh. Mus.* xli (1886), 176 n.).

² *Hermes*, xxxv (1900), 1–50; see also Ammon in *Bursian*, cv. 203 ff.; A. W. de Groot, *Der antike Prosarhythmus*, 101 ff.; and now Desmoulez (*R.-E.L.* xxx (1952), 168–85, esp. 168–73).

Athens, Rhodes, and Asia. His education at the first was philosophical.¹ His strictly rhetorical training he received, like Hortensius, in the school later known disparagingly as 'Asianist'. (It has often been doubted, not unreasonably, whether Cicero's claims on behalf of a Rhodian school are more than a compliment to his teacher, and a defence of his own training as a sort of compromise between the extremes of Atticism and Asianism—the whole thing an afterthought occasioned by the controversy with the Atticists.)

From such beginnings Cicero went on to develop an oratory without equal and a humane and all-embracing rhetorical theory. But between the publication of *De Oratore* in 54 and of *Brutus* in 46 there set in Calvus' reaction against certain aspects of Cicero's style. This reaction may have had its origins in Greece²—if so, we know nothing of them. Wilamowitz insisted that the place of origin was Rome.³ At all events Cicero returned from Cilicia and the Civil War to find that, according to Calvus, 'Atticism' meant a plain Lysian style, while 'Asianism' was changing from a geographical term into a catchword of rhetorical polemic. He made some defence of 'Asianism' by asserting the merits of some Asian-born rhetoricians (*Brut.* 315, *Or.* 230–1) and pointing out that the youthful Calvus and Brutus had never heard the 'Asianist' Hortensius at his best (*Brut.* 326–7)—here, of course, the term 'Asianism' means no more than floridity. It is no more evidence that Hortensius consciously adhered to an 'Asianic' school than is its application to Timaeus, the Sicilian historian of the fourth to third centuries, evidence for conscious 'Asianism' at that time and place (*Brut.* 325). But Cicero's main attack was directed against his opponents' absurdly limited and tendentious use of the term 'Attic'. His arguments are unanswerable.

Roman Atticism was short-lived. Calvus was dead even before Cicero wrote *Brutus*. Brutus, the only other important Atticist,⁴ soon turned his attention to other things, while public apathy or hostility dealt with the rest (*Brut.* 289, *Tusc. Disp.* 2. 1. 3). The would-be imitators of Thucydides and Xenophon (*Or.* 30–32), together with those who raised the banner of 'Atticism' without being able to distinguish one Attic orator from another (*Brut.* 285), have vanished and left no trace.

The sequel is strange. The Greek background to all the above is, to say the least, shadowy, and our first clear evidence for Greek Atticism is provided by the writings of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, which confront us with a fully developed critical Atticism quite different from that of Calvus both in character and importance: in character, because it took cognizance of a much wider range of oratory and could also take into account the grammar and vocabulary

¹ Philo revived the formal study of rhetoric in the Academy, but Cic.'s account in *Brut.* 306, 315 shows that his studies at the Academy were philosophical. Kroll's view of Philo's rhetorical influence (*Neue Jahrb.* xi (1903), 681 ff.) runs counter to this. He builds on Cic.'s remark (*Or.* 12): 'fateor me oratorem . . . non ex rhetorum officinis sed ex Academiae spatiis extitisse'—but the context shows that Cic.'s precise point is his indebtedness to a purely philosophical training as a source of ideas and material: as a training in rhetorical technique, he expressly says it was inadequate. Similarly Brutus was

trained philosophically in the Academy, rhetorically by Pammene.

² As Rohde, l.c., and Hendrickson (Intr. to Loeb *Brutus*) suppose.

³ Op. cit. Cf. Schlittenbauer, *Jahrb. f. Cl. Phil.*, Suppl. xxviii (1903), 190. This view is perhaps supported by Dion. Hal. *Ant. Orat.* 3.

⁴ Cf. M. L. Clarke, *Rhetoric at Rome*, 80: 'the only two whom we can with certainty reckon as Atticists were Brutus and Calvus'. (But Calidius turns up as usual in a note (*ad loc.*!) See also Part B of this paper.

of the Attic orators, which were irrelevant to the Roman 'Attici'; and in importance, because it was to have a long and influential history.

I hope now to show by a detailed consideration of our knowledge of Calidius' oratory that there is no evidence that it was 'Atticist' in character. This part of my argument is largely independent of the foregoing observations, which are, however, relevant for two reasons. First, it is the prevalence of contrary views about the origin and scope of 'Atticism' which explains the rise and persistence of the Calidius-fallacy—a fallacy which lingers even in the writings of those who understand the history of Atticism itself (e.g. Schlittenbauer, Clarke, Desmoulez). The second reason is the need to forestall the objections of those who would view the detailed arguments about Calidius with impatience on the grounds that they had not supposed Calidius to be a thoroughgoing Atticist like Calvus, but merely in the general movement—commonly called Atticist for convenience—which eventually bred Calvus' extremist attitude. There was, if I am right, no such 'general movement' standing apart from the main Roman rhetorical tradition in which Cicero is the central figure.

B. THE ORATORY OF CALIDIUS

The evidence for Calidius' oratory is (1) the characterization in *Brutus* 274–9; (2) *Velleius Paterculus* 2.36.2; (3) *Quint. Inst. Orat.* 12.10.11; (4) ib. 39; (5) the statement of Jerome (Eusebius) that Calidius was a pupil of Apollodorus (2.155, Schoene).

1. The salient features of Cicero's description are:

- (a) Calidius was quite remarkable for the perfect finish of his periodic structure, which was lucid, fluent, and flexible.
- (b) His prose was subtly and unobtrusively rhythmical.
- (c) He freely employed figures of speech and thought, 'quibus . . . distinguebatur omnis oratio'.
- (d) He used 'non propria verba rerum sed pleraque translata'.
- (e) If the be-all and end-all of oratory were 'suaviter dicere', Calidius would have had no superior: but
- (f) he lacked 'vis atque contentio': he had no capacity to rouse the emotions. One might call his restraint *sanitas*—Cicero has himself just referred to Calidius' 'sanum genus dicendi'—but Brutus is made to ask how so pronounced a fault can be designated thus.

With this we may contrast point by point Cicero's description of the Atticists, or, what is the same thing from another angle, of the Master of the Plain Style 'quem solum quidam vocant Atticum' (*Or.* 75, cf. 28). Of course Cicero speaks more favourably of this ideal exponent of a type of oratory which had at any rate theoretical recognition than of actual members of the group of 'Attici'.

- (a) Atticism encouraged a superficial roughness. (*Or.* 28.)
- (b) That the Atticists disliked rhythmical prose we know (Tac. *Dial.* 18); it was a main element in their polemic against Cicero,¹ and Cicero tells us that the orator of the Plain Style must avoid it. (*Or.* 72.)
- (c) In the Plain Style we must look for 'sententiarum lumina' (figures of thought) 'quae non erunt vehementer illustria', not too brilliant or startling.

¹ Cf. Hendrickson, *A. J. Phil.* xlvi (1926), 243–5.

- (d) The orator of the Plain Style is 'in transferendis (verbis) verecundus et parcus'.
- (e) D'Alton noted that Calidius approaches most nearly to Cicero's account of the Middle Style.¹ While I admit and indeed wish to stress (*v.i.*) that Cicero's rhetorical vocabulary is not a rigid technical terminology, we may observe for what it is worth that *suavitas* is attributed to Calidius, and Cicero elsewhere writes (*Or. 91–92*): 'hoc in genere [i.e. the Middle Style] nervorum vel minimum, suavitatis autem est vel plurimum: huic omnia dicendi ornamenta (i.e. the figures) convenient plurimumque est in hac orationis forma suavitatis'. Let us also set side by side what Cicero says of his exemplar of the Middle Style, Demetrius of Phalerum: 'cuius oratio . . . sedate placideque liquitur, tum illustrant eam quasi stellae quaedam translatâ verba', and of Calidius, whose structure was 'ita pura ut nihil liquidius', whose 'genus orationis' was 'placidum et sanum'.
- (f) Here at last we have a possible point of contact with Atticism. For it might be urged that (i) *sanus* is a technical term appropriate to Atticism, (ii) Cicero's criticism of Calidius as lacking in *vis* points the same way, if we may draw inferences from the comment on Calvus in a letter to Trebonius (*ad Fam. 15. 21. 4*): 'multae erant et reconditae litterae: vis non erat.'

But (i) by both assigning and denying this quality to Calidius, Cicero shows how far he is prepared to go in eschewing a rigid technical terminology,² and how careful he is in this instance to avoid playing into the hands of his opponents by admitting their claim to a monopoly of *sanitas* and so to allow the debasement of the term to a catchword. Calidius is allowed some credit for his 'sanum genus dicendi', but the kind of *sanitas* which he shared with the 'Attici'—and which resulted in both cases in inability to hold the attention of an audience—is shown to be not *sanitas* at all but a *vitium*. (ii) It is dangerous too to treat *vis* as a technical term. For if we admit that there are grounds of a sort here for associating Calidius with the Atticists, we are at the same time faced with a curious and well-known paradox, namely that our evidence for Calvus' oratory apart from that provided by Cicero is that it was vigorous, ornate, and effective.³ The solution of this contradiction is not essential to my argument: *vis* is clearly as much an attribute of personality as of conscious style. Possibly

¹ Op. cit. 219, n. 8. (Elsewhere he confidently treats Calidius as Atticist.) Cf. also with Cicero's description of Calidius ancient views on the Middle and Plain Styles as set forth tabularly in S. F. Bonner, *Dionysius of Halicarnassus*, 20.

² A well-known instance is Cicero's wide range of equivalents for a single Greek term of well-defined meaning, *τερπόδος* (cf. Bornecke, *Mélanges Paul Thomas*, 66–68; Stegemann, *B. phil. Woch.* (1932), 1083–90). Tac. *Dial.* 23, 3 shows how *sanus* came to be treated as the perquisite of a single school of oratory. But it is too frequently overlooked that with Cicero we must always be on guard (as Heck, op. cit. *passim* was not). Two immediately relevant instances must suffice: (i) *Brut.* 148. Cic. describes an orator as 'ele-

gantium parcissimus', not as one might suppose from other occurrences of these terms an extreme Atticist, but L. Crassus, whom Cicero admired above all his forerunners (*Brut. 143*): Crassus, however, was no tiresome theoretical extremist, but '*sine molestia diligens*'. (ii) Cic. applies a favourite quotation (Lucilius' comparison of an elaborate style to a tessellated pavement) in compliment to Calidius. In *Or. 49* it is used as Lucilius used it, to censure too self-conscious rhythmical structure. Calidius escapes censure because his structure did not hinder his fluency: his *numeri* were 'varie dissimulantes conclusi', thus complying with *Or. 149*: 'nolo haec tam minuta constructio appearat'.

³ For the evidence and some suggestions cf. D'Alton, 262–3.

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Calvus deliberately watered down his style but could not check his naturally impassioned delivery, while Calidius is criticized for combining a feeble delivery with an elaborate style. At all events Cicero is rather shamefaced about having taken advantage of Calidius' restraint in order to score a debating point: on the cause of this restraint he offers a choice of reasons of which adherence to Calvus' coterie is not one.

If, then, Calidius was an Atticist, Cicero has kept us in the dark. For him Calidius was 'non unus e multis, potius inter multos prope singularis' (274) and 'summus orator' (278)—high praise for one who, if modern views are correct, must in Cicero's eyes have been a disaster in the history of Roman oratory.

2. Vell. Pat. 2, 36. 2. 'Quis enim ignorat diremptos gradibus aetatis floruisse hoc tempore Ciceronem, Hortensem, anteque Crassum, Cottam, Sulpicium, moxque Brutum, Calidium, Caelium, Calvum, et proximum Ciceroni Caesarum, eorumque velut alumnos Corvinum ac Pollionem Asinum?'

Velleius purports only to list distinguished orators whose lifetimes coincided at least partially with Cicero's. He mentions as Cicero's younger contemporaries Brutus, Calidius, Caelius, and Calvus, and his nearer contemporary Caesar. It is to modern scholarship that we are indebted for the notion that all these were Atticists. Thus we find Münzer¹ apparently correcting something that Velleius never wrote. What are the ascertainable facts?

Calvus was an Atticist (*Brut.* 283). There is no evidence that Caelius was;² he was trained by Cicero, and there is no hint of Atticism in the characterization in *Brut.* 273. It is rash to assert that Caesar was an Atticist.³ To mention a single point, *vis* was Caesar's chief stylistic feature, as Quintilian often reminds us. While much of Cicero's account in *Brutus* is concerned with Caesar's interest in a scientific *elegantia verborum*, enough is added (261) to show that Caesar's oratory was more elaborate and impressive than that of the Atticists. Nor do Caesar's views on grammar and *dilectus verborum* of themselves justify the Atticist label. Like Cicero, he believed in *Latinitas*, but thought that it needed technical study, while Cicero thought it something which could be taken for granted in any free-born and decently educated Roman. This, as the title of Caesar's grammatical treatise *De Analogia* indicates, links up with the great grammatical controversy over analogy and anomaly, but a connexion with Atticist oratory has not been demonstrated. Hendrickson⁴ attempted to establish connexions between '*Ελληνισμός*, *Αττικισμός*, *Latinitas*, and grammatical studies, and to show that Caesar's interest in the last is symptomatic of a fairly radical opposition to Cicero. To do this, Hendrickson in my view antedates Atticism, and exaggerates the difference of opinion between Caesar and Cicero on *Latinitas*. As I have already indicated, the difference was one of method and detail; it must not be forgotten that in theory and practice Cicero was as devoted to *Latinitas* as anyone.⁵ Hendrickson also overlooked the fact that *Latinitas* is a matter of pure and accurate diction, Atticism of simplicity of style. The Greek correlate of *Latinitas* is not *Αττικισμός* but '*Ελληνισμός* as opposed to *βαρβαρισμός*',⁶ and just as Greek Atticism is a refinement on '*Ελληνισμός*, so

¹ R.-E., l.c.: 'Er [Calidius] wird von Vell. Pat. zu den Attikern gestellt; er war mehr ein Vorläufer und Bahnbrecher der neuen attischen Richtung.'

² Cf. D'Alton, 254; Hendrickson, 237; Schlüterbauer, 195–6.

³ As Norden, *Die antike Kunstsprosa*, ii. 939:

contrast de Groot, op. cit. 101.

⁴ Cl. Phil. i (1906), 97 ff.; A. J. Phil. xlvi (1926), 234 ff.

⁵ Cf. Laurand, *Études sur le style des discours de Cicéron*, livre i, *passim*.

⁶ Cf. Radermacher, *Rh. Mus.* liv (1899), 353: see *Rhet. ad Her.* 4. 12. 17.

is Roman Atticism on *Latinitas*. Cicero's diction was pure but not simple: he spoke *Latine*, but not (in the polemical sense) *Attice*. Bonner's table (cf. p. 244, n. 1) shows that purity of diction (= *Latinitas*) is not a monopoly of the Plain Style. Weakness in this respect is only a 'possible' fault of the other styles.

Thus belief in *sermo Latinus* is not enough in itself to make a man an Atticist, nor, further, is adherence to the specific doctrine of grammatical analogy¹—rather the contrary. D'Alton sums up the case of Caesar thus: 'Caesar's Atticist leanings seem chiefly to have been on the side of the purist and grammarian.' If I am right in denying the relevance of these concerns of Caesar, there is nothing left of his 'Atticism'.

Brutus, we know, was closely associated with Calvus in the attacks on Cicero (*Tac. Dial.* 18) and it can hardly be doubted that he was an Atticist,² so far as he was interested in questions of rhetorical theory at all. But of course the fact that he is mentioned by Velleius in the same sentence as Calidius proves nothing. We have in fact evidence that his oratory was quite different from Calidius'. Cicero criticized it as 'otiosum atque disiunctum' (*Tac. l.c.*). Calidius' style was 'nec soluta nec diffluens' and generally remarkable for careful construction. While Calidius was subtly rhythmical, Brutus 'ipso durius componendi studio' fell into the use of iambic trimeters in his speeches (*Quint. Inst. Orat.* 9. 4. 76). The admission of verse-rhythms has always been censured, from the time of Isocrates and Aristotle, as incompatible with true prose-rhythm. Thus Brutus of set purpose avoided rhythmical prose. The contrast between Calidius and Brutus on (a) and (b) above was complete and aligned Brutus as clearly with the Atticists as it aligned Calidius on the other side.

3. In *Inst. Orat.* 12. 10 (esp. 16–39) Quintilian is engaged in showing (a) what kind of 'Atticism' is within the reach of the Roman orator—'Atticism' here being equated with perfect oratory—given the dangers inherent in the natural bareness of the Latin language, dangers which the soi-disant Attici had overlooked to their cost; and (b) that this kind was achieved not by the 'Attici' but by Cicero and some others including Calidius. The mention of Calidius here among 'illustrations of Roman Atticism at its best in his [Quint.'s] own sense of the term' (R. G. Austin ad loc.) would be utterly illogical if Calidius himself had been an Atticizer, in the usual sense of the term.

4. *Inst. Orat.* 12. 10, 11: '... subtilitatem Calidii...' *subtilitas* has a better claim than many words to be considered a quasi-technical term appropriate to Atticism, cf., for example, *de Orat.* 3. 28, *Brut.* 35, 64, *Or.* 110. But since in the light of the argument under (3) it is inconceivable that Quintilian regarded Calidius as an Atticist, we must again refuse to allow that the Atticists established an exclusive right to be so characterized, and suppose that in point of fact the term refers to Calidius' 'closely-woven' structure, Quintilian using a metaphor from the original meaning of *subtilis* to correspond to Cicero's image of the tessellated pavement.

5. Eusebius *anno Abr.* 1953: 'Apollodorus praceptor Calidi et Augusti'. The evidence that Apollodorus was an Atticist³ is set out by Brzoska.⁴ The following is a summary: (i) Apollodorus cannot, from what we know of him, have been

¹ Though Norden, op. cit. i. 184, maintained that it is, and is followed by Schlittenbauer (p. 199). Hendrickson (*Cl. Phil.* i (1906), 101, n. 2) recognizes that the contrary is the truth.

² But see K. Barwick, *Brutus* (Heidelberg,

1949), 15.

³ A view once held by Wilamowitz (*Hermes*, xii (1877), 333, 367) but later drastically modified by him (*ibid.*, xxxv (1900), 46–47).

⁴ R.-E. 'Apollodorus', No. 64, col. 2889.

sympathetic to Asianism, (ii) his pupils emulated the old Attic masters and employed simple styles, (iii) he was connected with Caesar and his associates and with Calidius, (iv) Caecilius may have been among his pupils. Atticism does not follow from (i) and (ii). The position of Caesar has been discussed above. To argue from Calidius, if I have been successful in demolishing the other arguments for his Atticism, would be to argue in a circle. (iv) is a matter of some uncertainty: in any case Caecilius was broader-minded than Calvus, and his Atticism a very different thing.

To summarize the matter: Calidius was an orator whose style showed great technical skill and elaboration, but one weapon, and that perhaps the chief in the Ciceronian armoury—the capacity to make a vigorous onslaught on the emotions of his hearers—he either lacked, or, as Cicero uneasily hints, scorned to employ.¹ In this he may have resembled the Atticists: of other resemblance there is no trace.

To put, finally, the whole question in perspective, let the last word be borrowed from a distinguished contemporary poet and critic. Mr. T. S. Eliot, on 'Romantic and Classic', has written:² 'These names which groups of writers and artists give themselves are the delight of professors and historians of literature, but should not be taken very seriously; their chief value is temporary and political—that, simply, of helping to make the authors known to a contemporary public.'³

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¹ He was thus more successful in defence than attack, as is shown by Caecilius (*Cic. Fam.* 8. 9. 5).

² *Selected Prose* (Penguin Books), 31.

³ I am greatly indebted to Prof. R. G. Austin, for help in the preparation of this paper.

THE KLIMATA IN GREEK GEOGRAPHY

Λοιπὸν εἶπεν περὶ τῶν κλιμάτων . . . τοῖς μὲν οὖν ἀστρονομικοῖς ἐπὶ πλέον τοῦτο ποιητέον, καθάπερ Ἰππαρχος ἐποίησεν. Strabo 131 (ad fin.).

The *climata* played an important role in Greek geography. As used in the mathematical geography of Hipparchus and Ptolemy the word *κλίμα* denotes a narrow belt or strip of land, 400 stades wide, on each side of a parallel of latitude; inhabitants of the same *clima* were assumed to be situated in the same geographical latitude, since, for practical purposes, the celestial phenomena, lengths of the longest and shortest days, and general climatic conditions did not change appreciably within this distance. We may compare the modern conception of arbitrary zones each possessing its own standard time; but whereas these are belts of longitude contiguous to each other, the *climata* were belts of latitude not necessarily contiguous.

The question is: when did this scientific conception of a belt of latitude first come into use and who was responsible for its formulation? Ever since the publication of Honigmann's book¹ and a critical, but on the whole favourable, review of it by Gisinger,² the answer has tended to be Eratosthenes³ or, before him, Eudoxus.⁴ The aim of the present paper is to show that the person responsible was Hipparchus, who lived from about 194 to 120 B.C. Hipparchus was primarily an astronomer; he was the first to place Greek astronomy on a satisfactory mathematical basis, the first to apply trigonometrical methods to astronomical problems, and the first to compile a star catalogue in which the positions of stars were fixed by ecliptic coordinates. It was this that led him, when he turned his attention to geography, to envisage a world map drawn on principles similar to those with which he was familiar in his astronomical work, with the positions of places definitively fixed by coordinates referred to the plane of the equator on the one hand, i.e. latitude, and to the main meridian through Meroë, Alexandria, and Rhodes on the other, i.e. longitude.⁵ As regards longitude Hipparchus could do little more than point out a method for determining this by observations of lunar eclipses,⁶ since trustworthy data by means of which longitudes could be calculated were practically non-existent even in Ptolemy's time.⁷ The case was different with regard to latitude since suitable observations for a number of places were already available.

We know from Strabo⁸ that Hipparchus wrote a treatise (now lost) in three books criticizing Eratosthenes' geographical work; it was in this treatise, I believe, that Hipparchus elaborated his system of *climata* (possibly taking the word from Eudoxus' astronomical writings—see below) which he envisaged in theory as drawn at fixed intervals determined ultimately by the angle at the earth's centre made by the line joining the *clima* to the centre and the equatorial plane, and based firmly on scientific (mainly astronomical) observations—a great advance on Eratosthenes' method of mapping by means of parallels drawn largely by guess-work.

¹ E. Honigmann, *Die sieben Klimata und die πόλεις ἑρίσημοι*, 1929.

² *Gnomon*, 1933, pp. 95–101.

³ Cf. A. Diller, 'Geographical Latitudes in Eratosthenes, Hipparchus and Posidonius', *Klio*, xxvii (1934), 258–69; and the same

author, 'The Parallels on the Ptolemaic Maps', *Iris*, xxxiii (1941), 4–7.

⁴ This is Gisinger's view (*loc. cit.*), and cf. J. O. Thomson, *History of Ancient Geography*, 1948, p. 116. ⁵ Cf. Str. 62. ⁶ Cf. Str. 7.

⁷ Ptol. *Geogr.* 1. 4. 2.

⁸ Str. 94.

The word *κλίμα* (literally = 'inclination', 'slope', from *κλίνω*) derives from the conception of the gradually increasing slope of the polar axis of the celestial sphere to the horizon, as the observer moves farther away from the equator. This is clearly explained by Cleomedes (end of first century B.C.).¹ To an observer on the equator, the north and south poles lie on the horizon, all the stars rise and set, and the days and nights are always equal; thus the axis of the celestial sphere lies in the same plane as the observer's horizon and is not inclined to it at all (*οὐτε ἐπὶ τὰ βόρεια, οὐτε ἐπὶ τὰ νότια ἔγκεκλιται ὁ κόσμος*, p. 36. 28). As the observer travels north, the celestial north pole gradually rises above the horizon by the amount of the latitude of the place of observation, and so the polar axis, and thus the whole sky, is as it were tilted to the plane of the horizon (*καὶ οὕτως ἀντὶ ἔγκλιμα λαμβάνει ὁ κόσμος*, p. 40. 9; and farther on, *οὕτω δὲ τοῦ κόσμου ἔγκεκλιμένου*). Ptolemy refers to the same phenomena in slightly different terms; he says at the beginning of book 2 of the *Almagest*² that having discussed the relevant phenomena for the 'right sphere' (*ἐπ' ὄρθῆς τῆς σφαῖρας*, the observer being supposed to be on the equator) in book 1, he will now pass to a consideration of the 'inclined sphere' (*περὶ τὴν ἔγκεκλιμένην σφαῖραν*, the observer being in latitudes north of the equator).

Obviously the amount of the inclination of the cosmos, measured by the height of the celestial pole above the horizon, gives the latitude of the place of observation; hence the three words *κλίμα*, *ἔγκλιμα* and *ἔγκλισις* used by themselves came to be synonyms for geographical latitude (cf. Vitruv. *de archit.* I. 1. 10, 'inclinationem coeli, quae Graeci clima dicunt, et aeris et locorum'). Hipparchus in his only extant work, the Commentary on Aratus,³ uses them in their strict sense of 'slope' or 'inclination' (but with reference to geographical latitude) and, in every case but one, appends the words *τοῦ κόσμου* (*κλίμα* I. 2. 22 : *ἔγκλιμα* I. 3. 5; I. 3. 10; I. 7. 22; *ἔγκλισις* I. 3. 8; 2. 6. 1).

Geminus (flor. 70 B.C.)⁴ uses *ἔγκλιμα* for the actual slope of the sky, often with *τοῦ κόσμου* added (5. 24, 26; 16. 14, 17, 18; while in 5. 47 the meaning shades off into that of *κλίμα* = 'latitude'), and *ἔγκλισις* for the slope of the zodiacal circle with no reference to terrestrial latitude (6. 36; 7. 9, 14, 21, 23, 26, 29, 30). For the latter he always uses *κλίμα* in its special sense (I. 12; 2. 25; 5. 20, 24, 27, 29; 10. 3; 16. 10; 17. 18). Similarly Cleomedes uses *ἔγκλιμα* (p. 40. 9; 64. 7) and *ἔγκλισις* (64. 19, 27; 198. 25), which refers merely to two circles intersecting each other obliquely) for the actual slope, while *κλίμα* is generally connected with geographical latitude (20. 23; 36. 23, 27; 38. 7; 40. 21, etc.). In at least three other instances the word takes on the more general meaning of 'region', 'district' (22. 22; 28. 6), and this less precise signification became common in later writers (see the references in Honigmann, p. 6).

By Ptolemy's time (A.D. 150) the original connotation of 'slope of the sky' is largely lost (*τοῦ κόσμου* no longer being added), and the three words *κλίμα*, *ἔγκλιμα*, and *ἔγκλισις* are nearly always connected with terrestrial latitude and

¹ *Cycl. Theor.* I. 4: ed. Ziegler (Teubner), 1891—other citations are all by page and line of this edition.

² Ed. Heiberg (Teubner), 1898–1907; the citations are all by page and line of the first volume of this edition.

³ Ed. Manitius (Teubner), 1894. This Commentary was probably written before Hipparchus turned his attention to criticizing Eratosthenes' geographical work.

⁴ Ed. Manitius (Teubner), 1898.

are apparently interchangeable (in the first two books of the *Almagest* ἔκλισις occurs p. 101, 11, 22; 115, 8; 117, 3, 13; 120, 24; 127, 19; 130, 11; 160, 5; 168, 1, 12: κλίμα occurs 20, 10; 133, 13; 142, 9, 24; 143, 10; 144, 3, 17; 145, 2; 154, 3; 158, 2; 155, 19, et al. in lib. 2, cap. 13 and 16: while ἔκλιμα occurs only once, 102, 3). Ptolemy also distinguishes between the *clima* and the actual parallel of latitude (142, 24, ἐτε τῷ ὑπὸ τὸν ἴσημερον παραλλήλῳ καὶ ἐτῷ τῷ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου κλίματος: cf. Str. 294, δῆλον ἐτῶν κλιμάτων καὶ τῶν παραλλήλων διαστημάτων: Str. 116), but in general this distinction was not insisted on, for Ptolemy himself refers to the parallel of Rhodes, which he takes as an example in chapters 2 and 3 of the second book, later on as the *κλίμα* of Rhodes (99, 12, . . . ἐπὶ τῷ ὑποκειμένου κλίματος: cf. several times in cap. 9 where *κλίμα* = 'latitude'), although he still in fact means the parallel since he gives the pole-height as 36°. Evidently the assumption that the phenomena did not change appreciably within the belt of the *clima* made it immaterial whether the word *παράλληλος* or *κλίμα* was used. Similarly Strabo says that he is going to discuss the *κλίματα* but he actually talks of the different parallels of latitude, though it is clear that he envisages them as belts rather than lines, since he describes them by the countries and regions through which they pass.

The word *κλίμα* may also mean 'direction', i.e. one of the four cardinal points, north, south, east, or west (ἔστι μὲν γάρ δέξασθαι τὰ τέτταρα κλίματα, Str. 455, and several times in this chapter), and when Strabo attributes to Homer a knowledge of the *climata* and the winds, καν τοῖς κλίμασι δε καν τοῖς ἀνέμοις διαφαίνεται τὸ πολυμαθές τὸ περὶ τὴν γεωγραφίαν "Ομηρος" (Str. 27), he must be using the word *κλίμα* in this special sense, and Jones¹ is wrong in taking it as a reference to Homer's 'knowledge of the general principle involved—the inclination of the earth's surface', since the poet did not know the concept of the spherical earth set in the middle of the celestial sphere which is presupposed in the doctrine of the *climata*.²

In his book Honigmann traces the history of the doctrine of the seven main *climata* of the Greek world (Meroë, Syene, Lower Egypt a little south of Alexandria, Rhodes, the Hellespont, mid-Pontus, and the mouths of the Borysthene, i.e. the Dnieper) from its probable origin in the second century B.C. (though Honigmann thinks it was earlier) through its widespread use in late antiquity to the Arabic geographers and the Middle Ages. He considers (pp. 9 ff.) that Eratosthenes was responsible for the scientific use of the word *κλίμα* as a narrow belt of latitude 400 stades wide in which the phenomena did not change appreciably,³ and he attributes to him the first definition of the above seven *climata*, although he thinks the general concept must have been familiar to geographers before Eratosthenes. Honigmann argues against attributing the origin of the doctrine to Hipparchus or Posidonius (the other likely names), on the grounds that the former disapproved of the use of the word *κλίμα* in this sense and preferred the more accurate term *παράλληλος* (p. 15), while the latter extended the concept of the *climata* to relatively wide zones of latitude, contiguous to each other, in which the general climatic conditions (including fauna, flora, and weather) were roughly similar (p. 28). The number of the *climata* as seven arose, according to Honigmann, from Eratosthenes' desire to divide up the inhabited world by seven parallels whose longest days

¹ Loeb Strabo, vol. i, pp. 100–1, n. 1.

² Cf. Bunbury, *History of Ancient Geography*, Sphaer., cap. 11.
vol. i, pp. 33 ff.

³ Cf. Gemin., pp. 62, 24; 170, 11; Proclus,

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differed by steps of half an hour (i.e. Meroë had a longest day of 13 equinoctia hours, Syene 13½, and so on up to the Borysthenes 16 hours); later, the number seven took on astrological significance and became connected with the seven planets and the universal belief in the magical powers of this number, and was thus perpetuated (p. 9).

Honigmann is quite dogmatic in his statements concerning the origin of the *climata* doctrine, and it is only when one examines the question more closely that one finds that there is very little real evidence to connect Eratosthenes with the *climata* at all.¹ In the first place, Honigmann is much too schematic in his treatment: the seven *climata* did not arise from deliberate design according to a well-conceived plan, but from the fact that they happened to be the seven parallels which passed through the best-known regions of the inhabited world (Honigmann tries to distinguish between *κλίματα* and *παράλληλοι* and criticizes previous commentators for confusing the two—cf. p. 11—but this distinction is not valid, since the ancient writers seem to have regarded the two terms as synonymous, as shown above), and so were most commonly mentioned in geographical and astronomical writings. Ptolemy's *Phaseis*, for example, is based on only five *climata* which are explicitly stated to have been the central ones of the inhabited world, and whose longest days did happen to differ by half-hour intervals from 13½ to 15½ hours.²

Textual evidence for the number seven is late; it is not mentioned by Strabo, Geminus, or Cleomedes, and these seven *climata* are not especially emphasized by Ptolemy in the tables in the second book of the *Almagest*.³ Pliny's account of seven *circuli*, though evidently taken from a Greek work,⁴ is conclusively proved by Honigmann (pp. 31 ff.) to be based on the astrological and not the ordinary geographical *climata*. Bunbury⁵ had already pointed out how different Pliny's *circuli* were from the *climata* of Strabo and Ptolemy, but did not realize that they derived from an astrological work. Honigmann (pp. 41 ff.) proves this by a comparison of the data in Pliny and in Firmicus Maternus, c. A.D. 336, and considers that Pliny obtained his information ultimately from an astrological work by Serapion, possibly one of Hipparchus' pupils, through the medium of P. Nigidius Figulus. The astrological *climata* started with Alexandria, and corresponded only to numbers III–VI of the geographical *climata*. Yet a knowledge of the former is no evidence for Pliny's acquaintance with the seven *climata* as previously enumerated, which he nowhere mentions.

Only in late writers do references to the latter multiply, when their use for astrological purposes had already gained them a wide recognition, and they remain as a last trace of the mathematical geography of Eratosthenes, Hipparchus, and Ptolemy. The first mention of τὰ ἑπτά κλίματα as such is apparently in Achilles Tatius⁶ who lived in the third century A.D. Honigmann

¹ Gisinger, loc. cit., pp. 96–97, also notes this.

² Ed. Heiberg, vol. iii, p. 4. 3: ἐν τοῖς ὑποτεθέμένοις ἡμῖν εἰς κλίμασι τοῖς περὶ τὸν μέσον μάλιστα τῆς καβ' ἡμᾶς οἰκουμένης ἡμωρίων διαφέρονται ἀλλήλων.

³ It is true that the table in cap. 13 is drawn up for these same seven parallels, but there is no actual mention of τὰ ἑπτά κλίματα and the only reason for their choice here is that they effectively spanned the known

world; as usual, Ptolemy describes them indifferently as *παράλληλοι*, 172. 7, or *κλίματα*, 172. 10 and 16.

⁴ *Nat. Hist.* 6. 211, 'hic addemus etiamnum unam Graecae inventionis sententiam vel exquisitissimae subtilitatis . . .'; 212, 'Plura sunt autem segmenta mundi quae nostri circulos appellavere, Graeci parallelos'.

⁵ Op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 438 and 441–2

⁶ *Isag.* 19.

himself remarks (p. 54) that the later Roman writers, as Servius (fourth century), Cassiodorus (sixth century) and Isidorus of Seville (seventh century), have preserved what he regards as the true Eratosthenic *climata*, which had already been corrupted in earlier writers (Strabo, Pliny, etc.). This, if it were true, would be a remarkable reversal of the normal course of a particular doctrine, which usually becomes less 'pure' as the original concepts are modified or extended; and there is, in fact, no evidence that the latter did not happen to the *climata*. The word lost its original scientific meaning and acquired the broader one of 'region' or 'district', but the names of the seven best known parallels were perpetuated.

Again, there is no real textual evidence to warrant the assumption that Eratosthenes was the first to use the term in a scientific sense. Whenever, in Strabo's second book which deals with mathematical geography, the *climata* (meaning belts of latitude) are mentioned in connexion with Eratosthenes, it will be found that the real reference is to Hipparchus and his criticism of the former. Thus in Str. 77 it is Hipparchus who states that no one has reported on the *clima* of India, 'not even Eratosthenes'; in Str. 87 it is Strabo himself who is explaining the different ways in which changes of latitude become perceptible, since Hipparchus had remarked that according to Eratosthenes himself such changes were noticeable 'even within 400 stades'.¹ Honigmann (p. 15; cf. p. 19) thinks that Hipparchus blamed Eratosthenes because the latter's comparison of the *climata* ($\tauῶν κλιμάτων σύγκρισις$, Str. 77) was too short, and that Hipparchus deliberately avoided the use of the word *κλίμα* because in his view it was too vague an expression. In fact, however, there is no evidence of this at all. Honigmann's interpretation of the above passage to the effect that Hipparchus blamed Eratosthenes for his brevity is entirely imaginary and based on a complete disregard of the actual text. All that Hipparchus does is to call attention to the necessity for a comparison of the *climata* of Meroë and of India, in order to determine whether they did in reality lie on the same parallel; but it was impossible to do this because no one, Eratosthenes included, had given any scientific information about the *clima* of India (Hipparchus merely states this as a fact—there is no hint of blame of Eratosthenes), and therefore it was better to suspend judgement and leave the old maps uncorrected.

Similarly, there are no grounds for believing that Hipparchus deliberately avoided using the word *κλίμα*, and in fact all the evidence points to the opposite conclusion. In Str. 7 Hipparchus specifically emphasizes the necessity for an 'investigation by means of the *climata*' ($\deltaιὰ τῶν κλιμάτων ἐποκεψις$). In the passage quoted at the head of this paper Strabo introduces the subject of the *climata*, immediately cites Hipparchus, and goes on to list the parallels of latitude as accepted by him.²

¹ On this see further p. 254, n. 2 below. The figure of 400 stades for the width of a *clima* was only an approximation permissible in geographical work because the standard of accuracy was far less than in astronomical work; this was owing to the lack of accurate latitude observations for a sufficiently large number of places, and the complete dearth of longitude measurements (cf. Ptol. *Geogr.* 1. 4. 2). Both Eratosthenes and Hipparchus knew that in actual fact gnomon measurements, for example, would show a percept-

ible difference within 400 stades.

² I hope to discuss this passage in greater detail in another paper. Strabo's account is unsatisfactory on several points, and there is good reason to suspect that he has here confused two separate tables of Hipparchus—one, a table of some fourteen *climata* which were all that Hipparchus regarded as being based on trustworthy data, and the other a purely theoretical table giving astronomical information for different latitudes from the equator to the North Pole.

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Eratosthenes' basis for mapping (as explained by Strabo at the beginning of his second book) was the division of the world by the main parallel through the Straits of Gibraltar and Rhodes, the main meridian through Rhodes and Alexandria, and by the geometrical shapes of the *σφραγῖδες*, 'seals' (roughly rhomboidal segments into which Eratosthenes divided his map: the word *σφραγίς* perhaps suggested itself to him as a means of emphasizing the curvature of the earth's surface, as seals often have curved upper surfaces), at least for the eastern regions of the *οἰκουμένη*.¹ In addition, wherever he found in his sources a number of stade distances reported as being the same (or nearly the same) at different points from a given reference line, he was enabled to sketch in other parallels of latitude, such as the two going through Caria, Media, the Caspian Gates, etc., and through Mysia, Paphlagonia, Bactria, etc., which are reported by Strabo as being definitely Eratosthenic and not Hipparchian (Str. 134). These additional parallels, however, could only be drawn where Eratosthenes found sufficient information to enable their course to be (at least roughly) estimated. There is no evidence that he desired to draw his parallels at half-hour intervals for the length of the longest day from Meroë to Borysthenes (as Honigmann believes), and it is certain that Strabo would have mentioned this important point in his detailed description of Eratosthenes' methods if it had been there to be mentioned. Berger² says definitely 'Die Aufstellung von Klimaten lässt sich über Eratosthenes zurück nicht nachweisen', and Thalamas (op. cit.) barely mentions the *climata* at all, and assumes that they played no role in Eratosthenes' geography. It is quite probable that the empirical fact of the longest days' being the same in various places helped Eratosthenes to decide the courses of his parallels, but it is unlikely that he could evaluate latitude in terms of degrees north of the equator by means of these data. In the first place, the general division of the circle (and hence of the meridian and the equator) into 360° was unknown to him, being first introduced into Greek mathematics by Hipparchus; and in the second place, the calculation of the latitude from the length of the longest day involves a knowledge of trigonometry, which Eratosthenes did not possess, but which Hipparchus did.

Thus the evidence is strongly in favour of the view that it was Hipparchus who was responsible for the scientific concept of the *climata* as narrow belts of latitude, and not Eratosthenes, who did not use the word *κλίμα* in this special sense, but used *παράλληλος* instead. Indirect confirmation of this view is afforded by the fact that it seems to have been the geographer and astronomer Serapion, mentioned by Cicero³ and Pliny,⁴ who elaborated the doctrine of the astrological *climata* (Honigmann, pp. 45 and 67 ff.), and Serapion, to judge from Cicero's connexion of him with Hipparchus and from the fact that he also criticized Eratosthenes' geographical work, was probably a pupil of Hipparchus. It is, therefore, very likely that Serapion found the concept of the *climata* already formulated in his master's work, and adapted this concept to the needs of astrological doctrines, especially astrological geography, according to which every district of the inhabited world was placed in its proper *clima*, which came under the influence of a particular planet or constellation (it must not be forgotten that Hipparchus himself was an exponent of these doctrines).⁵

¹ Cf. A. Thalamas, *La Géographie d'Eratosthène*, 1921, pp. 239 ff.

² E. H. Berger, *Die geographischen Fragmente des Eratosthenes*, 1880, pp. 191–2, n. 2.

³ *Ad Att. 2. 6.*

⁴ As one of the authors consulted for books 2, 4, and 5 of the *Natural History*.

⁵ Hephaest., *de duodec. nom. et effect.* (ed. Engelbrecht), pp. 47. 20; 60. 30.

According to Str. 390, Eudoxus of Cnidus (*c.* 370 B.C.) was already familiar with the concept of the *climata* (μαθηματικοῦ ἀνδρὸς καὶ σχημάτων ἐμπείρου καὶ κλίματων), and Gisinger (loc. cit.) thinks that Eudoxus used the word *κλίμα* in the sense of 'latitude' in his *Erdkugelgeographie*. Thomson also believes that in the time of Eudoxus 'the word now becomes part of the new globe geography and expresses the fact that a place is warmed by the sun according to the "inclination" of its horizon to the earth's axis',¹ but he is chary of actually attributing the complete concept to Eudoxus. Honigmann, however, shows that Strabo's words are probably a reminiscence of vv. 112–14 (referring to Eratosthenes) in the work of the pseudo-Scymnus of Chios,² *c.* 100 B.C., and cannot be regarded as evidence of Eudoxus' use of the technical term.³ This geographical poem in iambic verse is a confused compilation from various out-of-date sources, and is quite worthless as an authority;⁴ the author professes to have followed Eratosthenes chiefly, but in fact relies mostly on Ephorus, a fourth-century B.C. historian, and takes no account of more recent work.

If Eudoxus did in fact use the word *κλίμα* in its later technical sense, then it is difficult to see why Eratosthenes, who lived over 100 years after Eudoxus and must have been familiar with his work, should not also have used the concept. The fact that Eratosthenes did not use it is, I think, sufficiently proved by Strabo's silence on this point (see above). Eudoxus was primarily an astronomer; only one geographical work, a *Γῆς περίοδος*, of which inconsiderable fragments remain, is attributed to him. It is therefore very probable that he used *κλίμα* in its original sense of 'inclination' of the cosmos, or for a region of the sky, or to denote direction. Then Hipparchus, who was, of course, well acquainted with Eudoxus' work, may well have found the word so used in an astronomical context, and himself adapted it to designate geographical latitude in conformity with his own conception of a mathematical geography based on astronomical observations.

This was Hipparchus' most important contribution to the study of scientific geography, and he envisaged his *climata* as drawn (eventually—when sufficient

¹ Op. cit., pp. 116–17.

² *Geographi Graeci Minores*, ed. Müller, vol. i, pp. 196–237. The lines are:

τῷ τὴν γεωγραφίαν γὰρ ἐπιμελέστατα γεγραφότι, τοῖς τὰ κλίμασι καὶ τοῖς σχήμασι,
Ἐρατοσθένει μάλιστα συμπεπειρένος.

It is noteworthy that this is the only passage where the name of Eratosthenes is directly connected with the *climata*. Liddell and Scott (v. *κλίμα*) is misleading here; under the heading '4. seven latitudinal strips in the *oikouménē* on which the longest day ranged by half-hour intervals from 13 to 16 hours', it cites Eratosth. ap. Str. 2. 1. 35, 2. 5. 34, followed by references to Geminus, Posidonius, Marinus, and Ptolemy. As I have shown above there is no real evidence for these seven *climata* as a particular doctrine in itself until after the time of Ptolemy; they were merely the ones which happened to span the best known part of the *oikouménē*. Moreover, in the first passage cited for Eratosthenes in Strabo, it is not the former but the latter who

is talking about the *climata*: apropos of Hipparchus' pointing out that according to Eratosthenes himself differences of latitude were detectable even within 400 stades (ώς ἐπὶ τοῦ δι' Αθηνῶν παραλήδου καὶ τοῦ διὰ Ρόδου)—note the use of the word *παραλήδος*, not *κλίμα*), Strabo says, speaking *ex cathedra*, that this is true for exact gnomon measurements, but the geographer dealing with large distances can be allowed to ignore this. The second passage cited begins with the quotation I have put at the head of this paper, and it is Hipparchus whose name is directly connected with the *climata*, not Eratosthenes. In fact, in this whole section of Strabo's work (34), Eratosthenes is mentioned once only, where it is stated that his figure for the circumference of the earth (252,000 stades) was used by Hipparchus also.

³ Cf. W. A. Heidel, *The Frame of the Ancient Greek Maps*, 1937, pp. 98–99.

⁴ For a just valuation of it see Bunbury, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 69–74.

reliable data were available) at fixed intervals (cf. Str. 132) instead of at irregular intervals wherever the stade distances happened to fit, as was the case with Eratosthenes' parallels. Moreover, Hipparchus insisted on the necessity for determining the *climata* by means of astronomical data such as (a) the length of the solstitial day, (b) shadow ratios from the gnomon, (c) the maximum elevation of the sun, and (d) the relative positions of the fixed stars and constellations, including observations of the stars always visible at a particular place. Strabo gives examples of all these data in his account of Hipparchus' *climata* (Str. 132-6, i.e. the end of his second book). Then, since meridians parallel to the main meridian through Meroë, Alexandria, and the mouths of the Borysthenes (cf. Str. 62) could also be drawn by observing the comparative times of eclipses, in theory at any rate the surface of the globe could be reticulated by lines of latitude and longitude, by means of which the position of every place in the inhabited world could be accurately defined. This was the ideal which Hipparchus adumbrated, but which proved incapable of realization for the ancient geographers.

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